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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to analyse the differences between the German and British 
system of industrial relations, with particular emphasis on the influence of EC legislation. 
The first three chapters will provide an historical and methodical background, with the first 
chapter  tracing  the  respective  history  of  trade  unions  in  each  country.  Chapter  3  will 
present the history of works councils and the Works Constitution Act in Germany and 
European Influences on the British System of Workers'  Representation.  Chapter 3 will 
highlight core differences while Chapter IV will present problems trade unions are facing 
on a national, European and global scale. Suggested Solutions to these problems will be 
discussed. Chapter V – the conclusion – will assess the benefits of the German and the 
British system of industrial relations while at the same time trying to determine which 
system is better equipped to deal with the problems presented. Suggestions as to the future 
course of actions of trade unions will be presented. 
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Glossary
Angestellter White-collar worker
Arbeiter Blue-collar worker.
Arbeiterschutzgesetz Law for the protection of workers
Arbeitskampf Industrial action
Arbeitszeitverkürzung Reduction in working hours. An 
important and controversial topic in the 
mid 1980s in Germany was the fight for 
the 35-hour week. 
BAG Bundesarbeitsgeicht – Federal Labour 
Court
Betrieb The translation of Betrieb is company, 
enterprise, shop or plant; however, under 
German law the term is defined as 
“organisational entity of means for work 
by means of which the employer, 
together with his employees, pursues 
one or several work-related ends”. A 
Betrieb is characterised by a uniform 
organisation, it is therefore crucial where 
the decision of the employer regarding 
the employees are taken. 
Betriebliche Einheit Company entity.
Betriebliche Öffnungsklauseln Öffnungsklausel may be translated as 
36
‘opening’ or ‘opt-out clause’.
According to § 4 III TVG, they allow to 
agree on less favourable terms than 
provided for in the collective agreement.
Betriebsegoismus Literally ‘plant egoism’. Due to its 
position in the plant, a works council 
might try to achieve merely better 
conditions for their constituents while 
neglecting broader aims. 
Betriebsführer Literally works manager; a figure in 
industrial relations under Hitler.
Betriebsnahe Tarifpolitik The demand for a greater shop-floor role 
in collective bargaining that surfaced 
after the wildcat strike of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s in Germany. 
Betriebsrätegesetz Law on works councils.
Betriebsvereinbarung Agreements  between  employer  and 
works council on plant level; wages and 
conditions that either are or typically are 
determined by collective agreements are 
not  allowed  to  be  regulated  by 
Betriebsvereinbarung (§77 III BetrVG).
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz Works constitution Act.
Bundesrepublik Federal republic.
Bündnis für Arbeit Alliance for Jobs. A new revivial of the 
Konzertierte Aktion from the 1960s and 
1970s. Started after the change in 
Government in 1998 (and deactivated 
37
after 2002) in which Government and 
top-representatives of unions and 
employers' association agreed on 
measures that had the aim to reduce 
unemployment, create jobs and enhance 
the competitiveness of the German 
economy.
DAG Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft – 
German clerical workes' union.
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund – the 
German Trade Union Federation
Drohpotential Literally „threatening potential“, the 
ability of a union to deliver convincing 
threats of industrial or other action.
Einheitsgewerkschaft A union organisation in the form of a 
single, strong union for all workers, 
regardless of enterprise or occupation, 
encompassing a number of industry and 
occupational groups.
Flächentarifvertrag Agreements that have been concluded 
between a union and an employers' 
organisation on regional or national 
level.
Frankfurter Nationalversammlung The Frankfurter Nationalversammlung 
was the first freely elected parliament 
comprising all of Germany. After the 
revolution of 1848 it drafted a 
constitution, which, due to the refusal of 
Prussia’s King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. to 
accept the Kaiser’s crown, never was 
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enacted. 
Friedenspflicht Peace Obligation – the duty to not resort 
to industrial action during the validity of 
a collective agreement
Führerprinzip The Führerprinzip (literally ‘leader 
principle’) was a main principle of 
national socialistic Weltanschauung, 
applied not only in politics but also in 
economical and social life. It is based on 
a restructuring of power on strict order 
lines. Instead of democratic structures, 
Führer are given the power to govern on 
the principle of ‘order and obedience’, in 
fact blind obedience (Führer befiehl, wir 
folgen – Leader, command and we will 
follow) is a main characteristic of the 
principle. All political power was 
concentrated in Hitler as the most 
superior Führer. 
Gewerbeordnung Trade, Commerce and Industry 
Regulation Act
Gewerkschaftliche Vertrauensleute Literally ‘union trust people’. They 
provide a link between the union and its 
members at the shop floor, but, unlike 
the British shop steward, they enjoy 
neither bargaining nor participation 
rights.
Großer Senat A Senate of the Federal Employment 
Court comprised of members of its two 
ordinary senates and lay judges from the 
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employers’ as well as the employees’ 
side. If a Senate plans to deviate from a 
decision of another Senate or the 
Großen Senates, an appeal to the Große 
Senat is possible. An appeal is also 
possible in legal decision of fundamental 
importance if necessary for the 
development of the law and the 
safeguarding of consistent jurisdiction. 
Gruppenprinzip Group-principle. Under this principle, 
blue- and white-collar workers elected 
their representatives to the works council 
separately.
Günstigkeitsprinzip Günstigkeitsprinzip may be translated as 
‘favourability principle’. Laid down in § 
4 II TVG it stipulates that, where no 
Öffnungsklausel is present, departure 
form the terms of a collective 
agreements is only allowed when the 
new regulation is more favourable to the 
employee.
Humanisierung der Arbeit Humanisation of work. The concept 
contained various offensives to improve 
working conditions in order to facilitate 
self-development and self-realisation. 
The first phase between 1974 and 1989 
included attempts to better work 
contents and work relations, and a 
reduction of cumbering or unhealthy 
labour situations.
Interessensausgleich Interessenausgleich may be translated as 
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“reconciliation of interests”. If employer 
and works council don't succeed in 
concluding an Interessenausgleich, they 
can appeal to either the head of the 
Federal Employment Office for 
arbitration (§ 112 II 1 BetrVG) or to the 
normal arbitration board. 
Kampfparität Literally ‘battle parity’; a very important 
concept used by the BAG when it comes 
to judge actions in a strike. It entails that 
all measures in a strike are judged in 
regard to if they give one side an unfair 
advantage over the other.
Konjunkturpolitk Business cycle policy.
Leitender Angestellter Executive employee.
NSDAP Nationalsocialistic German Workers' 
Party – the Nazi Party
Rätebewegung Council movement
Restmandat A Restmandat emerges when a Betrieb, 
due to closedown, demerger or merger 
ceases to exist. The works council will 
then remain in office as long as it is 
necessary to exercise the participation 
and codetermination rights in regards to 
the breakup (§ 21b BetrVG).
Schutzwürdiges Interesse Literally ‘interest worthy of protection’. 
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A schutzwürdiges Interesse must be 
present for a terminating lockout to be 
justified.
Sozialadäquat Literally ‘social acceptable’. According 
to the BAG (BAG, Großer Senat, 
January 28th, 1955, GS 1/54), a strike is 
socially acceptable when it neither 
interrupts the peace duty, nor constitutes, 
according to its means, its aims or the 
disproportionality of means and aims, 
socially inappropriate action (for 
example a direction intervention into 
employers’ enterprises). An immoral 
strike (immorality as defined in § 826 
BGB) would also not be socially 
acceptable 
Sozialgesetzbuch Code of social law.
Sozialplan Sozialplan is a social compensation plan, 
designed to alleviate the economic 
disadvantages employees may suffer due 
to the changes. A Sozialplan can be 
enforced by appealing to the arbitration 
board (§ 112 IV BetrVG).
SPD Social Democratic Party
Stabilitätsgesetz Stabilitätsgesetz can be translated as 
Stability law – law to promote stability 
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and growth of the economy. The aim 
was for all parties participating in the 
economic process to coordinate their 
actions in order to overcome the 
economic crisis. The idea was for 
representatives of the federal ministries 
of economics, of finance and labour, of 
the federal bank and the 
Bundeskartellamt, of the council of 
experts (Sachverständigenrat) as well as 
representatives of the business 
associations and the unions to meet 
several times per year to discuss pending 
economic problems, wage contracts and 
industrial planning, thus creating 
economic stability. The reciprocal 
information on each others expectations 
and interest was desired, but the 
meetings were not intended to reach 
binding arrangements that would limit 
the responsibility/decision-making 
powers of the government and free 
collective bargaining (Tarifautonomie). 
The first talks in 1967 included 
employers' association, unions, 
representatives of agriculture and 
representatives of the federal state, the 
individual states and the municipalities 
(Bund, Länder und Gemeinden).
Although it continued to exist until the 
unions withdrew in 1977, it was 
ineffective before that.
 
43
Tarifvereinbarungen Literally tariff acknowledgement – 
agreements between workers’ 
organisations and employers on wages; 
however, less extensive than ordinary 
collective agreements.
Tarifvertragsgesetz (TVG) Law on Collective Agreements.
Tarifvertragsordnung Regulation on collective agreements.
Übergangsmandat An Übergangsmandat results when a 
Betrieb is split up. The former works 
council will then remain, under certain 
circumstances laid down in § 21a 
BetrVG, in office until a new council is 
elected.
Unerlaubte Handlungen Tortious acts or civil offences.
Unternehmen Unternehmen is defined as “a 
organisational entity, defined by its 
economical or ideational intention, to 
which intention are serving one or 
several organisationally linked Betriebe 
of the same Unternehmen”. 
ver.di Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft – 
unified services unions, the German 
equivalent to UNISON.
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Vertrauensräte Literally trust councillors. In the Third 
Reich, those were selected by the 
employer in accordance with the 
NSDAP. Even though they should act as 
representatives, they had only advisory 
functions.
45
Introduction
This research compares the German and the British system of (collective) industrial 
relations in order to determine which one is of more benefit to the individual worker. At 
the same time, it will be tried to determined which, if any, of the two systems might be 
better equipped to deal with problems presented by Europeanisation and Globalisation. 
The purpose of the research thus is an assessment of the two systems; where they are 
coming from and where they might be going. Trade unions face a number of problems, be 
it unemployment, decline in membership or globalisation and it is felt that unions must 
react. At the same time, European policies and developments have more and more 
influence on national industrial relations. A unified European trade union response is 
necessary and the research will present ideas for it and will try to determine what rights 
and facilities are necessary in order to facilitate it. In order to approach the question how a 
future European trade union movement might be structured, a comparison of the German 
and the British system seems helpful. These systems can be seen as presenting two 
opposite poles in the spectrum of industrial relations (legalistic and voluntaristic), a 
comparison therefore might give hints as to whether a future European trade union 
movement would benefit from a more legalistic or a more voluntaristic approach. 
Therefore, the thesis will try to assess which system is of more benefit to the individual 
worker on a national scale before trying to assess which system might be better adapted to 
deal with the ideas for European and international responses presented in the thesis. 
In order to facilitate such a comparison, first a short history of trade unions in the two 
countries needs to be presented, for, as Edwards has put it, “the legacy of the past shapes 
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current developments, a point which applies particularly strongly in Britain”1. Since the 
German system consists of two channels and there is a strong suspicion that the British, 
due to European influences, might be developing in a similar direction, the second chapter 
will deal with these (emerging) second channels of representation; presenting the German 
systems of works councils and trying to assess the changes to the British system. 
Subsequently, key differences between the systems will be pointed out. Afterwards, 
problems unions are facing on a national, European and global scale will be presented and 
suggested solutions discussed. The conclusion will try an assessment of the two systems by 
trying to determine the benefits offered to workers nationally by trying to determine which 
might be better able to deal with the challenges presented by Europeanisation and 
Globalisation. Finally, suggestions as to the future development of unions will be made.
1 Paul Edwards “'The Employment Relationship” in Paul  Edwards “Industrial Relations: Theory ad Practice 
in Britain” Oxford 1995, p. 3ff. (p. 5).
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Methodology
The research has been desk-based and comprised extensive literature review on various 
topics. To gain a historical understanding of the different issues and developments of 
German and British industrial relations, first a historical outline is given. It has been 
composed of an extensive literature review of textbooks, historical studies and journal 
articles. While the years up to the late 1960, mid 1970s have mainly been covered by an 
analysis of textbooks, historical studies and occasional case law; the analysis of later years 
has also included primary sources. Journal articles on new (legal) developments, written at 
the time, have provided a “contemporary witnesses'” view and given an idea of the 
expectations connected with the new legislation or with new developments.
The thesis compares the British and the German systems of industrial relations and has 
been written predominantly in the UK. Access to materials on German history and 
developments has therefore been difficult at times. Apart from the – widely used – facility 
to order books via the Document Delivery Service, several on-line resources have been 
helpful (for example, the on-line database of the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, a union 
foundation, has been helpful on German union history). While the databases available via 
the Stirling University's Athens Authorisation give no access to German articles or case-
law, some, mainly newer, cases were available via the website of the courts or could be 
located by utilizing search engines. Additionally, during visits to Germany, research has 
been undertaken at the law library of University Hamburg, giving access to a vast number 
of textbooks on German industrial relations law as well as to various journals; ranging 
from legal journals to union publications. An abundance of information was available this 
way. 
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The thesis researches problems and possible solutions trade unions are facing on a 
national, European and global level. Information on these supranational topics was 
predominantly available via journals present  the Stirling University Library and via on-
line access to journals and articles; while not much information was available in textbooks. 
The websites of international (union) actors like the ILO and International Transport 
Workers' Federation have been useful as well. 
The research has been undertaken by desk-based research rather than by doing fieldwork 
or conducting interviews. There are several pros and cons to this approach. First, once a 
basic historical overview had been established, interviews could have been used to validate 
the theoretical account with personal experiences. Personal views could have also provided 
the research with a different perspective or focus (e.g. on the actual impacts on everyday 
industrial relations) that might have been overlook when relying on more abstract 
accounts. On the other hand, I am a lawyer to be, not a social scientist, and the thesis is, to 
a large part, concerned with legal developments. Personal experiences, that might be 
influenced by a lot of other factors beside the legislation and that are necessarily limited to 
the personal sphere of the interviewee, have therefore been regarded as less important than 
accounts of the impact on industrial relations as a whole. Such accounts have, for example, 
been available in the WERS Industrial Relations surveys. At the same time, reasons behind 
legislation or economic developments have been important for the thesis and those are 
difficult to research with personal interviews. Due to the factors mentioned, the use of 
interviews would have been restricted to the parts on trade union history and it was felt that 
the information available via the sources utilized was sufficient. Finally, research based on 
a multitude of articles, books and cases at the same times gives access to a multitude of 
opinions, views and interpretations, thus facilitating a more differentiated view. 
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Thus, while some interviews might have provided the research with more direct personal 
experiences of the impact of different measures described in the text, the points in favour 
of desk-based research prevailed; not least because of short time available for completion 
of the thesis.
50
Chapter I – A History of Collective Agreements
Introduction
The purpose of this research is to try an assessment of the different systems of industrial 
relations present in the UK and Germany. For such a comparison, a clear idea of the 
development and the differences between the systems is necessary. Working from the 
assumption that in Germany as well as the UK (even though the second channel might 
not be fully developed in the UK) the industrial relations systems are made up of two 
channels, one being trade unions and the second other, often statutory, means of worker 
representation,  a  short  history  of  trade  unions  and  collective  agreements  will  be 
presented in Chapter I, while Chapter II will be devoted to the second channel.
An historical overview over the development of trade unions, collective agreements and 
the different historical issues, fights and problems is necessary in order to understand 
where industrial relations are coming from and where they might be going. It is also 
necessary  in  order  to  fully  understand  and  appreciate  the  differences  between  the 
systems and the different responses to EC law to be laid out in the following chapters. 
Such an overview will be provided in this chapter.
The time period covered is from 1945 to about 1984 with a short overview added to 
developments in the UK after 1984. The reasons for this are that,  first,  for German 
unions the Second World War marked a deep cut with a virtually fresh start in 1945. 
Secondly,  the  early  1980s  in  both  countries  not  only  mark  a  shift  towards  more 
conservative  politics  under  respectively  Thatcher  and  Kohl,  from this  time on  also 
European influences are more clearly to be observed. These are dealt with in a different 
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chapter, so the early 1980s make a convenient close. The year 1984 was chosen because 
major strikes were taking part in both countries in that year. However, since consecutive 
years and especially the election of a Labour Government in 1997 after nearly 20 years 
of Conservative rule have brought about a change in industrial relations policy in the 
UK, a short overview of these developments will be given. 
1945 - 1950
United Kingdom
The British system of industrial relations adheres to the principle of voluntarism, and, 
true to this, state intervention into the field of collective bargaining was not wished for 
by the unions1.
Therefore  trade  union  leaders  were  prepared  to  accept  voluntary  wage  restraint  in 
exchange for other benefits, but opposed all attempts by government to impose statutory 
restraints.
Consequently,  TGWU  General  Secretary  Bevin  relied  on  the  Conditions of 
Employment and National Arbitration Order (Order 1305) of 1940 during his time as 
Minister  for  Labour  under  the  1940  coalition  Government  rather  than  imposing 
statutory wage restraints (as demanded by the Treasury). The order rendered strikes and 
1 Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John McIlroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics – The 
Post-War Compromise, 1945-64, Aldershot 1999, p. 77f.
Therefore, they usually opposed any proposals for a national wage policy. Despite the tradition of 
voluntarism, however, NUVB and AEU demanded a statutory minimum wage at the 1946 Trade 
union congress. Given its antagonism to the voluntarism idea and the fact that the proposal was 
rated as ‘naïve’ by speakers of the General Council, the margin by which it was voted down was 
surprisingly narrow
(Campell et. al. cit. opp. p. 77f.)
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lock-outs illegal and introduced compulsory arbitration; its application, however, was 
only  possible  with  the  consent  of  the  TUC  which  lead  to  a  cautious  use  by  the 
Government2. 
In 1948, the Labour Government secured the TUC's support “for a voluntary policy on 
wage restraint in exchange for commitment on retaining food subsidies”3  in what turned 
out to be a short-lived agreement. Devaluation and inflation as a result of the Korea War 
soon drove prices up. Labour demand in industries like engineering rose and the rise in 
unions’ bargaining power turned opinion against wage restraints.  Therefore, the Trade 
Union Congress voted (albeit with a small majority) in September 1950 against incomes 
policies4 and wage restraints came to an end5. However, industrial relations continued to 
be characterised by “a policy of concession and compromise” under moderate leaders 
like Arthur Deakin (TGWU) and Willi Lawther (NUM) 6. 
2 Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John McIlroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics – The 
Post-War Compromise, 1945-64, Aldershot 1999, p. 76; Sid Kessler, Fred Bayliss, Contemporary 
British Industrial Relations, 3rd Edition, London 1998, p. 2; M. A. Hickling, Citrine's Trade Union 
Law, 3rd Edition, London 1967, p. 25.
Not only declaring, instigating or inciting others to strike, but also taking part in a strike was illegal 
and presented a criminal offence. Furthermore, the order also implemented some kind of legal 
enforceability of collective agreements as employers were obliges to observe “´recognized terms 
and conditions` of employment established by means of negotiation or arbitration by the 
representatives of substantial proportions of employers and workers employed in the trade or 
industry in the district”. (Hickling, cit. opp., p. 25)
3  Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John McIlroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics – The 
Post-War Compromise, 1945-64, Aldershot 1999, p. 78; Hugh Armstrong Clegg, The System of 
Industrial Relations in Great Britain, 3rd Edition, Oxford 1976, p. 414. 
4  Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John McIlroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics – The 
Post-War Compromise, 1945-64, Aldershot 1999, p. 78;  W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British 
Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 198; Sid Kessler, Fred Bayliss; Contemporary 
British Industrial Relations, 3rd Edition, London 1998, p. 3.
5  Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John McIlroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics – The 
Post-War Compromise, 1945-64, Aldershot 1999, p. 78.
6 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 198.
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Germany
The German trade union movement had been destroyed in 1933, and so German unions 
in 1945 had, unlike their British counterparts, the obligation, but also the chance, to a 
downright reorganisation. 
When starting to rebuild union-structures, unionist agreed that the new union movement 
should no longer be divided along political or union-political lines7. The allied forces 
had banned all political activities, thus requiring non-political unions8; another reason 
was the destruction of unions under Hitler, for it was believed that a unified union 
movement could have resisted more effectively. Furthermore, in opposition against 
Hitler unionists had worked together, an experience that obliterated former political 
divisions and created a base of trust that facilitated the building up of a politically 
unified movement9. 
However, initially unionists disagreed about the form the new movement should take. 
Right after the collapse of the Third Reich, a significant number of unionists had 
7 Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p. 20.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, works councils played an important role in the rebuilding of the 
union movement. At first, establishments were in fact governed by works councillors and works councils 
presented the primary organisation of workers. The aim of the councils was the development of a strong 
and powerful union movement and later on many councillors found their place in union bureaucracy. The 
importance of councils diminished with the emergence of organisational structures in enterprises, 
administration and especially unions, since neither occupying powers nor union officials were willing to 
allow a “dual power” system of unions and strong councils  (Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – 1945 – 
1952: vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur Zähmung der Gewerkschaften, München 1960, p. 32).
8 Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p. 20.
9 Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p. 35; Franz Spliedt, Die Gewerkschaften: Entwicklungen und Erfolge – Ihr Wiederaufbau 
nach 1945, Hamburg 1947, p. 72.
4
favoured a centralised Einheitsgewerkschaft; that is, a union organisation in the form of 
a single, strong union for all workers, regardless of enterprise or occupation, 
encompassing a number of industry and occupational groups10; the idea resulting from 
the collective antifascist battle of Christians, social democrats and communists11. The 
principle of Einheitsgewerkschaft was seen as part of their struggle for an anti-capitalist 
realignment12 and unions simply lacked resources, especially in smaller communities, to 
facilitate a differentiated union structure with a number of industrial unions. 
Additionally, in the post-war confusion, the specific interests of individual branches or 
industries were not prevalent since the economic and social emergency affected all. 
Finally, a single organisation was perceived to exercise the most power13. Hans Böckler, 
later first chairman of the DGB14, strongly backed such a single organisation, arguing in 
1945 that reconstruction would only be possible with a collaboration of all15. 
10 Hermann Weber, Siegfried Mielke, Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 
20. Jahrhundert – Band 6: Organisatorischer Aufbau der Gewerkschaften 1945 – 1949, Document 11, p. 
108; Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 
1949, Köln 1990, p. 38.
11 Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – 1945 – 1952: vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur Zähmung der 
Gewerkschaften, München 1960, p. 53.
12 Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p. 36.
13 Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p. 38f.
14 Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund – German Trade Union Federation
15 Hermann Weber, Siegfried Mielke, Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 
20. Jahrhundert – Band 6: Organisatorischer Aufbau der Gewerkschaften 1945 – 1949, Document 11, p. 
108; Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 
1949, Köln 1990, p. 38.
The “Free Socialist Union” in Hamburg was founded as early as May, 11th 1945 and, being a result of a 
combined initiative of social democrats and communists, constituted a political entity that also 
administrated union functions. Its self-perception was to be the sole representative of Hamburg's working 
class by unifying political and union struggle, thus following the idea of Einheitsgewerkschaft rather than 
Industriegewerkschaft. However, it was short-lived and cancelled in favour of autonomous unions based 
on individual industries, trades or establishments in June 1945. This first move against the idea of 
Einheitsgewerkschaft was based on resentments amongst members against the concept and the 
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Others favoured organising along industry lines; that is, only one union shall represent 
all employees in an enterprise and in fact, only one union shall represent an industry16, 
visualising an effective representation of members' interests and safeguarding of 
internal union democracy17. It seemed obvious to unionists that a divided union 
movement with unions mainly focusing on the interests of individual occupations and 
industrial sectors would not be able to influence the political and economical 
reconstruction in a direction they approved of18. 
The western allies opposed the idea of Einheitsgewerkschaft and in early 1946 those 
German unionists that favoured autonomous industrial unions under a federal umbrella 
organisation had got the upper hand19. When the Allied Control Council passed 
combination of union and political functions, less on intervention by the military government (Fichter, cit. 
opp., p. 39f.;  Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster 
Teil 1945 – 1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 1960 p. 
26, 31; Franz Spliedt, Die Gewerkschaften – Entwicklungen und Erfolge: Ihr Wiederaufbau nach 1945, 
Hamburg 1947, p. 92ff.)
16 Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p. 23f.
That idea actually originated earlier than 1945. The Leipzig convention of 1922 agreed on a resolution 
that stated that only industrial unions would be in a position to oppose an industrial enterprise that on 
their part more and more comprise various branches. Therefore the unions' struggle for better wages and 
condition would be seriously impeded if various branch organisations compete in an industry or oppose a 
single entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs in collective bargaining (Franz Spliedt, Die 
Gewerkschaften: Entwicklungen und Erfolge – Ihr Wiederaufbau nach 1945, Hamburg 1947, p. 64).
17 Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p. 40; Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: 
Erster Teil 1945 – 1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 
1960 p. 37.
18 Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p. 36.
19 Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p. 40; Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: 
Erster Teil 1945 – 1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 
1960 p. 37.
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Allocation No. 31 in November 1946 on “Development of Union Federations”, 
allowing union federations on a larger scale but imposing the restriction that unions had 
to be organised as industrial unions, the decision against the Einheitsgewerkschaft was 
taken20. 
The process of rebuilding was not centrally organised, but happened independently 
within the different zones of occupation, influenced by different demands and ideas of 
the allied powers. While inter-sectoral communication of unions was not possible; 
similar experiences made sure that rebuilding in the western sectors followed similar 
lines21. Even though the allies regarded unions as a way to educate the German people 
towards democracy, German unionists later complained about difficulties raised by the 
occupying forces. Unionists held they had not been able to rebuild unions as they 
wished and as it would have been necessary. In the first few months, contacting other 
unions had been illegal. The British military government had restricted rebuilding by 
devising a three-step plan for unions' development: in the first phase, unionists 
interested in founding a union could obtain the approval of the military government and 
were then allowed to hold meetings. In the second phase, accreditation to collect 
membership fees was granted and the third and final phase allowed free development 
and therefore federations with unions beyond the local sphere22. The Americans, based 
on their belief that union development needed to start from the bottom up, restricted 
union organisation to the local sphere and even banned federations of local unions23. 
20 Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 – 
1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 1960 p. 45.
21 Franz Spliedt, Die Gewerkschaften: Entwicklungen und Erfolge – Ihr Wiederaufbau nach 1945, Hamburg 
1947, p. 65.
22 Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 – 
1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 1960 p. 27f.
23 Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 – 
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The fact that unions in the Russian sector were build up from top to bottom and 
therefore had a headstart in terms of regional and sectoral organisation led, together 
with the growing differences between the allied powers, the western sectors to relax the 
restrictions little by little in order to prevent workers from sympathising with the 
Russian government24. 
After the structure of the future union movement had been determined and the western 
allies relaxed their restrictions, unions started organising on a regional and eventually 
national scale. First steps towards inter-sectoral cooperation had already been taken in 
1946, when the World Trade Union Congress had called for an inter-sectoral trade 
union conference in Germany, maintaining that only a unified German union 
organisation could become member of the WTUC. A first meeting of German union 
representatives with union functionaries from abroad and WTUC-representatives took 
place in November 1946, followed by the first inter-sectoral conference in Hanover in 
December 1946. These conferences were intended to take place every two months and 
had as their aim the development of common union structures25. 
On a political level, the American and British military governments announced the 
implementation of a combined administration of their sectors starting from January 1st, 
1947. Unionists in the American sector took this as a signal to start organising a bi-
sectoral union movement; however, British sector unions initially were opposed, 
arguing that a bi-sectoral unification would present a partition wall between West and 
East. They also advocated the nationalisation of mining, iron- and steel industry in the 
1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 1960 p. 37.
24  Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 – 
1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 1960 p. 62f.
25  Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 – 
1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 1960 p. 66f.
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Ruhr district, fearing that the Americans would try to hinder this and would put more 
pressure on union politics26. Unions therefore decided on a union council administering 
bi-sectoral tasks and issues of a future federation rather than unification, hoping for an 
all-German movement. It soon became obvious, however, that the differences between 
the allied forces were such that a unified Germany was unlikely to happen. Complete 
political and economical federation of the western sectors and its integration into the 
capitalist western world became immanent and, since a union council could only yield 
little influence, in 1948 unions in the British sector eventually agreed to prepare a 
unification of British and American sector union federations; still hoping (and this hope 
was reflected in the declaration that allowed joining of the Russian and French sector 
unions) to one day build a federation including all of Germany27. However, by now this 
was highly unlikely; not least because the Americans had made it very clear that they 
would only agree to a unification with the eastern sector trade union federation under 
certain obligations they knew it could not fulfil; namely economical cooperation 
between the sectors and a democratically structured union movement. The eastern 
federation eventually left the inter-sectoral conferences in August 1948.28
26  Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p. 76.
27  Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p.77f.
The sixth inter sectoral conference in October 1947 had decided to call a general German union congress 
for spring 1948, asking a committee made up from union representatives of every sector and Berlin to 
present basic principles and a constitution for a German trade union congress (including unions from the 
eastern sector); however, these guidelines failed to be passed by the conference. Fritz Tarnow, who had 
been an important figure in the union movement in the Weimar Republic and also played an important 
role in the re-building of unions after 1945, had presented a “declaration of principles” to be passed 
alongside the guidelines that included definitions of “democracy” leading to (and in fact being intended 
to) the exclusion of the unions of the eastern sector (Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die 
Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 – 1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 
'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 1960 p. 72ff.)
28  Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
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Incorporating the French sector unions was difficult, too; but in autumn 1948 the 
French military government eventually allowed negotiations about a three-sectoral 
federation and finally, in October 1949, the founding conference of the DGB could take 
place in Munich. Hans Böckler was elected as first chairman of the new federation, 
which was designed as a federation of 16 (then newly founded) industrial unions. It is 
not a mere federation but also administers functions (like legal protection and 
organising campaigns) traditionally connected with individual unions29. 
In 1948, unions had more members than in 193330 but immediately after the war and in 
the first  years of the Federal  Republic,  they had to struggle with grave economical 
problems. Unions were permitted to conduct  Tarifvereinbarungen31, but there was no 
room for a regular policy of collective agreements or even wages; rather, the Allied 
Control Council (ACC) had issued a pay freeze in May 1945 that was not abolished 
until  November  194832.  When prices rose  dramatically  after  the currency reform of 
Köln 1990, p.78f.
29  Michael Fichter, Einheit und Organisation – der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund im Aufbau 1945 – 1949, 
Köln 1990, p.79f; Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: 
Erster Teil 1945 – 1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 
1960 p. 144.
30 Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 – 
1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 1960 kp. 33.
31 Literally tariff acknowledgement – agreements between workers’ organisations and employers on wages; 
however, less extensive than ordinary collective agreements.
32  Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitik – Die 50er Jahre: Tarifpolitk im 
Zeichen des Wirtschaftswunders, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-
68F72AED/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16598.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005; Tarifarchiv der Hans-
Böckler-Stiftung, Die wichtigsten Tarifbewegungen und -abschlüsse, 
http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-68F72AED/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16564.html, last 
accessed September 30th, 2005.
Union pressure prompted the ACC to prohibit wages below 50pf an hour; to raise wages in 
industries that were neglected by the wage policy of the Nazis; to suit piece wages to new conditions 
of production; and to raise the wages of women and young workers to the men's level – when they 
performed the same work and performance. All new wages had to be approved by the German 
Administration for Labour and could not result in a increase to the wage rate. Full freedom of 
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1948,  many  wages  fell  under  the  margin  of  subsistence33.  In  the  American  sector, 
General  Clay  had  announced  in  July  1948  that  free  prices  require  free  wages  and 
stressed that “free wages” included a right to strike; however, unions and their members 
tried to tackle the problem of falling real wages by attacking prices, and asking for 
wage-rises on a political level34. The wage stop was lifted in October 1948 but unions 
still rather relied on political protest forms than strikes. In November 1948, the union 
council called for a demonstration in the form of a one-day break to emphasise their 
demands, including rationing in the food sector and elements of a planned economy as 
well as socialisation of basic industries and credit association. However, they failed to 
make clear what they would do if their demands were not met. Additionally, negotiation 
with the military governments had the results that some important industries were not 
collective agreements was not restored until the abolishment of the pay freeze on November 3rd, 
1948. Thereafter, the Tarifordnungen  of the Third Reich were  gradually replaced by collective 
agreements and eventually the Law on Collective Agreements (Tarifvertragsgesetz) came into force 
in April 1949, the passing of the Constitution in May 1949 ensured the Freedom of Coalition.
Standard hourly wages at this time ranged between 59 Pfennig for workers in agriculture and 
1.77Mark in the chemical industry, monthly wages were between 175 mark for butchers and 531 
Mark in the chemical industry with lower rates or deductions for women, wages f women were also 
often laid down in special “women wage groups”. The Industrial High Court declared those wage 
groups illegal in 1955; however, they were to be removed from collective agreements only very 
slowly over the next years rsp. decades
(Tarifarchiv der Hans-Wackler-Stiftung, Die wichtigsten Tarifbewegungen und -Abschlüsse, 
http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-68F72AED/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16564.html, last 
accessed September 30th, 2005.)
33 Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 
– 1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. Münchhausen 1960 p. 
102f, 105.
34 Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 
– 1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 1960 kp. 102f, 
105.
In August 1948 unions demanded wage rises and an official limit on prices, to be controlled under 
union-cooperation. If necessary, government control of the economy should be re-introduced for 
those vital goods and foodstuffs not available in sufficient amounts (Parker, chit. opp., p. 103).
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affected by the  “demonstration”  at  all  and that  its  duration  was restricted  to  a  few 
hours35.  
 
1950 – 1960
United Kingdom
Restrictive wage policies continued in the 1950s. 
In 1951 the Churchill Government was elected and hoped to link wage increases to 
productivity increases36. However, it had only a very small majority in Parliament37 and 
Churchill himself hoped “to work with the trade unions in a loyal and friendly spirit”38. 
Ideas for wage restraints were therefore soon abandoned and in some cases, for example 
engineering  and  shipbuilding,  wage  rises  above  the  cost  of  living  were  given  with 
government approval39. However, unions tried to keep up good relations by maintaining 
the moderate politics practised under the preceding Labour Government40.
35  Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 
– 1952 – Vom 'Ende des Kapitalismus' zur 'Zähmung der Gewerkschaften'. München 1960 kp. 
104ff.
36  Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, 5th Edition, London 1992, p. 223.
37  Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, 5th Edition, London 1992, p. 223; W. Hamish 
Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 198.
38  Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John McIlroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics – The 
Post-War Compromise, 1945-64, Aldershot 1999, p. 78.
39  W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 198ff.; 
Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, 5th Edition, London 1992, p. 223. 
40  Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, 5th Edition, London 1992, p. 223.
A statement of the General Council of the TUC declared: “Since the Conservative administration of 
pre-war days the range of consultation between Ministers and both sides of industry has 
considerably increased, and the machinery of joint consultation has enormously improved. We 
expect of this government that they will maintain to the full this practice of consultation. On out part 
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The 1957 Conservative Government under Macmillan introduced a Council on Prices, 
Productivity and Incomes which was met with very little enthusiasm among employers' 
associations  or  trade  unions  –  the  Council  statement  that  the  best  remedy  against 
inflation was rising unemployment, did nothing to warm the unions to it41. While the 
Court  of  Appeal  had emphasised  in National  Coal  Board  v Galley42 that  collective 
agreements (unless otherwise intended by the parties) are not legally enforceable, the 
Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959 contained a provision that provided 
some enforceability of agreements43. The case also established that strikers are liable in 
damages to their employers; however, each worker was only held to be “liable for the 
damage caused by his own breach, not that by others, even if they had all acted in 
concert”44.
Germany
The  1950s  witnessed  a  debate  on  reduction  in  working  time  and  the  beginning 
jurisdiction of the Bundesarbeitsgericht45 on strikes.
Once the economic situation had improved, weekly hours went up to pre-war standards 
of between 47.5 and 48.6 h.  A main objective of German unions, especially in the 
we shall continue to examine every question solely in the light of its industrial and economic 
implications”. 
However, the willingness to play along with wage policies was partly due to anti-communist 
sentiments, as unions tried to undermine the influence of communist unions by regularly (and with 
considerable majorities) voting down their proposals to refuse all kind of wage restraints (Selling, 
chit. opp., p. 223f.)
41  W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 203.
42  National Coal Board v Galley [1958], 1 All ER 91. 
43  M. A. Hickling, Citrine's Trade Union Law, 3rd Edition, London 1967, p. 27f, p. 651f.
44  Considerable effort was spend to explain why in this special case an agreement was meant to be 
legally binding.
45  Federal Industrial Court. In the following referred to as BAG.
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second half of the 1950s, was therefore a reduction of working hours, soon supported by 
the  Social  Democrats,  then  in  opposition46.  The  employers'  associations  considered 
reductions in working time possible if following an increase in productivity47.
German unions, unlike their British counterparts would have done, preferred to reduce 
working  time  by  changes  to  the  law.  However,  eventually  a  series  of  agreements 
reached by the metal-workers’ union IG Metall between 1956 and 1960, acting as model 
agreements that would be adapted by other industries, provided the break-through for a 
wide distribution of the 40-hour week48. 
This  was  mostly  achieved  without  resort  to  industrial  action.  Since  the 
Wirtschaftswunder, German  unions  are  regarded  as  more  peaceful  than  their 
counterparts elsewhere and the 1950s and 1960s indeed were not only peaceful when 
compared with Italy, France or England, but also compared to earlier periods of German 
46  Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften – Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland von 
den Anfängen bis heute, Bonn 1989, p. 281f.
47  Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften – Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland von 
den Anfängen bis heute, Bonn 1989, p. 281ff.
In the following time different unions achieved different results. In the food and catering trade the 
IG Nahrung – Genuß – Gaststätten achieved the 40 hour week already in 1959, in the metal industry 
it took till 1967.
48  Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften – Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland von 
den Anfängen bis heute, Bonn 1989, p. 282f; Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Die 
wichtigsten Tarifbewegungen und -abschlüsse, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
3D0AB75D-68F72AED/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16564.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005. 
The reduction in working-time was, like the increase in holidays, achieved by collective agreements; 
however, only the achievements in holidays were (at this time) secured by law. In 1963 the 
Bundesurlaubsgesetz (National Law on Holidays) provided for 3 weeks holidays per year; however, 
the average holidays provided by collective agreements soon rose to 4 weeks at the end of the 1960s 
and to about 5 weeks in 1975, showing that legal rights still allow for agreements providing for 
better conditions. The metal workers achieved a reduction from 48 to 45 weekly hours in 1956 and 
in the following time different unions achieved different results. In the food and catering trade the 
IG Nahrung – Genuß – Gaststätten achieved the 40 hour week already in 1959, while in the metal 
industry it took till 1967. Nevertheless, by 1973 only about 69% of employees had an agreed 
standard working week of 40h, and it was not until 1978 that a percentage of above 90% was 
reached (Michael Schneider, cit. opp. p. 281ff: Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, cit. opp.).
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history.  This,  however,  does  not  mean  that  German  unions  are  “toothless  tigers”. 
Rather,  the then prevalent extremely favourable economic situation plus good union 
organisation  resulted  in  a  convincing  Drohpotential49,  enabling  unions  to  get  their 
demands met without industrial action50. 
Peaceful industrial relations have also been influenced by the jurisdiction of the BAG, 
which developed detailed regulations regarding the legality of strikes51. It decided in a 
number of decisions in 195552 that a strike that was not conducted about issues that 
could be regulated by collective agreement is illegal53 and could constitute an intrusion 
49  Literally ‘threatening potential’: the ability to threaten convincingly.
50  Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften – Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland von 
den Anfängen bis heute, Bonn 1989, p. 285.
51  Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften – Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland von 
den Anfängen bis heute, Bonn 1989, p. 285. 
The right to strike is today generally derived from the constitution, however, as it is not laid down 
expressis verbis most of the rules regarding strikes and the constitutional right to strike itself have 
been developed by the courts, notably the BAG. Before the BAG did so a right to strike could be 
derived from the historical development after 1869, especially § 152 I GewO, and a general legal 
conviction (the Reichsarbeitsgericht generally assumed such a right) but also from § 49 II 3 
BetrVG.
According to the rules laid down by the BAG, a strike is legal when it is conducted with the aim of 
concluding a collective agreement. It therefore must have as its aim issues that are capable of 
regulation by a collective agreement; political, sympathy- and solidarity strikes are illegal, as are 
strikes that are carried out to demonstrate a general dissatisfactions with employers’ behaviour. 
Furthermore, only strikes conducted by actors that can be parties to a collective agreement (trade 
unions, employers and employers’ associations) are legal; wildcat strikes without unions support are 
therefore not permitted. Strikes are forbidden during the Friedenspflicht, that is, the peace duty that 
accompanies every collective agreement in Germany during its validity. Finally, the BAG held that 
industrial action has to be conducted under restriction of commensurability. 
(Schneider, cit. opp. p. 285; Günter Schaub (Ed.), Arbeitsrechts-Handbuch – Systematische 
Darstellung und Nachschlagewerk für die Praxis, 11th Edition, München 2005, p. 1867ff., § 193, Rn. 
7ff.)  
52 BAG, May 4th, 1955, 1 AZR 493/54.
53 It was held that even one illegal aim of the strike would render the whole strike illegal (BAG, May 
4th, 1955, 1 AZR 493/54.)
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into a commercial enterprise and thus entitle to damages according to § 823 I BGB54. It 
held  that  a  strike  without  union  involvement  was  illegal  by  deciding  that  a 
sozialadäquat55 strike that had started without a union calling it would be legitimate 
once the union approved of it and declared to continue it56. 
Most importantly, the  Große Senat  of the BAG57 decided, against the then prevailing 
opinion in legal literature and jurisprudence, that legitimate strikes did not constitute 
breaches of contract58. In a strike, workers would deliberately, consciously and solidary 
act  together,  making  it  a  collective  action.  The  stoppage  of  the  individual  worker 
therefore  had  to  be  considered  as  part  of  a  collective  action  that  has  to  be  judged 
according to collective principles of employment law but not according to contractual 
obligations,  which  are  only  meant  to  govern  individual  actions.  Strikes  are,  under 
certain circumstances, legitimate under collective principles; therefore, taking part in a 
54 § 823 I BGB (Bürerliches Gesetzbuch – German Civil Code) is the main norm governing 
unerlaubte Handlungen; that is tortious acts or civil offences. It is therefore one of the main bases 
for claims of damages. 
55  Literally ‘social acceptable’. According to the BAG, a strike is socially acceptable when it neither 
interrupts the peace duty, nor constitutes, according to its means, its aims or the disproportionality of 
means and aims, socially inappropriate action (for example a direction intervention into employers’ 
enterprises). An immoral strike (immorality as defined in § 826 BGB) would also not be socially 
acceptable.
(BAG, Großer Senat, January 28th, 1955, GS 1/54).
56  BAG, September 5th, 1955, 1 AZR 480/54.
57  BAG Großer Senat, January 28th, 1955, GS 1/54. 
The Große Senat is a Senate of the Federal Employment Court comprised of members of its two 
ordinary senates and lay judges from the employers’ as well as the employees’ side. If a Senate 
plans to deviate from a decision of another Senate or the Großen Senates, an appeal to the Große 
Senat is possible. An appeal is also possible in legal decision of fundamental importance if 
necessary for the development of the law and the safeguarding of consistent jurisdiction. In the 
present case the second choice was used (see § 45 ArbGG).
58 While not deciding whether there is a constitutional right to strike, the Große Senat nevertheless 
emphasised the circumstances under which a strike would be socially adequate and lawful (BAG, 
GS 1/54, para 32ff.; compare footnote 28). 
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(legitimate) strike would be legitimate as well59. This meant that employers could not 
dismiss individual  employees  without  notice;  however,  they did have  the right  to  a 
‘terminating  lockout’.  While  suspending  lockouts  are  possible,  they  will  often  be, 
especially when used as a defensive measure against a strike, pointless, since, according 
to  the  new  doctrine  of  the  BAG,  the  contracts  of  employment  have  already  been 
suspended by the strike. According to the principle of  Kampfparität60, the risks of an 
industrial dispute must be divided equally between employers and employees. Merely 
suspending lockouts, however, would relieve the employees’ side of the risk of loosing 
their jobs and would therefore constitute a risk-division in their favour; considering that 
employers bear the risk of losses and, eventually, of economic breakdown. Therefore, 
employers must have the right to use terminating lockouts; moreover, the Große Senat 
held that lockouts normally, if no other intention is apparent, will be terminating61. It 
also held that there is no general duty to reinstate after a lockout; rather, the decision 
whether and which employees are reinstated lies in the employers' discretion. A general 
duty to reinstate would shift  the  Kampfparität  in favour of employees and render a 
terminating lockout  pointless.  However,  employers have to  use fair  discretion when 
reinstating, that is, they are not allowed to act obviously improper62.
Even though strikes would not constitute breaches of contract, they were made more 
risky by generously allowing lock outs. Strikes are always connected with a risk, but 
from  today’s  perspective  it  seems  as  if  the  risk  distribution  turned  out  to  the 
disadvantage of unions. After all, in addition to the economic risk of not getting paid 
during the conflict (interestingly, the economic risk of the employer was used to justify 
59  BAG, GS 1/54, para 47ff.
60  Kampfparität literally means ‘battle parity’ and is a very important concept used by the BAG when 
it comes to judge actions in a strike. It entails that all measures in a strike are judged in regard to if 
they give one side an unfair advantage over the other.
61  BAG, GS 1/54, para 62ff.
62  BAG, GS 1/54, para 86ff.
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the use of lockouts), employees had now also bore the risk of not being reinstated after a 
lockout; However, one has to take the circumstances of the time into consideration: in 
1955,  Germany  had  full  employment;  a  dismissal,  especially  of  skilled  workers, 
therefore might have actually been more harmful to the employer who then had to seek 
for adequate substitution; while workers had little problems with finding new and often 
better employment. Taking this into account, the judgement does appear to maintain the 
Kampfparität.
The right to lock-out was further consolidated with two more decisions: in 1957 the 
BAG held that it was legitimate to lock-out workers who didn't participate in the dispute 
because of holiday or illness63 and in 1960 it decided that a lock-out did not need to be 
done in a single act but could be undertaken successively as long as it was based on the 
same decision by the employer64. 
Employers’  position  in  industrial  conflict  was  strengthened,  so  from the  mid-1950s 
strikes  were  used  only  in  highly  controversial  and  fundamental  issues65.  Most 
remarkable in this period is probably the 16-week strike conducted in 1956/57 by IG 
Metall in Schleswig-Holstein for longer holidays and sick pay for blue-collar workers66. 
63  BAG from September 27th, 1957, AP Nr 6 zu Artikel 9 GG Arbeitskampf.
64  BAG from October 14th, 1960, BAG 10, S. 88ff, AP Nr. 10 zu Artikel 9 GG Arbeitskampf.
65  Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften – Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland von 
den Anfängen bis heute, Bonn 1989, p. 285.
The numbers of employees participating in strikes and days lost in a strike fell from 1.1 million 
workers and 6.3 million days between 1950 and 1955 to 33,200 workers and 3.6 million days 
between 1956 and 1961 (Schneider, ct. opp. p. 285).
66  Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften – Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland von 
den Anfängen bis heute, Bonn 1989, p. 286f. 
An important difference to strikes in Great Britain can be seen here, as this strike indirectly forced 
parliament to legislate the factual equality of blue- and white-collar workers by providing equal sick 
pay rights to both groups. The “Law on sick pay” (Gesetz zur Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall) 
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The union won, but had to pay damages. It had held a strike ballot before the end of 
arbitration and the BAG decided that this constituted an offensive measure and thus a 
breach of the Friedenspflicht67. 
While their British counterparts had to deal with policies of wage restraint,  German 
unions enjoyed free collective bargaining and could concentrate on issues such as the 
reduction  of  the  working  week.  However,  they  had  to  deal  with  legal  restraints  of 
industrial  action soon after  the war.  With regard to strikes,  therefore,  the system of 
legalism worked to the disadvantage of German unions, with numerous obstacles and 
liabilities confining the constitutional right to strike. 
1960 - 1970
United Kingdom
Wage policies continued to be important. 
In the summer of 1961, prompted by pressure on sterling, the government declared a 
“pay pause” for public service employees and those covered by wage councils without 
consulting the unions. The mark for future pay rises was set at 2.5%68 but this was soon 
to be undermined by a 9% pay rise for dockers after they threatened industrial action69. 
was passed, but not until 1970 was full equality achieved  (Schneider, opp. cit., p. 286f.).
67  Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften – Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland von 
den Anfängen bis heute, Bonn 1989, p. 286f.; however, prevailing opinion seems to have changed 
so that possibly ballots are not regarded as offensive measures anymore (http://www.jura.uni-
bielefeld.de/Lehrstuehle/Rolfs/Begleitmaterial/SS_2002/Arbeitsrecht/ArbeiskampfR2.pdf, last 
checked November 2nd, 2005)
68  W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 207f; Alan 
Campbell, Nina Fishman, John McIlroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics – The Post-
War Compromise, 1945-64, Aldershot 1999, p. 79.
69  W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 207f.
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The pay pause was to end in March 1962 and even though a general sense of need for a 
national incomes policy began to emerge, strong opposition showed that the approach to 
income control needed to be more flexible. The Conservative Government discussed a 
“guiding light” of 2.5% increase for the rest of the year and union representation on the 
new established National  Economic Development  Council  (NEDC) with the TUC70. 
Although eager to not be responsible for any policy of wage restraint, union leaders did 
agree to take part in it, but only under the condition that wages and other collective 
bargaining issues should not be discussed71. 
The  government  also  set  up  a  National  Incomes  Commission  to  formulate  an 
independent opinion on major wage claims. The TUC was asked to join, but, since it 
was  obvious that  this  was  an attempt  to  get  the unions'  support  for  wage restraint, 
declined. The Commission never succeeded in winning the support of either employers 
or trade unions, which still opposed government intervention and preferred to rely on 
collective bargaining instead72. It never had much influence and vanished after Labour 
regained office in 196473.
Labour  soon  established  a  new  Department  of  Economic  Affairs,  concerned  with 
incomes  policy74.  Unemployment  had  fallen  to  about  300,000,  giving  unions  the 
necessary power to negotiate improvements. Many succeeded in achieving a working 
70  Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, 5th Edition, London 1992, p. 245. The NEDC 
was set up “to examine the long-term prospects for growth in the economy and the processes for 
securing it” (Pelling, cit. opp. p. 245).
71  Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, John McIlroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics – The 
Post-War Compromise, 1945-64, Aldershot 1999, p. 80; Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade 
Unionism, 5th Edition, London 1992, p. 245.
72  W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 208.
73  Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, 5th Edition, London 1992, p. 245.
74  Hugh Armstrong Clegg, The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, 3rd Edition, Oxford 
1976, p. 418.
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week  of  40  hours.  However,  labour  costs  were  outstripping  output  and  unions, 
employers' associations and government signed a “Declaration of Intent on Productivity, 
Prices  and  Incomes”  to  improve  productivity  while  George  Brown's  National  Plan 
suggested  a  norm  of  3-3.5%  for  wage  rises  to  keep  incomes  growth  in  line  with 
inflation, to be administered by a National Board for Prices and Incomes75. Unions were 
split on the issue of incomes policy: some were in favour as long as prices would be 
restrained  too,  while  others,  particularly  the  craft  unions,  argued that  giving  up  on 
collective bargaining would lead to a policy controlling wages but not prices. However, 
they were persuaded by the then General Secretary of the TUC, George Woodcock, to 
“submit any new wage claims to a TUC wage-claim vetting committee so that a system 
of ‘early warnings of problems could be established”76.
However, inflation and poor economic performance were not the sole responsibility of 
unions  and  their  wage  claims.  Rather,  Governmental  attempts  to  keep  up  full 
employment and develop a welfare state contributed to tax rises and public borrowing, 
which in turn led to pressure for higher wages and prices and a loss in competitiveness. 
Moreover,  Germany,  along  with  Japan,  had  recovered  from  the  war  and  overtook 
Britain in terms of annual growth and world market share77.
In  1964 the House  of  Lords  decided in  Rookes  v Barnard that  a  threat  to  break a 
contract (or to induce such a breach) constituted a tort of intimidation78. Since the legal 
75  W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 210f.; 
Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, 5th Edition, London 1992, p. 249.
Under certain circumstances (increases in productivity, exceptionally low pay or the need 
to animate recruitment) larger rises could be permitted (Pelling, cit. opp., p. 249).
76 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 210f.
77 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 5.
78 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, 2nd Edition, London 
1977, p. 232, 259.
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immunity given by the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 that had removed trade unions’ 
liability  for  “inducing  a  breach  of  contract  of  employment  in  contemplation  or 
furtherance  of  a  trade  dispute”  did  not  cover  torts  of  intimidation by  threatening  a 
breach of contract, considerable unrest among unionists was caused79. Additionally, not 
only the strikers themselves, but also union officials calling a strike or just acting as a 
mediator between would-be strikers and the employer could be subject to legal action 
for tort of conspiracy80. 
Unions  lobbied  for  new legislation  to  overthrow the  effects  of  the  decision  and in 
response Labour passed the 1965 Trades Disputes Act, intended to restore the law to the 
status quo ante. While it provided that a threat of breach of contract or to induce such a 
breach shall  not be  actionable81,  strikes still  constituted breaches of contract. At the 
same time, the Government set up the Donovan Commission to have a close look at the 
system of industrial relations82.
The Prices and Incomes Act 1966, agreed to by the TUC, imposed – for the first time – 
criminal sanctions on unions, union members and employers for breach of its terms. In 
return  it  was  hoped that  unions  would  get  to  play  a  more  active  role  in  economic 
planning83,  but  all  efforts  of  establishing  incomes  policies  were  unsuccessful;  some 
Employees generally didn't wish to terminate their contracts, rather, while intending to break them, 
they wished to keep “the contract alive for as long as the employers would tolerate the breach 
without exercising their right of rescission”. (Rookes v Barnard), see also Lord Denning in Stratford 
v Lindley [1965] AC 269 at 285 (Richard Kidner, Trade Union Law, London 1979, p. 135).
79 Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, 2nd Edition, London 1977, p. 232; M. A. Hickling, Citrine's 
Trade Union Law, 3rd Edition, London 1967, p. 17, 28f., 623; W. Hamish Fraser, A History of 
British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 209; 
80 M. A. Hickling, Citrine's Trade Union Law, 3rd Edition, London 1967, p. 28f., 623.
81 M. A. Hickling, Citrine's Trade Union Law, 3rd Edition, London 1967, p. 30.
82 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 209.
83 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 211ff..
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areas in fact experienced a wage explosion rather than a wage restraint84. 
In 1968, the Court of Appeal held in Morgan v Fry85 that strike action suspended rather 
than terminated contracts of employment. Lord Denning emphasised that strikes would 
not, if sufficient notice was given, constitute breaches of contract, since that “would do 
away with the right to strike in this country”86. While this understanding was held to be 
common before  Rookes  v Barnard,  Lord Denning now was the only one to take this 
view.  Since  Morgan  v  Fry  provided  no  authority  in  this  matter,  all  strikes  now 
constitute, regardless of any notice given, a breach of contract87. 
In  1969,  Ford  Motor  Co.  Ltd  v AUEW88 confirmed  that  collective  agreements  are 
normally not intended to be legally binding. Ford had advocated the binding nature of a 
series of collective agreements, while the unions prevailed with their arguments that 
“collective bargaining agreements are not intended to create legal relations unless,  ... , 
the parties express a wish that they should do so”89. 
84 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 219.
More strikes took place in the following years and claims for wage restraint weren’t helped 
by the fact that in some industries the shortage of skilled labour was such that orders had to be 
turned down (Fraser, cit. opp. p. 211ff.)
85 Court of Appeal, Morgan v Fry and others [1968] 2 QB 710, June 27th, 1968
86 Morgan v Fry, Judgement of Lord Denning. A note was held to be sufficient when it was “at least as 
long as the notice required to terminate the contract”; after all, “the men can leave their employment 
altogether by giving a week’s notice to terminate it. That would be a strike which would be perfectly 
lawful. If a notice to terminate is lawful, surely a lesser notice is lawful; such a notice that “we will 
not work alongside a non-unionist”.
(Morgan v Fry, Judgement of Lord Denning).
87 Roger Rideout, Rideout's Principles of Labour Law, 5th Edition, London 1989, p. 325. 
88  Ford Motor Co, Ltd v Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers and 
Others,[1969], 2 QB 303.
89  Ford Motor Co. V AUEW, paras 314, 329, 330; W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade 
Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 219f.
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Germany
In the first economic crisis after the war, German unions were confronted with policies 
of stability and wage restraint for the first time. 
While  the  late  1960s  were  characterised  by  negative  growth  and  a  peak  in 
unemployment  of 3.1% in February 196790, the early 1960s were still  marked by a 
favourable economic development with wage rises91 of about 30%, accompanied by a 
striking drop in industrial disputes; the strong economy allowed for wage rises without 
the need for  industrial  action92.  However,  conditions  began to  change.  In  1963,  the 
Federal Government first published guidelines for a wage policy, demanding a link to 
productivity. Pressure on unions increased with the slowing down of the economy and 
they failed to negotiate wage rises significantly higher than the rise in productivity93.
90  Karl Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, Berkeley 1980, p. 
200; Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften – Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland 
von den Anfängen bis heute, Bonn 1989, p. 319ff..
91 Furthermore, collective agreements in the (early) 60s also brought a number of other improvements: 
for the first time holiday money was provided collective agreement; in wood processing in 1962; 
paper, metal and textiles industries followed in 1965, chemical industry and printing in 1966, hard 
coal mining in 1969 and retail and wholesale trade in 1971. Employer's contributions to tax-
deductible saving schemes (Vermögenswirksame Leistungen) were introduced for construction 
workers in 1965 (and followed by numerous other branches in the 70s), and the 40 hour week was 
achieved for printing  in 1965, metal industry and wood processing in 1967, construction in 1969, 
chemical industry, paper and trextiles industry in 1970, retail in 1971, insurances in 1973, public 
services in 1974 and, finally, agriculture in 1983 (Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Die 
wichtigsten Tarifbewegungen und -abschlüsse, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
3D0AB75D-68F72AED/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16564.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005).
92  Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitk – 60er Jahre: Zwischen 
“Konzertierter Aktion” und spontanen Streiks, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
3D0AB75D-1E433A65/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16600.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005.
93  Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitk – 60er Jahre: Zwischen 
“Konzertierter Aktion” und spontanen Streiks, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
3D0AB75D-1E433A65/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16600.html, last accessed May 1st, 2005.
The IG Metall, however, managed to conclude an agreement providing for wage rises after a strike 
in the metal industry in Baden-Württemberg, involving 300,000 workers – the greatest strike up to 
that point in the history of the Bundesrepublik. Employers previously had declared that they wanted 
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In  1963  the  BAG  decided  that  an  employer  needed  to  have  the  intent  to  offer 
reinstatement to workers for a (defensive) lockout to be lawful94. In two other decisions 
it confirmed the illegality of wildcat strikes. The first held that illegally striking workers 
were liable  for damages as joint  debtors,  while the second extended the liability  to 
unions offering support to the strikers95. The dividing line between a union officially 
supporting  and  thus  taking  over  and  legalising  the  strike  and  a  union  unofficially 
supporting the strike (by paying strike money) and thus being liable for damages is very 
thin, leaving unions in a grey area96. They were thus detained from offering support to 
workers when they could not or did not want to officially take over the strike (e.g. due 
to  the  Friedenspflicht).  Such decisions  and the  ensuing  politics  are  able  to  alienate 
members from their unions.
The  recession  of  1966/67  marked  a  break  in  union  policies.  GNP  fell  by  0.3%, 
unemployment  rose  from 0.7  to  2.1%,  and  arguments  for  state  intervention  in  the 
to enforce a pay pause. 
(Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Tarifarchiv, cit. opp.)
94  BAG December 6th, 1963, 1 AZR 223/63.
95  BAG December 20th, 1963, 1 AZR 428/62 and 1 AZR 429/62.
96  see: Theo Mayer-Maly, remarks to BAG 1 AZR 429/62, in: AP Nr. 33 zu Artikel 9 GG 
Arbeitskampf.
Mayer-Maly pointed to the contradiction between regarding a strike as illegal because it is not 
supported by a union while simultaneously holding the union liable for supporting the strikers. He 
assumes this might be due to the BAG demanding a clear announcement of the union’s support; but, 
on the other hand, under German law only strikes supported by a union can be lawful. Therefore, 
any support by a union should be regarded as sufficient support. In the present case, however, even 
accepting the union’s support as sufficient probably wouldn’t have rendered the strike legal since it 
was not held for ends that may be regulated by collective agreement (Mayer-Maly, cit. opp.).
25
economy began to be generally accepted97. The politics of  konzertierte Aktion98 were 
implemented and laid down in the 1967 Stabilitätsgesetz99. Obviously, employers hoped 
that  this  would bring about  a  restriction  in  union wage claims100,  but  unions  rather 
perceived it as an instrument to become integrated into governmental wage policy – 
something  British  unions  were  keen  to  avoid.  While  rejecting  the  official  wage 
guidelines, unions collective demands initially kept within their limits101; however, this 
97 Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitk – 60er Jahre: Zwischen 
“Konzertierter Aktion” und spontanen Streiks, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
3D0AB75D-1E433A65/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16600.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005.
98 Concerted action. A process of regular exchange of information and discussions between 
government, federal bank, council of economical advisors, employers’ associations and unions.
(Tarifarchiv der Hans- Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitk – 60er Jahre: Zwischen 
“Konzertierter Aktion” und spontanen Streiks, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
3D0AB75D-1E433A65/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16600.html, last accessed May 1st, 2006)
99  http://www.biologie.de/biowiki/Konzertierte_Aktion, last accessed September 21st, 2005.
Stabilitätsgesetz can be translated as Stability law – law to promote stability and growth of the 
economy. The aim was for all parties participating in the economic process to coordinate their 
actions in order to overcome the economic crisis. The idea was for representatives of the federal 
ministries of economics, of finance and labour, of the federal bank and the Bundeskartellamt, of the 
council of experts (Sachverständigenrat) as well as representatives of the business associations and 
the unions to meet several times per year to discuss pending economic problems, wage contracts and 
industrial planning, thus creating economic stability. The reciprocal information on each others 
expectations and interest was desired, but the meetings were not intended to reach binding 
arrangements that would limit the responsibility/decision-making powers of the government and 
free collective bargaining (Tarifautonomie). The first talks in 1967 included employers' association, 
unions, representatives of agriculture and representatives of the federal state, the individual states 
and the municipalities (Bund, Länder und Gemeinden).
Although it continued to exist until the unions withdrew in 1977, it was ineffective before that.
Michael Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften – Ihre Entwicklung in Deutschland von 
den Anfängen bis heute, Bonn 1989, p. 319ff.; Dennis L. Bark, David R Gress, A History of West 
Germany – Part 2, Democracy and its Discontents 1963 – 1991, 2nd Edition, Oxford and Cambridge, 
Mass 1993, p. 84. 
100  Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Informationen zur politischen Bildung Heft 258, 
http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/08595360513445560736840565438389.html, last accessed 
September 20st, 2005)
101  Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitk – 60er Jahre: Zwischen 
“Konzertierter Aktion” und spontanen Streiks, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
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ended when the economy improved in the late 1960s102. 
The economic upturn commenced in 1967 and soon turned into a boom. While wages 
stayed way behind business profits, IG Metall argued against high wage demands, and 
felt, despite the mounting dissatisfaction, still bound to an agreement concluded in 166 
that provided no rises in real wages. These factors gave rise to a number of unofficial 
strikes in September 1969103.
Initially, these were not supported by the unions, the striking workforce elected their 
own  spokesmen  and  chief  negotiators  (mostly  members  of  the  works  council  or 
gewerkschaftliche  Vertrauensleute104).  However,  the  concerned  unions  (mainly  IG 
Metall and IG Bergbau) managed relatively quickly to start negotiations and thus put 
themselves at the head of the movement. While both unions wished to end the strikes as 
soon as possible, the IG Bergbau tried to portray them as a result of communist and 
student agitators, IG Metall firmly resisted such (conspiracy) theories105.
3D0AB75D-1E433A65/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16600.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005.
102  Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Informationen zur politischen Bildung Heft 258, 
http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/08595360513445560736840565438389.html, last accessed 
September 20st, 2005)
103  Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Informationen zur politischen Bildung Heft 258, 
http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/08595360513445560736840565438389.html, last accessed 
September 20th, 2005; Horst Gobrecht, Improvisiert, zaghaft, perspektivlos und hilflos?, in: 
Marxistische Blätter 5/04, p. 87ff. http://marxblaetter.placerouge.org/2004/04-5-87.html, last 
accessed September 20th, 2005.
104  Literally ‘union trust people’. They provide a link between the union and its members at the shop 
floor, but, unlike the British shop steward, they enjoy neither bargaining nor participation rights.
105  Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Informationen zur politischen Bildung Heft 258, 
http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/08595360513445560736840565438389.html, last accessed 20st 
September 2005.
In the members' magazine of IG Bergbau from September 16th, 1969 the strikes were called “illegal” 
and “doomed to fail”. As to the permissibility of those strikes, the right to strike can be taken from 
Art 9, Abs 3 of the German constitution, the Grundgesetz (GG). However, a great deal of the actual 
rules governing strikes have been made by judges. One of those rules is that an industrial dispute is 
27
The strikes had started as a result of members feeling not sufficiently represented by 
their  unions  (and  a  lot  of  rage  and  disappointment  at  the  conduct  of  union 
representatives during and after the strikes was expressed), but unions incurred little 
loss of trust. This was mainly because works councillors and Vertrauensleute played an 
important role in organising the strikes and enjoyed the special trust of the workers. 
Most of the councillors were union-members, thus depicting a positive image of unions. 
Consequently, unions saw no great need to think about their policies or end their often 
criticised cooperation in the konzertierte Aktion106. 
However,  some  unions  tried  to  learn  from  the  experience  and  strived  for  a 
decentralization  of  their  bargaining  policy.  Eager  not  to  be  outdone  by  workplace 
militants again, they tried for record wage claims after 1969. IG Metall achieved a more 
than 10% rise after token strikes in 1970 and the 1971 bargaining round saw higher 
demands and more stoppages, including the first strike in the chemical industry for 50 
years107. The unions' successes paid off in terms of memberships: the declining rate of 
only permissible if it is conducted by a union, an employers' association or a single employer – that 
is, by parties that can be parties to a collective agreement (see § 2 Abs. 1 TVG (Tarifvertragsgesetz 
– Law on collective agreements). If a dispute is not carried by one of those parties, it is, as a wildcat 
action, not protected by Art. 9 Abs. 3 GG and illegal; however, if a union later on decides to take 
over such a strike, it will be legalised
(Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, cit. Opp.; Günter Schaub (Ed.), Arbeitsrechts-Handbuch – 
systematische Darstellung und Nachschlagewerk für die Praxis, 11st Edition, München 2005, p. 
1869, § 193, Rn. 13; BAG, December 20th, 1963, 1 AZR 429/62; BAG, October 21th, 1969, 1 AZR 
93/68.
106 http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/08595360513445560736840565438389.html  , last accessed 20st 
September 2005; Peter Birke, 60 Pfennig nicht genug. Muss eine Mark. Wilde Streiks und 
Gewerkschaften in der Bundesrepublik, 1967 – 1973; Manuskript des Vortrages zur Konferenz 
“1968 und die Arbeiter. Ein europäischer Vergleich.” DGB-Bildungszentrum Hattingen, 11. 2. 
2005, p. 7, http://www.labournet.de/diskussion/geschichte/birke.pdf, last accessed April 28th 2006.
107 Peter Birke, 60 Pfennig nicht genug. Muss eine Mark. Wilde Streiks und Gewerkschaften in der 
Bundesrepublik, 1967 – 1973; Manuskript des Vortrages zur Konferenz “1968 und die Arbeiter. Ein 
europäischer Vergleich.” DGB-Bildungszentrum Hattingen, 11. 2. 2005, p.7; Richard Hyman, 
Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, London 2001, p.125; 
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unionisation in  the 1960s was stopped and even reversed,  while  the policy of  high 
claims was brought to an end with the global economical crisis after 1973 108.
The strikes also resulted in a shift of attention away from pure wage bargaining towards 
more “qualitative” demands, eventually leading to the concept of  Humanisierung der 
Arbeit109. “A third response, partly related, was the demand for a greater shopfloor role 
in collective bargaining”; summarized under the heading betriebsnahe Tarifpolitik, this 
could  partly  be  seen  as  a  new emergence  of  the  old  goal  of  a  German-style  shop 
stewards system and works councils more under union authority110. A result was the 
conclusion  of  Lohnrahmentarifvertrag  II  (LRTV  II). This  agreement  contained 
regulations  regarding  “payment  by  results,  shift-work  and  overtime”,  but  also 
arrangements to “determine track speed, minimum hourly rest periods and minimum 
task  times  on  assembly-line  and  repetition  work”111.  It  also brought  some 
decentralisation since the applications of some of its principles were left to company-
Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Die wichtigsten Tarifbewegungen und -abschlüsse, 
http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-68F72AED/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16564.html, last 
accessed September 30th, 2005. 
108 Peter Birke, 60 Pfennig nicht genug. Muss eine Mark. Wilde Streiks und Gewerkschaften in der 
Bundesrepublik, 1967 – 1973; Manuskript des Vortrages zur Konferenz “1968 und die Arbeiter. Ein 
europäischer Vergleich.” DGB-Bildungszentrum Hattingen, 11. 2. 2005, p.7; Richard Hyman, 
Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, London 2001, p.125.
109 Humanisation of work. The concept contained various offensives to improve working conditions in 
order to facilitate self-development and self-realisation. The first phase between 1974 and 1989 
included attempts to better work contents and work relations, and a reduction of cumbering or 
unhealthy labour situations.
(wikipedia, Humanisierung der Arbeitswelt, 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanisierung_der_Arbeitswelt, last accessed May 1st, 2006).
110 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p.126.
111 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p.125f.
Generally, “collective agreements reached in an individual bargaining district are extended across 
Germany, in this case employers were bitterly opposed to the encroachment into managerial 
prerogatives and LRTV II remained an isolated achievement” (Hyman, opp.cit, p. 126).
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level  agreement.  However,  unions’  backing  of  an  increasing  degree  of  shop  floor 
autonomy and  decentralization  of  bargaining  was  merely  rhetoric,  as  union  leaders 
certainly could do without “the emergence of a structure of workplace representatives 
with  the  rights  to  strike  and the  capacity  to  define  their  own collective  bargaining 
priorities”112.  As  will  be  shown  in  following  chapters,  one  of  the  reasons  for  the 
functioning of the dual system is that the spheres of unions and works councils are 
separated; especially, works councils have no bargaining rights.
In 1968, the BAG113 confirmed the illegality of wildcat strikes and held that employers 
had the right to dismiss workers participating without notice. If an employer had asked 
an employee repeatedly and justified to return to work and the employee still objected, 
he was guilty of an insistent refusal to work justifying a dismissal without notice114. 
Solidarity among workers, it was held, didn't justify participation in illegal strikes and 
employers had the right to restore “law and order” in the shop by every lawful mean; in 
case of a wildcat strike that might be a dismissal without notice. The principle of equal 
treatment was not held applicable for dismissals because of illegal strikes so that the 
employer had the right to dismiss one striker but not another, due to the notion that, if 
112 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p.126.
113 BAG 1 AZR 93/68.
Even though this decision was issued just after the September strikes, it didn't concern those but 
rather dealt with a strike that took place in 1967. This decision was subject to criticism since it 
appeared that the reason for the wildcat strike lay in illegal and oppressive behaviour on the side of 
the employer, so that giving him the right to dismiss a striking worker without notice seemed a bit 
hard (Bernd Rüthers, Anmerkung zu BAG 1 AZR 93/69, in: AP Nr 41 zu Artikel 9 GG 
Arbeitskampf).
114  BAG 1 AZR 93/68.
This is generally held to render the continuation of the employment unreasonable for employers and 
thus constitutes an important reason for termination of contract necessary for dismissal without 
notice (Bernd Rüthers, Anmerkung zu BAG 1 AZR 93/68, in: AP Nr 41 zu Artikel 9 GG 
Arbeitskampf).
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an employer presented with an unofficial strike had only the right to dismiss none or all 
of his workers, he would be forced to either concede to the demands of the strikers or 
loose his entire workforce and so suffer an economic loss115.
Confirming its restrictive position towards strikes, the BAG kept up a rather legalistic 
distinction between industrial action with or without union support.  Only the former 
was justified and would not constitute a breach of contract, whereas the second would. 
Considering the number of obstacles the BAG had put before an ‘official’ strike, the 
constitutional right to strike by now was seriously constricted. The fact that not even the 
concept of “solidarity” endured before the court was able to impede any spontaneous 
actions of workers. British unions, on the other hand, enjoy no right to strike but are 
merely covered by immunities against actions in court and Rookes v Barnard has shown 
that this protection might be less broad than expected (and depends on the judiciary); 
thus both systems are able to restrict unions' room for manoeuvre. 
1970 - 1979
United Kingdom
After taking office in 1970, the Conservatives put an end to the Prices and Income 
Board and passed the Industrial Relations Act 1971. For the first time now every written 
collective agreement was presumed to be legally binding, unless otherwise stated in the 
agreement itself. Registration was required to enjoy the protections and benefits, e.g. 
legal assistance in obtaining recognition; however, registered unions would be subject to 
strict requirements and the inspection of the Registrar116.
115  BAG, October 21st, 1969, 1 AZR 93/68.
116  This was quite revolutionary given that up till then it was impossible to make legally enforceable 
agreements. Even though most collective agreements of that time bore the stamp “TINALEA” (this 
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The TUC ordered its unions to not register  alternatively to de-register.  Most unions 
followed, the 32 who didn't de-register were expelled from the TUC. Generally, the Act 
was considered a fiasco117 and it is estimated that some 3,300,000 working days were 
lost due to protests against it118. 
is not a legally enforceable agreement) courts still had to deal with the question of enforceability. In 
1973 the National Industrial Relations Court clarified that the legal enforceability did not apply to 
agreements conducted before the coming into force of the IRA 1971 (Stuart and others v Ministry of  
Defence and Electrical, Electronic and Telecommunications Union/Plumbing Trades Union [1974] 
IRLR 143). In a decision by the Court of Appeal from 1973 the question whether the reduction of an 
oral understanding to writing constitutes a “written agreement” and therefore a legally binding 
agreement was left open (The Mitsubishi Banks v National Union of Bank Employees [1974] ICR 
200).
The Act contained other measures concerning collective agreements and collective bargaining, for 
example legal provisions regarding recognition matters or machinery for and registration of 
procedure agreements. The Act furthermore provided for positive and negative freedom of coalition 
thus rendering the pre-entry closed shop illegal. In fact, the IRA 1971 did introduce statutory 
machinery for recognition for the first time and by their mere existence (Kidner described them as 
“somewhat legalistic and inflexible”) an extension of recognition especially among smaller 
employers was achieved. The National Industrial Relations Court was introduced as a division of the 
High Court, among its powers was the right to order a 60-day cooling off period or a ballot before a 
strike; it could also take action if written collective agreements were broken. There were to be no 
more legal immunities for unions in sympathy strikes and, importantly, it established the tort of 
“unfair industrial practice”, meaning those undertaking or being responsible for industrial action 
might be liable in damages and be the subject of an injunction unless the authorised by an official 
(there was a limit to damages for registered unions, according to their size, the limit for the biggest 
union was ₤ 100,000. No such limit was given for unregistered unions). This was derived from the 
Donovan Commission's analysis that officials needed to get a grip on shop stewards and rendered 
unofficial strikes illegal. These provisions were passed without consultation of the TUC, as has been 
good practice since 1945. In addition, the new Government made it harder for strikers' families to 
receive state support.
The Act also contained provisions on unfair dismissal of striking workers, stating in s 26 that a 
employee, who was dismissed because of his taking part in a strike or in “any irregular industrial 
action short of a strike” can only claim unfair dismissal if it can be shown that other employees 
taking part in that action were not dismissed or that other employees who were dismissed because if 
the industrial action were offered re-installment. (s 33 (4) provided the definition for irregular action 
short of a strike: “In this Act ‘irregular industrial action short of a strike’ means any concerted 
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National strikes reappeared and working days lost hit levels unknown since the 1920s, 
rendering policies of wage restraints unsuccessful. Wage rises up to 15 % were given119. 
The Counter Inflation (Temporary Provisions Act) 1972 was launched and imposed a 
statutory pay and price freeze for 90 days120.
In January 1972, the NUM had called the first national miners strike since 1926, with 
Arthur  Scargill  developing  his  system of  “flying  pickets”  picketing  power  stations, 
steelworks, ports and coal depots to stop their depots from being refilled. In February, 
state of emergency was declared but in the end the Government had to give in. The 
miners gained a 20% pay rise but in September 1973, after rejecting an offer of another 
13% pay rise, the NUM imposed an overtime ban. The prime minister announced a 
three-day working week for the beginning of 1974, followed by power cuts. People 
were told “to brush their teeth in the dark”. When the miners balloted for an “all-out 
strike” the Government “called a general election on the issue of ‘who governs Britain’” 
- and lost. Before the election the Pay Board had given out the information that their 
course of conduct (other than a strike) which, in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, -(a) 
is carried on by a group of workers with the intention of preventing, reducing or otherwise 
interfering with the production of  goods or the provision of services, and (b) in the case of some or 
all of them, is carried on in breach of their contracts of employment or (where they are not 
employees) in breach of their terms and conditions of service”).
(W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 222f; Philip 
Kolvin, Collective Bargaining – Don't Cry for me Tina Lea, in: Current Law Week, 2000 8(8); Brian 
Doyle, Legal Regulation of Collective Bargaining, in: Roy Lewis (Ed.), Labour Law in Britain, 
Oxford 1986, p. 112; H. A. Clegg, The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, 
Oxford 1979, p. 320; Richard Kidner, Trade Union Law, London 1979, p. 296.)
117  Few complaints were made to the Industrial Court; the “cooling-off-period” was only used once, in 
spring 1972 in connection with a railway dispute. When a ballot was imposed as well, the workers 
voted with a great majority for strike (W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 
– 1998, London 1999, p. 223).
118 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 224.
119 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 225ff.
120 Chronicle September 1972 – December 1972, Government Policy and Activities, in: British Journal 
for Industrial Relations, Vol.11, p. 149.
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calculation of miner's wages “revealed that they were in fact substantially less well paid 
than workers in manufacturing industry”121.
The new Labour Government passed the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act 1974, 
repealing the IRA 1971122.  
The Employment Protection Act 1975 extended individual workers' rights and included, 
inter  alia,  rights  to  guaranteed payments and improved protection from dismissal123. 
Unions were granted some immunities against legal action for breach of contract and 
the closed shop was protected124. It gave trade unions a right to obtain information from 
the employer for bargaining purposes and with included a provision for the extension of 
collectively agreed terms125. Employers were obliged to consult with trade unions before 
121 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 225ff.
122 H. A. Clegg, The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, Oxford 1979, p.383.
The 1971 Act had abolished most of the legislation on trade unions and trade disputes since 1871 
and a complete repeal would have meant a return to the situation before 1871; apart from that, 
government as well as unions wished to maintain some of the provision, e.g. on unfair dismissal. 
(Clegg, opp. Cit. p. 383)
The provisions of unfair dismissal because of taking part industrial action were for the most part 
taken on, however, on important change was that industrial action didn't require breach of contract 
anymore and other industrial action was not qualified as being irregular and short of strike anymore. 
It was confirmed in  Power Packing v Faust and others [1983] Court of Appeal, QB 471, that “once 
an industrial tribunal decided that an employee was, at the time of his dismissal, taking part in 
industrial action, whether in breach of contract or not,..., the tribunal must, ..., refuse to entertain the 
employee's complaint of unfair dismissal, unless he had been subjected to discriminatory treatment 
in regard to the dismissal or re-engagement within the meaning of s 62 (2) of the Act”.
123 Brian Doyle, Legal Regulation of Collective bargaining, in: Roy Lewis (Ed.), Labour Law in 
Britain, Oxford 1986, p. 112f.
For example, it rendered dismissal or discrimination because of trade union membership unfair 
(Doyle, cit. opp., p. 112f.)
124 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 230f.
125 Brian Doyle, Legal Regulation of Collective bargaining, in: Roy Lewis (Ed.), Labour Law in 
Britain, Oxford 1986, p. 113.
Schedule 11, operating from January 1str, 1977, allowed independent trade unions or an employers’ 
association to make a claim to the ACAS (which then will be transferred to the CAC (Central 
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redundancies; the Act therefore meant an improvement of unions’ position both within 
and outside of the plant126. The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) 
was established as an independent body “charged with the general duty of promoting 
the improvement of industrial relations, and in particular of encouraging the extension 
of collective bargaining”127.
Labour  also  abandoned statutory incomes policies  and  instead relied  on  the  ‘Social 
Contract’: unions agreed to keep demands for wage rises in line with the increase in the 
retail price index; in turn the Government would commit “to social policies, including 
improved employee protection”128. 
In 1976, the Trade Unions Amendment Act extended the protection of the closed shop 
by giving protection against dismissal only to those who objected to unionisation on 
religious grounds129.
Union membership had reached record levels with more than 60% density among men 
Arbitration Committee) if it cannot be otherwise settled) to invoke either terms and conditions set by 
industry or national agreement or observed generally for comparable employees in the same trade or 
industry, thus basically extending the principles of the 1946 Fair Wage Resolution to private 
employers. The provisions were widely used, with 1,900 claims being made to ACAS in the first 
two years of which 685 achieved an award. This high number has been linked to the continuation of 
incomes policy since awards made by the CAC were exempted from restrictions under the Attack on 
Inflation.
(Brian Bercusson, The New Fair Wages Policy: Schedule 11 to the Employment Protection Act, in: 
The Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 129ff. (p. 129); Michael Jones, CAC and Schedule 11: 
The Experience of Two Years, in: The Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 28ff. (p. 28f., 33, 35, 
42))
126  Brian Doyle, Legal Regulation of Collective Bargaining, in: Roy Lewis (Ed.), Labour Law in 
Britain, Oxford 1986, p. 113.
These consultation obligations were an implementation of the Directive for Collective 
Redundancies, see Chapter IV.
127  GS Morris, TJ Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, 2nd Edition, London 1993, p. 30; 
Richard Kidner, Trade Union Law, London 1979, p. 296.
128 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 230.
129 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 230f.
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and  more  than  50%  overall  in  1974.  Unions  used  the  moment  and,  by  “catch-up 
increases and demand for earlier pay rises to be incorporated into basic pay”, secured 
pay rises of 35% and more. However, after yet another sterling crisis in 1975 restraining 
measures on wages, prices and dividends were, with TUC agreement, imposed once 
again. In 1977, with inflation rising and real wages falling, miners demanded a pay rise 
of  nearly  50%130 and  the  TUC,  in  violation  of  the  Social  Contract,  voted  for  “the 
abolition of all wage restraint”. The Government tried to impose a 5% maximum on 
wage increases in the autumn of 1978 and, without TUC support of the restraint, was 
soon facing the “winter of discontent”131. Unions declared they would not comply with 
any wage restraint and called for a return to free collective bargaining with demands for 
pay rises as high as 40%. When those were unmet, industrial action followed throughout 
the  country.  As  Moss  Evans,  then  Secretary  of  the  TGWU,  put  it:  “It  is  not  my 
responsibility to manage the economy. We are concerned with getting the rate for the 
job.”132 However, the decision to reject “the concept of incorporation into the process of 
government in favour of the traditional free-for-all of the voluntarism system of wage 
negotiations” led to the defeat of the Labour Government at the 1979 elections133.
Germany
The 70s were characterised by the after-effects of the 1968 revolt, resulting in greater 
shop floor  militancy and wildcat strikes.  Also,  the ensuing global  economical  crisis 
soon  changed  the  focus  of  collective  bargaining  away  from  pure  wage  bargaining 
towards more protection against rationalisation.
130 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 231f.
131 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 233.
132 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 233f.
133 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 235.
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In 1971, the BAG again had to deal with the question of whether a lock-out cancelled or 
just suspended the contracts of employment and amended the rules set up in 1955134. 
Employers’ right to lockout was upheld in principle under the aspect of Kampfparität135, 
but the right to a terminating lockout was restricted. 
Against  the  background of  ‘pinpoint  strikes’136,  suspending  lockouts  of  non-striking 
workers would serve a purpose. It was also held that those could be meaningfully used 
against striking workers. Employers could use them as a first warning sign and switch to 
a terminating lockout later, they could also hold up the lockout after the fighting union 
had declared the end of the strike. However, under the principle of commensurability 
employers  were  only  allowed  to  do  so  if  they  were  still  using  the  lockout  as  a 
Kampfmittel137 to pursue aims of the industrial dispute. 
A terminating lockout was held to be only permissible under certain circumstances. 
While  an  employer  usually  would  not  have  a  schutzwürdiges  Interesse138 for  a 
terminating lockout, this may change during the course of the strike and due to special 
circumstances. Since industrial action may only be taken with the aim of concluding a 
collective  agreement  and  industrial  peace  shall  be  restored  as  quick  as  possible, 
employers might need to answer a longer lasting strike with a terminating lockout in 
order to facilitate an agreement. The employer might also try to rationalise jobs in a 
longer lasting conflict, this too would justify a terminating lockout. As an answer to 
illegal strikes, terminating lockouts are subject to fewer constraints.
134 BAG Großer Senat, Beschluß vom 21. April 1971, GS 1/68
135 Literally ‘battle parity’. See footnote 61 for a more extensive explanation.
136 Strikes involving only a limited number of workers but rendering a bigger number useless.   
137  Literally ‘means of battle’ – means that are (legally) used in industrial action.
138  Literally ‘interest worthy of protection’. A schutzwürdiges Interesse must be present for a 
terminating lockout to be justified.
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It was also held that generally employees, as long as their jobs are still existent, are to 
be reinstated after a terminating lockout. This departure from the 1955 decision was 
founded with the argument that the earlier decision didn’t take the fact into account that 
industrial action is a means to an end. After the goal is met, industrial peace has to be 
restored and therefore, as far as possible, the locked-out workers have to be reinstated. 
Reinstatement therefore lay not in the free, but in the fair discretion of the employer139. 
This does not mean that all employees are to be reinstated; in fact, if an employee’s job 
has  been  given  to  someone  else  or  is  no  longer  existent  due  to  rationalisation, 
reinstatement is neither possible nor necessary. However, if the job is still available, and 
the strike had been legitimate, the mere fact that the employee had taken part in it does 
not justify a refusal of reinstatement. Was the strike illegitimate, employees who knew 
about the illegitimacy and still played a prominent role in the dispute need not to be 
reinstated;  however,  also  after  an  illegitimate  strike  the  employer  has  to  consider 
reinstatement with fair discretion. 
The Große Senat thus widely restricted the right to lockouts. Also, re-instalment after 
the  dispute  now  was  fully  reviewable  by  the  courts,  giving  workers  rights  against 
discriminatory and disciplinary measures by the employers. 
In 1973, wildcat strikes occurred again140 and about 275.000 employees in 335 plants 
139 The difference between “fair” and “free” discretion is that fair discretion is fully verifiable by the 
courts, who check if the specific workplace is still existent and free and also if the final cancellation 
of just this contract was necessary; if just one of a number or comparable workplaces is not 
available anymore the court also have to check if the employer chose the workers to be terminated 
in a proper way.
140 A collective agreement conducted in that year for the steel industry provided for a wage rise of 
8.5%. Steelworkers, however, were not content with this margin and so the first strikes soon 
erupted, since a collective agreement had just been conducted these strikes took place during the 
peace obligation and were not supported by any union. It started off with 100 employees of 
Hülsbeck & Fürst in Velbert, soon to be followed by about 15.000 Hoesch employees in Dortmund. 
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joined the strikes between February and October. Most of the strikes were successful in 
gaining cost of living bonuses of 20 or 30 Mark per month, rises of up to one Mark 
more per hour or other benefits141.
Reactions of the unions were, as in 1969, “ambivalent and contradictory”. As Markovits 
pointed out, “the strikes provided both a learning experience and an opportunity to co-
opt  the militancy of  the workforce”,  but  unions also tried to  discipline the activists 
(especially  those  where  communist  influence  was  suspected)  and  some  even  were 
expelled142.
The Mannesmann plant in Duisburg-Huickingen was occupied for a week and in April about 10.000 
workers of Volkswagen joined the strike. The best known incident, however, is probably the strike 
at Ford's Cologne plant at the end of August 1973. 17.000 workers went on strike with the central 
demand being a wage rise of 1 mark per hour. During the strike other demands, like higher manning 
on machines, 6 weeks paid holiday and lowering of average work rates, were added. However, 
management tried splitting the workforce between Germans and Turks (with help from IG Metall 
work council members, who negotiated concessions with management improving mainly the 
situation of the German workers without taking the demands of the Turkish workers into account). 
Eventually a fight between strikers and strike-breakers, accompanied by a massive police presence, 
broke out and finally the leaders of the strike were fired.  (One factor that differed the 1973 strikes 
from the ones that took place in 1969 was the often a central focus of dissent was the situation of 
migrant workers; this is especially true of the Ford strike, which was mainly carried out and 
supported by Turkish workers. Many immigrants had the impression that the politics of works 
councils and trade unions were mainly benefiting the – usually more skilled and better paid – 
German workforce while neglecting the concerns and issues of the “guest workers”, usually 
employed in low wage groups, such as “work intensification in routine jobs, insecurity, and arbitrary 
and oppressive discipline”. 
(Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p.125.; Ursel Beck, Vor 30 Jahren – August 1973 – Höhepunkt wilder Streiks, 
http://www.labournet.de/diskussion/geschichte/august73.html, last accessed September 
21st, 2005).
141 Ursel Beck, Vor 30 Jahren – August 1973 – Höhepunkt wilder Streiks, 
http://www.labournet.de/diskussion/geschichte/august73.html, last accessed September 21st, 2005.
142 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p.125.
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The global economic crisis, triggered by the oil price shock in 1973/74, didn’t leave 
Germany  unscathed143.  It  put  unions  in  a  defensive  position  and  thus  collective 
agreements of this time concentrate more on protecting employees against job cuts and 
negative effects of new technologies rather than wage rises. In this context the idea of 
job-protection  through  reduction  of  working  time  gained  importance.  In  1977,   IG 
Metall demanded the 35-hour week for the first time 144. 
Different  from  British  unionism,  the  DGB  favoured  state  intervention  to  counter 
unemployment,  even  though  it  was  aware  of  the  fact  that  this  form  of 
Konjunkturpolitik145 would  increase  public  deficits.  However,  such  spending,  it  was 
argued,  should  be  seen  as  a  loan.  After  all,  the  state  would  benefit  from a  higher 
employment rate not only in terms of taxes and social  expenditures but also in less 
money spent on unemployment and welfare benefits146.
1979 – 1984
143  Andrei S. Markovits, Christopher S. Allen, Power and Dissent: The Trade Unions in the Federal 
Republic of Germany Re-Examined, in: Jack Hayward (Ed.), Trade Unions and Politics in Western 
Europe, London 1980, p. 75.
Capital and labour had different concepts for dealing with the situation. In the eyes of employers, 
wage restraints would lead to higher profits, more investment and thus, eventually, to more 
employment. Unions, on the other hand, advocated wage increases, which, since workers were 
providing the largest group of consumers, would lead to higher consumption, thus to higher profits 
and more investments and, eventually, to more jobs (Markovits and Allen, cit. opp., p. 77)
144 Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitik – 70er Jahre: Boom, 
Wirtschaftskrise, Massenarbeitslosigkeit, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-
A1A41265/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16601.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005.
145 Business cycle policy.
146 Andrei S. Markovits, Christopher S. Allen, Power and Dissent: The Trade Unions in the Federal 
Republic of Germany Re-Examined, in: Jack Hayward (Ed.), Trade Unions and Politics in Western 
Europe, London 1980, p. 78.
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United Kingdom
The election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 heralded a new age in the relations between 
state  and  trade  unions.  While  in  the  1960s  Kahn-Freund  could  write  about  British 
industrial relations that “there is perhaps no major country in the world in which the law 
has played a less significant role in the shaping of these relations”147; at the end of the 
Thatcher regime those had come to be “one of the most tightly regulated systems in 
advanced democracies.”148
Thatcher believed in the free market's ability to correct all economic wrongs and set off 
to reduce trade union power by cutting back on their legal protections and giving greater 
freedom to the Common Law; she fiercely believed that trade unions impeded the free 
market. The rights of employers to hire and fire at will were believed to be crucial for 
the free market and therefore for economic success. Unemployment benefits had to be 
cut down since in Conservative belief high benefits stopped dismissed workers from 
competing with employed workers by being willing to work for a lower salary, so that 
the  market  could  not  properly  operate  (and  reduce  wages)149.  For  the  Conservative 
Government of 1979 trade unions were the root of all economic evil: 
“the  real  exploiters  in  our  present  society  are  not  egoistic  capitalists  or 
entrepreneurs and in fact not separate individuals but organisations which derive 
their power from the moral support of collective action and group loyalty”; 
or, as F.A. Hayek, who had an important intellectual influence of the government, put it: 
147 Otto Kahn-Freund, Legal Framework, in: Allan Flanders, H. A. Clegg, The System of Industrial 
Relations in Great Britain – Its History, Law and Institutions, Oxford 1967, p. 42ff. (p. 44).
148 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 5.
149 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 11f.
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“These legalised powers of the unions have become the biggest obstacle to raising 
the living standards of the working class as a whole. They are the chief cause of the 
unnecessarily big difference between the best-and worst-paid workers. They are the 
prime source of unemployment. They are the main reason for the decline of the 
British economy in general”150.  
Since  the  First  World  War  unions  had  become more  and  more  integrated  into  the 
political system. Now, they were treated with a policy of exclusion and efforts were 
made  to  weaken  their  power  (and  workers'  power  in  general),  to  strengthen  the 
individual  at  the  expense  of  the  unions,  and,  of  course,  to  undermine  collective 
bargaining151. Conservatives aimed at the restoration of one-to-one negotiations, linked 
to  their  desire  to  obtain  a  greater  flexibility  of  labour.  Furthermore,  they  were  not 
content with the weakening of collective bargaining that would automatically yield from 
the weakening of trade unions, but in addition abolished specific instruments aiding the 
process, such as the Fair Wages resolution or the Wage Councils. The apex was the 
elimination of the teachers' collective bargaining machinery in 1987. Needless to say, 
union de-recognition was on a rise and the government was determined “to resist EEC 
initiatives  which  might  stimulate  a  strengthening  or  extension  of  collective 
bargaining”152.
The first Employment Act to be passed under the new Government in 1980 was not 
particularly revolutionary, though. Employment Secretary James Prior still stood in the 
conservative tradition of maintaining industrial  peace.  While secondary strike action 
150 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 12f.
151 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 238.
152 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 18f.
42
was  rendered  illegal  (and  corresponding  immunities  for  officials  removed)  and 
picketing only allowed if carried out by workers of the affected workplace153, it didn't 
abolish the closed shop. These could still be set up if 80 % of the workers covered by 
the agreement voted for it in a ballot; existing closed shops were left untouched. Unions 
themselves did not lose any of their immunities154. However, the two Social Security 
153 Charles G. Hanson, Taming the Trade Unions – A Guide to the Thatcher Government's 
Employment Reforms, 1980 - 1990, London 1991, p. 24; W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British 
Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 235; Brian Bercusson, Picketing, Secondary 
Picketing and Secondary Action, in: The Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 215ff. (p. 215).
Secondary action remained lawful, however, if it principal purpose is to directly prevent or disrupt 
the supply during the dispute of goods and services between an employer party to the dispute and 
the employer subject to the secondary action . And although picketing at one's own place of work 
was not rendered illegal it may constitute secondary action and might thus be unlawful). The 
adoption of a subjective interpretation of the words “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade 
disputes” by the House of Lords in Express Newspapers v McShane [1980] 2 WR 89 (H.L.), where 
it was held that statutory immunity was to be granted if it could be reasonably believed that the 
secondary action could further the dispute, was thus rendered untenable.
(Bercusson, cit op., p. 216f, 221)
154 Charles G. Hanson, Taming the Trade Unions – A Guide to the Thatcher Government's 
Employment Reforms, 1980 - 1990, London 1991, p. 24; W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British 
Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 235; Patrick Elias, Closing in on the Closed Shop, 
in: The Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 201ff. (p. 201f, 204). 
However, the Closed Shop began to be under attack since the statutory rights of non-members in a 
closed shop were extended. 
The Code of Practice on Closed Shop Agreements and Arrangements, which was issued by the 
Secretary of State for Employment with powers given by the Employment Act, made the 
introduction or the maintaining of a closed shop much more difficult, however. It stated pretty clear 
that the government wished to put an end to the closed shop; about pre-entry closed shops it was 
said that “no new agreements of this type should be contemplated and where they currently exist the 
need for their continuation should be carefully reviewed”. The point of closed shops, providing 
solidarity and a united workforce as well as reinforcing union discipline, was diminished by the fact 
that union membership agreements (!) should provide that a closed-shop worker, when refusing to 
participate in industrial action and therefore being removed from his union, cannot be dismissed. 
Existing closed shops should be reviewed every few years. Similar was true for the Code of Practice 
on Picketing, which equally worsened the legal situation of pickets and picketing in general, by for 
example restricting the number of pickets to six at any entrance to a workplace.
(John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
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Acts  of  1980 drastically  cut  down on benefits  for  anyone  who lost  their  jobs  as  a 
consequence of a trade dispute155. In agreement with the Government’s hostile position 
towards unions, the 1975 legislation regarding trade union recognition was abolished 
and ACAS given the authority to deal with recognition claims. ACAS now had less 
recognition claims referred to and the proportion of successful claims declined156. 
Unemployment was rising and the Conservatives had made it clear from the beginning 
that  their  priority  was  to  reduce  and  control  inflation  rather  than  fighting 
unemployment157 and, as former TUC General Secretary Len Murray admitted later on, 
unions were unprepared for Thatcher's attack: 
“We didn't believe a lot of what she was saying... we just didn't believe it. Our 
major  error  was  that  we  didn't  believe  she  was  committed  to  a  very  radical 
reorganisation in the industrial relations field”. 
1991, p. 30, 43; Patrick Elias, Closing in on the Closed Shop, in: The Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 9, 
No. 4, p. 201ff (p.201, 204.))
155 Martin Partington, Unemployment, Industrial Conflict and Social Security, in: The Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 243ff. (p. 248).
Unemployment benefit was never available to anyone participating or directly interested in a 
dispute, but dependants could claim supplementary benefits. The 1980 Acts stated that all payments 
received during the dispute were taken into account, whereas there had been a ₤4 before. There 
would also be no payments if the weekly rate would be ₤12 or less, rates above ₤12 would be 
diminished by ₤12 and no urgent needs payments were to be made. No extra allowances for heating 
or special allowances would be made if a member of the family was engaged in a industrial dispute 
(Partington, cit. opp., p. 249f.).
156 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 26.
However, the procedure had been so complex that employers had been able to find a series of legal 
loopholes to challenge ACAS findings. Still, statutory recognition was not to be reintroduced until 
1999.
(Richard Painter, Ann Holmes, Cases & Materials on Employment Law, 4th Edition, Oxford 2002, p. 
698; GS Morris, TJ Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, London 1993, p. 5; see 
Grunwick v ACAS [1975], AC 655).
157 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 236.
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Therefore,  unions  didn’t  develop  a  strategy  of  opposition;  it  has  to  be  admitted, 
however,  that  “the bitty,  piecemeal nature of the legislation,  despite its  wide sweep 
when examined as a whole, made coordinated opposition difficult”158.
The 1982 Employment Act, passed under Norman Tebbit  as Employment Secretary, 
tightened legislation on the closed shop, with pre-entry ones made illegal and post-entry 
ones  requiring  a  ballot  with  85%  approval.  Additionally,  unions  were  obliged  to 
compensate any worker who did “not accept a closed shop”. Employers were given 
greater freedom to dismiss striking workers and a right “to sue for damages and to get 
court injunctions to halt industrial action”159. 
The definition of a trade dispute  was narrowed so that from now on, only disputes 
between workers  and  their employer  would  fit  the  definition  and therefore  provide 
immunity  to  union  officials  acting  in  “contemplation  or  furtherance  of  a  trade 
158 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 49f.; Len Murray was interviewed in “The Thatcher Decade” Radio 4,  April 11, 1989. 
159 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 237; GS 
Morris, TJ Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, 2nd Edition, London 1993 p. 5;  K.D. 
Ewing, Industrial Action: Another Step in the “Right” Direction, in: The Industrial Law Journal Vol. 
11, No. 4, p. 209ff. (p. 209). 
The Act was also intended to reverse the decision (which was considered aberrant and was 
inconsistent with Rookes v Barnard) of the Court of Session in Plessey PLC v Wilson [1982] IRLR 
198, where it was held that “unlawful acts may attract immunity where the only consequences which 
give rise to a claim in reparation are interferences with the trade or business of the complainer.” (K. 
D. Ewing, cit. opp., p. 209).
These rights were soon applied when the National Graphical Association (NGA) tried to “enforce a 
closed shop and existing agreed employment conditions in provincial newspapers at a Warrington 
newspaper printing works by the use of mass picketing”. It ended up with fines of ₤50.000, 
enhanced to ₤100.000 after refusing to obey to court orders. Its attempt to call a nationwide 
sympathy strike was declared illegal and it became clear that the General Council of the TUC would 
not back up further action. It was fined another ₤ 525.000 and the NGA finally had to back down 
just to survive (W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, 
p. 237f.)
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dispute”160. Disputes between different groups of workers were no longer considered to 
be  trade  disputes  and  political  strikes  were  also  much  harder  to  fit  under  the  new 
definition.  It  was  rendered  unlawful  to  resort  to  industrial  action  to  support  or  to 
demonstrate solidarity with fighting workers abroad, unless it was likely that British 
workers would be affected by the foreign dispute. It is clear that industrial action now 
was much more likely to be unlawful than it used to be; besides, the right to claim 
unfair dismissal for being selectively dismissed while taking part in industrial action 
was reduced. The immunities of the 1906 Trade Dispute Act were removed and unions 
would be liable for acts presenting economic torts or for conspiracy to commit a tort 
authorised or endorsed by a responsible person. Aside from that, they would also be 
liable for acts of servants or agents undertaken within the scope of their liability or 
endorsed by the union; abolishing the wider immunity for unions compared to that of 
union  officials  or  individuals.  Damages  to  be  put  on  unions  were  limited,  though, 
160 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 58f; GS Morris, TJ Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, 2nd Edition, London 
1993, p. 5; Charles G. Hanson, Taming the Trade Unions – A Guide to the Thatcher Government's 
Employment Reforms, 1980 - 1990, London 1991, p. 24f.; K.D. Ewing, Industrial Action: Another 
Step in the “Right” Direction, in: The Industrial Law Journal Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 209ff.(p. 216).
In 1979 the House of Lords had held that a dispute carried out by the International 
Transport Federation against ship owners who were not meeting the minimum conditions laid down 
by them without participation of the employees in question, would fit the definition “trade dispute” 
since it had a clear connection to terms and conditions of employment, thus recognizing the then 
underlying legislative policy of excluding trade disputes from judicial review. Lord Scarman put it: 
“All that [s. 29 (1)] requires is that the dispute be connected with one or more of the matters it 
mentions. If it be connected, it is a trade dispute and it is immaterial whether the dispute also relates 
to other matters or has an extraneous, e.g. political or personal motive. The connection is all that has 
to be shown”.(NWL v Nelson, NWL v Woods, [1979] 1 WLR 1294 (H.L.); reported in The Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 45ff. (p. 45).) Such action was now rendered unlawful. 
In Express Newspapers v McShane [1980] 2 WLR 89 (H.L.) the House of Lords advocated 
a subjective interpretation of “in furtherance or contemplation” of a trade dispute. A trade dispute 
therefore was given when the act in question could reasonably be believed to foster the dispute. This 
point of view was also outlawed by the new legislation. 
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ranging from ₤10,000 for unions with less than 5,000 members to ₤250,000 for unions 
with more than 100,000 members161.
Government took another step towards individualisation of industrial relations with the 
abolishment of the Fair Wages Resolution in 1983, in force since 1946. The Resolution, 
also  adopted  by  nationalised  industries  and  local  authorities,  had  stated  that  all 
government contractors and subcontractors should pay wages and observe terms and 
conditions not less favourable than those established by collective bargaining in that 
trade or industry162.  The abolishment was in line with arguably the most bold strike 
against  unions  in  the  early  days of  the Thatcher  Government;  the  banning of  trade 
unions  at  the  GCHQ  at  Cheltenham.  Although  the  last  union  members  were  not 
161 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 60f; GS Morris, TJ Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, 2nd Edition, London 
1993, p. 5; Charles G. Hanson, Taming the Trade Unions – A Guide to the Thatcher Government's 
Employment Reforms, 1980-1990, London 1991, p. 24f.; K:D: Ewing, Industrial Action: Another 
Step in the “Right” Direction, in: The Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 209ff. (p. 215); 
Essex Papers in Politic and Government, No 79: David Marsh, Trade Unions under Mrs Thatcher: 
Loss without Limit?, Essex 1991, p. 5. 
s 15(3) provides that a responsible person would either be “(a) the principal executive committee of 
the union; (b) any other person who is empowered by the rules to authorise or endorse acts of the 
kinds in question; (c) the president or general secretary; (d) any other employed official; and (e) any 
committee of the union to whom an employed official regularly reports”. Categories (d) and (e) 
would not incur liability when the act was repudiated by the union or the person acting was not 
allowed to authorize or endorse such acts. However, a union would also not be liable in tort when 
the action in question was authorized by a ballot of members or a conference of the union or if it 
was ultra vires the rules of the union (K.D. Ewing, opp. cit., p. 219, 221).
162 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 62f.
Even though employees enjoyed no direct rights under the Fair Wages Resolution, they had the right 
to make a complaint to the CAC that an employer failed to meet the described standards but a 
decision in favour of the employee did not become automatically part of the employment contract 
but only if the employer agreed to incorporate its implications into the contract  (Brian Doyle, Legal 
Regulation of Collective bargaining, in: Roy Lewis (Ed.), Labour Law in Britain, Oxford 1986, p. 
120f.).
47
dismissed until 1988, it was not before 1997, when Labour took office again, before the 
right to union membership was at least partly restored163. 
While the Trade Unions Act 1984 mainly contained provisions regarding union ballots, 
whether in “union elections, […] prior to industrial action and […] on the maintenance 
of  unions’  political  funds”,  unions  were  also  held  legally  responsible  for  official 
industrial action. Statutory immunity granted by s 13 of TULRA 1974 against liability 
in tort was now only to be given if a ballot was held with a majority vote in favour prior 
to the industrial action164.
The miners' strike in 1984-85 demonstrated the weakening of unions due to Thatcher's 
policy. The NUM, traditionally one of the more militant unions, had to bow down to the 
law eventually165.  Since  there  had  never  been  a  ballot,  as  required under  the  Trade 
Unions Act 1984, the strike was technically illegal and therefore the “union could not 
refer to the stoppage as official, issue  instructions to the membership to strike and to 
respect  picket  lines  or  initiate  disciplinary  action  against  strike  breakers”166. 
163 W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700 – 1998, London 1999, p. 239.
164  John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 81; GS Morris, TJ Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, 2nd Edition, London 
1993, p. 5; Charles G. Hanson, Taming the Trade Unions – A Guide to the Thatcher Government's 
Employment Reforms, 1980 - 1990, London 1991, p. 27; John Hutton, Solving the Strike Problem: 
Part II of the Trade Union Act 1984, in: The Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 212ff. (p. 
212).
165 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 88.
Interestingly, it did not have to back down to the new Acts of the 1980s but rather to criminal law 
used by the police (McIllroy, cit. opp. p. 88).
166 Taylor v NUM (Derbyshire Area) [1984] IRLR 440; John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - 
Conservative Law  and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 1991, p. 91; K. D. Ewing, The Strike, the 
Courts and the Rule-Books, in: The Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 14, No 3, p. 160ff. (p. 162), in a 
number of Areas the strike was also illegal due to breach of Area rules.
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Additionally, the police treated the recommendations of the Picketing Code of Practice 
as  a  legal  norm,  restricting  the  number  of  “official”  pickets  to  six.  Massive  police 
presence regularly outnumbered pickets, though police action against them varied from 
utter determination in enforcing the picket regulations of the Employment Act 1980 to 
co-operation  with  the  official  pickets167.  The  law  (not  only  Employment  law  but 
Common, Civil and Criminal law as well) was used on a much greater scale in this 
conflict than it was in former major disputes, confirming “the growing ‘legalisation’ of 
industrial  conflict  in  Britain”168.  The  priced  “free  market”  and  deregulation  of  the 
economy hence was accompanied by tight regulation of union activities.
167 Peter Wallington, Policing the Minders' Strike, in: The Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 
145ff. (p. 153); John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade 
Unions, Nottingham 1991, p. 88f.
168 John McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution? - Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Nottingham 
1991, p. 93. 
For example, in Thomas v NUM (South Wales Area) [1985] 2 All ER 1 the picketing in 
question didn't fell under the provision of s 16(1) of the Employment Act 1980 for lawful picketing 
and it was declared that mass picketing presented a common law nuisance and therefore a tort as 
well as being criminal under s7 of the 1875 Act. In Taylor v NUM (Yorkshire Area), [1985] The 
Times 20 November 1985, union members applied for a decision that payment from union funds to 
support the strike were unlawful and a misapplication of the union's funds. The High Court held that 
“payments made by the defendant union in connection with the strike against the National Coal 
Board to pickets for picketing duty and for the relief of hardship f miners on strike were beyond the 
powers of the union since the strike was not authorised and was in breach of the union's rules. The 
payments were therefore an unlawful misapplication of the union's funds.” However, the officials 
were not required to restore the money to the union since it could not be out-ruled that a majority of 
the members would resolve that no action should be taken. In Taylor v NUM (Derbyshire Area) 
[1984] IRLR 440 the High Court ruled that the strike called by the NUM and the Derbyshire Area of 
the union was in breach of the rules of the NUM and the Derbyshire Union und thus invalid. It was 
also unlawful since there hadn't been a national ballot and the Derbyshire ballot had turned out 
against the strike. Therefore the union was not entitled to discipline the plaintiffs for disregarding 
instructions to strike or to not cross picket lines. The suspension of the membership of the plaintiffs 
for continuing to work was therefore void. 
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Germany
Policies  of  collective  agreements  in  the  early  80s  were  characterised  by  a  sharp 
economic recession which peaked in 1982. Unemployment crossed the 2-million mark. 
Furthermore, 1982 brought a conservative government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
that was to last for 16 years, and which, even though German conservatism under Kohl 
was less hostile to trade unions than  the Thatcher Government, still brought about an 
economic and financial policy that was mainly supply orientated and entailed a drastic 
reduction in social benefits and protection rights169.
Probably  the  most  important  topic  in  tariff  disputes  during  the  1980s  was 
Arbeitszeitverkürzung170.  IG Metall  had  decided  to  campaign  for  the  35  hour  week 
without loss of pay in the late 1970s. Many unions thought this unachievable and were 
not  convinced  that  it  was  actually  a  way  to  save  jobs,  but  IG Metall  managed  to 
persuade the DGB to adopt this goal171.
169 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p.127; Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitk -80er Jahre: 
Arbeitszeitverkürzung und qualitative Tarifpolitk, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
3D0AB75D-A1A41265/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16602.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005.
170 Reduction in working hours.
171 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p.128f. 
A taboo catalog by employers listed the 35-hour week, however the connection between working 
time and unemployment and the discussion on working time itself was a dominating topic at that 
time, for the Green Party supported in their programme for the elections to the Deutscher Bundestag 
in 1983 the aim of a 35-hour week with full pay for low and middle paid jobs and the Social 
Democrats advocated an “international employment pact” which should supply a lead-in to the 35-
hour week as well as to a reduction of the life-working-time (Lebensarbeitszeit).  The Liberals had a 
passage on “liberalization of working time” as well, but rather in terms of part-time jobs while the 
Christian democrats and the Christian Social Union rather preferred to lower the pension age and 
create more part-time jobs  (Rolf A. Beyer, Deutschland heute – Politik – Wirtschaft – Gesellschaft, 
Leamington Spa  1986, p. 84f.; Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – 
Between Market, Class & Society, London 2001, p.128f).
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A first  strike for  the  35-hour  week in  the  steel  industry did achieve  some benefits 
included on the employers’ taboo list172 (increased holiday entitlement, for example) 
while failing to gain any reduction in the working week. The main disputes, a six-and-a-
half week strike in the metal industry and a twelve week dispute in printing, the most 
expensive and bitterly fought in the history of German labour battles, occurred in 1984. 
When the former was ended by arbitration, the outcome was a complicated compromise. 
The average working week would be 38.5 hours, but the individual standard working 
week could be anywhere between 37 and 40 hours. The details were left for discussions 
between management and works councils on the shopfloor. However, a breakthrough 
through the “40-hour-barrier”  was achieved and soon the general  norm for working 
hours in collective agreements was 38.5, with IG Metall and IG Medien obtaining the 
35 hour week by the mid 90s173.
Unions celebrated the reduction of the working week and regarded the 1984 strikes as 
proof of their ability to act even in times of economic crisis (besides, the second step of 
reduction of working time in 1987 was achieved without any industrial action); but the 
price to pay,  apart  from greater flexibility,  was a shift  of  power towards the works 
councils that were now able to undercut unions' official politics on the company level. A 
172 A list by employers who got known to the public shortly before. It included certain topics employers 
thought were not negotiable.
173 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p.128f; Stephen J. Silva, Every which Way but Loose – German Industrial Relations 
Since 1980, in: Andrew Martin, George Ross et al., The Brave New Wold of European Labour – 
European Trade Unions at the Millennium, Oxford 1999, p. 75ff. (p. 99); Wildcat Zirkular, 35-
Stunden-Woche: Weniger Lohn und mehr Arbeit, http://www.wildcat-
www.de/zirkular/48/z48azver.htm, last accessed September 27th, 2005; Tarifarchiv der Hans-
Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitk -80er Jahre: Arbeitszeitverkürzung und qualitative 
Tarifpolitk, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-
A1A41265/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16602.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005.
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door towards flexibility had been opened and from now on employers would only agree 
to further  reductions  in  working hours  in  exchange for  more  flexibility174.  Criticism 
from the radical left included the fact that reduction of working time was often bought 
with the cut of other privileges such as paid breaks and wage rises; it also reproached 
unions for including the idea of flexibility from the beginning on in their proposal for a 
35-hour week - unions were accused of playing into the hands of capital175.
Collective  agreements  in  the  1980s  were,  apart  from the  hot  topic  of  reduction  in 
working time, mostly characterized by “qualitative issues”, even though a lot of the 
goals  set  by  union  could  be,  if  at  all,  only  partly  accomplished176.  However,  early 
retirement regulations for the chemical industry, food, construction, banking trade and 
insurance were achieved 1984; and in 1988 the first uniform agreement on pay for blue- 
and white-collar workers alike in a major branch of industry (the chemical industry) 
were agreed177. 
174 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p.129; Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitk -80er Jahre: 
Arbeitszeitverkürzung und qualitative Tarifpolitk, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
3D0AB75D-A1A41265/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16602.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005.
175 Wildcat Zirkular, 35-Stunden-Woche: Weniger Lohn und mehr Arbeit, http://www.wildcat-
www.de/zirkular/48/z48azver.htm; last accessed September 27th, 2005.
176 Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitk -80er Jahre: Arbeitszeitverkürzung 
und qualitative Tarifpolitk, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-
A1A41265/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16602.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005.
“Qualitative issues” included the further development of protection against rationalization, a 
reformation of the system of differentiation in remuneration, improvements in health and ecology 
and rules regarding further education policies of companies (betriebliche Qualifizierungs- und 
Weiterbildungspolitik).
(Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, cit. opp.)
177  Tarifarchiv der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Stationen der Tarifpolitk -80er Jahre: Arbeitszeitverkürzung 
und qualitative Tarifpolitk, http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-
A1A41265/hbs/hs.xsl/559_16602.html, last accessed September 30th, 2005.
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United Kingdom after 1984
The 1988 Employment Act further undermined the closed shop. Industrial action in 
order to install or defend it was rendered illegal, regardless of whether a ballot had been 
held or not. Consequently, even in closed shops approved by a ballot, dismissal of non-
union employees was made unlawful. Members were given the right to take their union 
to court for industrial action taken without a ballot and disciplinary measures against 
members refusing to take part in industrial action were made unlawful.
The 1990 Employment Act staged another attack on the closed shop by giving ground 
to a complaint to an Industrial Tribunal for discriminating on grounds of union-
membership when hiring workers. A closed-shop agreement itself, however, could still 
be lawful.
Secondary action was rendered illegal, and unions were held responsible for unofficial 
strike action, unless they had expressly disallowed it. Unofficially striking workers 
could be collectively dismissed and action taken on their behalf did not enjoy immunity.
The most important change for trade unions in the 1993 Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Rights Act – the last piece of employment legislation to be enacted by the 
Conservative government before Labour's return to power in 1997 -  was the 
requirement to obtain written permission from members every three years for checking-
off of dues. This was to be repealed by Labour in 1998. Furthermore, regulations on 
balloting for industrial action were strengthened and Fair Wage Councils abolished178.
178 John T. Addison, W. Stanley Siebert, Changes in Collective Bargaining in the UK, IZA Diskussion 
Paper No. 562, Bonn 2002, p. 7 and 48f. Available on-line from www.iza.org.  
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Legislation regarding unions has worsened substantially, but it has been suggested that 
the new rules were rarely used, and if, “mainly in those industries with a history of bad 
industrial relations”179.
Real wages have risen since 1979 and there seems to be little evidence from aggregate 
or sectoral level analysis of wages of any major decline in the bargaining power of 
unions180.  However,  collective bargaining since Thatcher has focussed more on pay; 
and, due to demands by management, wage rises have increasingly only been given in 
exchange  for  productivity  or  flexibility  deals.  Levels  of  employment  have  been 
negotiated  less  often  but  there  has  been  a  move  away  from  national  level  multi-
employer bargaining towards single employer bargaining at company level181. A fall in 
industrial action and picketing could be observed, but this was partly due to the fact that 
the Department of Employment didn't record any stoppages less than three days and a 
lot of industrial action now was rather short182.
Marsh has held that, although the political role of unions had been transformed so that 
unions were rarely consulted by Government and had very little political influence, shop 
floor relations seem to have remained relatively unchanged with little evidence of a 
major  move  towards  derecognition.  However,  while  there  was  no  major  decline  in 
coverage,  the  scope  and  content  of  collective  agreements  have  changed183.  While 
179 Essex Papers in Politic and Government, No 79: David Marsh, Trade Unions under Mrs Thatcher: 
Loss without Limit?, Essex 1991, p. 8.
180 Essex Papers in Politic and Government, No 79: David Marsh, Trade Unions under Mrs Thatcher: 
Loss without Limit?, Essex 1991, p. 18.
181 Neil Millward, Mark Stevens, British Workplace Industrial Relations 1980 – 1984 – The 
DE/ESRC/PSI/ACAS Surveys, Aldershot 1986, p. 231ff, 246ff.; Essex Papers in Politic and 
Government, No 79: David Marsh, Trade Unions under Mrs Thatcher: Loss without Limit?, Essex 
1991, p. 14. 
182 Essex Papers in Politic and Government, No 79: David Marsh, Trade Unions under Mrs Thatcher: 
Loss without Limit?, Essex 1991, p. 16f.
183 Essex Papers in Politic and Government, No 79: David Marsh, Trade Unions under Mrs Thatcher: 
Loss without Limit?, Essex 1991, p. 27.
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significantly fewer strikes and picketing occurred, the influence on legislation is hard to 
determine and it was suggested that it is
“history and current state of relations between capital and labour within a given 
company which has most  effects  on the institutions  and outcomes of  industrial 
relations in that company. In the private sector at least, the Government can only 
influence the legal framework and the ideological context within which industrial 
relations occurs; this is an important influence, but it is an indirect one184”.
However, contrary to Marsh’s impression, data indicates a clear drop in recognition, 
especially in the private  sector185,  to be seen in Graph 3 at  the end of this  chapter. 
184  Essex Papers in Politic and Government, No 79: David Marsh, Trade Unions under Mrs Thatcher: 
Loss without Limit?, Essex 1991, p. 27.
185  There did occur a drop in the level of union density from 58.9% in 1978 to 46.5% in 1987 and from 
54.5% to 38.7% in TUC affiliated unions; the fall has mostly been in the private sector while the 
public sector remained largely unscathed. This decline has been attributed to the change in 
legislation under Thatcher by Freeman and Pelletier, while Metcalf held a combination of five 
factors responsible: the macro-economic climate, the composition of jobs and the workforce, the 
policy of the state, the attitudes and conduct of employers and the stance taken by unions themselves 
(Richard Freeman, Jeffrey Pelletier, The Impact of Industrial Relations Legislation on 
British Union Density, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.28, No. 2, p. 141ff. (p. 155); 
Essex Papers in Politic and Government, No 79: David Marsh, Trade Unions under Mrs Thatcher: 
Loss without Limit?, Essex 1991, p. 12, 23).
The decline in recognition seems to be less significant with a sample by Millward and Stevens 
showing that in 1980 64% of the surveyed companies recognised unions and 66% did so in 1984. 
While those numbers show an increase in recognition (to be reversed by 1990) there is some 
evidence for a rise in derecognition as well. Claydon identified 49 cases of derecognition in 
1987/88.  However, the Labour research Study was able to conclude that “ in general ...  outside 
specific sectors like publishing, the unions report that recognition is not yet a major threat although 
a new and growing phenomenon” (Tim Claydon, Union Derecognition in Britain in the 1980s, in: 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 214Ff (p. 214); Neil Millward, Mark 
Stevens, British Workplace Industrial Relations 1980 – 1984 – The DE/ESRC/PSI/ACAS Surveys, 
Aldershot 1986, p. 63, table 3.5; New Wave Union Busting, in: Labour Research, Vol. 77, No. 4, p. 
13ff. (p. 13); Essex Papers in Politic and Government, No 79: David Marsh, Trade Unions under 
Mrs Thatcher: Loss without Limit?, Essex 1991, p. 13 ).
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Against  this  background,  Marsh’s  analysis  that  shopfloor  relations  remained largely 
unscathed appears doubtful. After all, representation relied mostly on recognised unions 
and shop stewards, who wouldn’t be present in derecognised workplaces. 
His assumption of no major decline in coverage appears disputable as well, seeing that 
the percentage of workers covered by collective agreements dropped from 86 percent in 
1984 to 75 percent in 1990 and to 67 percent in 1998186. Additionally, those numbers 
only apply to workers in workplaces with recognised unions, so that the overall decline 
must have been even more dramatic. While it is clear that the Thatcher administration 
and its legislation has had a negative influence on unions, other factors for the decline of 
unions have to be acknowledged as well. 
It is important to note this decline of union power started before Thatcher even came to 
power. Unions had been integrated under the Heath administration and this continued 
under the succeeding Labour Government. The period from February 1974 to June 1975 
had  seen  intensive  co-operation  between  unions  and  Government  within  the  Social 
Contract. Things began to change in 1975 when the Social Contract began to resemble 
little more than an incomes policy. Economic necessities brought the Government to 
adopt,  against  the  opposition  of  the  TUC  a  more  monetarist  and  less  corporatist 
economic policy, thus gradually excluding unions from political influence187. 
Another factor was the economic decline beginning after 1973. The de-industrialisation 
that went with it accounted for mass unemployment and a change in the structure of the 
workforce (see Chapter IV). Since unions traditionally have been particularly strong in 
the  manufacturing  sector  that  suffered  the  greatest  loss  of  jobs,  a  decline  in  union 
186 Neill Millward, Alex Bryson, John Forth, All Change at Work? British Employment Relations 1980 
– 1998, as portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey Series, London 2000, p. 160, 
Table 5.8. 
187 Dave Marsh, Jeff King, The Trade Unions under Thatcher, Essex Papers in Politics and Government, 
Number 27, Essex 1985, p. 2, 29ff; Dave Marsh, Trade Unions under Mrs Thatcher – Loss without Limit? 
Essex Papers in Politics and Government, Number 79, Essex 1991, p. 5.
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membership numbers has been the consequence. This in turn lead to weaker unions and 
less solidarity among workers188. New jobs did accrue, sometimes, but mostly in smaller 
towns with different  terms for  unionism.  In the traditional  union strongholds in the 
industrial  cities,  work  and  life  were  intertwined,  while  in  the  new  workplaces  the 
workforce tends to live more scattered, thus minimising the potential for unionism to 
become a part of their lives, not just their jobs. Militancy, or just identification with 
one's union, thus is harder to achieve. Also, workplaces now tend to be smaller, and as 
unionisation and organisation tend to increase with size (larger plants are more likely to 
have shop stewards, conveners and the like), this too has an adverse effect on unionism. 
Unions therefore became more vulnerable to attacks from employers and Government 
so that Thatcher's anti-union politics and the anti-union climate they created could have 
full effect189. 
Thatcher therefore started her attack on the unions at a time when those were already 
weakened. After 1979, there have been less meetings between Government and unions 
and fewer of these meetings were initiated by Government. Also, if such meetings took 
place, unions were less able to wield any influence on Government politics than they 
did under predecessing Labour governments190. The Government took a tougher stance 
towards industrial action in the public sector and usually made clear that it was willing 
to resist industrial action and was prepared to do so for a long time, if necessary. Indeed, 
only two major disputes could be won by unions in the early 1980s.  191.  This rigid 
188 Dave Marsh, Jeff King, The Trade Unions under Thatcher, Essex Papers in Politics and Government, 
Number 27, Essex 1985, p. 36f., 41.
189 Dave Marsh, Jeff King, The Trade Unions under Thatcher, Essex Papers in Politics and Government, 
Number 27, Essex 1985, p. 41, 45, 49.
190 Dave Marsh, Trade Union under Mrs Thatcher – Loss without Limit? Essex Papers in Politics and 
Government, Number 79, Essex 1991, p. 5f; Dave Marsh, Jeff King, The Trade Unions under Thatcher, 
Essex Papers in Politics and Government, Number 27, Essex 1985, p. 2.
191 Martin Holmes, The First Thatcher Government 1979 – 1983 – Contemporary Conservatism and 
Economic Change, Boulder, Colorade 1985, p. 140Ff, 147.
Those were the miners' strike threat in 1981 against NCB's plans to close 23 pits and the strike of the 
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position discouraged militancy by unions, giving them “the impression that it was not 
worthwhile for strike action to take place, because such action would not succeed”192, 
which  was  most  obviously  demonstrated  in  the  miners'  dispute  of  1984/85. 
Additionally,  Government  also  managed  to  avoid  industrial  action  by  appealing  to 
members above the heads of union leaders.  Consequently, during the miners'  strike, 
members who wanted to stay at work made use of the new legislation and took their 
union to court 193.
Finally, weakening of unions was facilitated by unemployment. Apart from all other 
post-war governments,  Thatcher did not pursue a full-employment policy.  Quite the 
contrary, the pursued monetarist policy had the effect of rising unemployment and some 
ministers admitted to clandestine delight at the connected weakening of unions194. So 
while Thatcher did play a major part in the unions' decline, other factors have been 
influential as well. 
1997 and beyond
While  the  new  Labour  Government  largely  upheld  Conservative  legislation  on 
industrial action, it did relax strike ballots a little and strengthened protection against 
unfair  dismissals  of  legally  striking  workers,  requiring  the  employer  to  show  that 
“reasonable procedural steps to resolve the dispute have been undertaken – and even 
then only eight weeks after the striker has been on strike.” At the same time, there is no 
qualifying service period for claims of unfair dismissal because of strike. Thus strikers 
water-workers in 1983 (Holmes, cit. Opp., p. 140, 147)
192 Martin Holmes, The First Thatcher Government 1979 – 1983 – Contemporary Conservatism and 
Economic Change, Boulder, Colorade 1985, p. 147.
193 Alasteir J. Reid, United We Stand – A History of Britain's Trade Unions, London 2004, p. 404f.
194 Alasteir J. Reid, United We Stand – A History of Britain's Trade Unions, London 2004, p. 399.
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are better protected against court action195. 
True to Labours' aim to introduce statutory recognition procedures, Schedule A1 was 
added to TULRCA 1992 through the ERA 1999, coming into effect in June 2000196. 
Applying to workplaces with more than 20 employees,  the procedures allow for an 
application to the CAC if a union request for recognition is not successful. The CAC 
then has to decide on the appropriateness of the (proposed) bargaining unit and whether 
a majority of workers in that unit support the union. If a majority of workers are union 
members, recognition will automatically be awarded; otherwise, a secret ballot will be 
held197.
The regulations have been subject to criticism. They can only be invoked in workplaces 
with more than 21 employees; this might be problematic since smaller workplaces are 
less likely to recognise unions in the first place. While recognition is only available to 
independent unions there is a limited range of issues for negotiation under statutory 
recognition. Finally, the threshold for recognition is rather high: if a ballot is held, the 
union must win not only a majority of those voting, but 40% approval of the workforce 
as a whole198. 
195 John T. Addison, W. Stanley Siebert, Changes in Collective Bargaining in the UK, IZA Diskussion Paper 
No. 562, Bonn 2002, p. 21, 23. Available on-line from www.iza.org. Linda Dickens, Mark Hall, Fairness 
– up to a Point. Assessing the Impact of New Labour's Employment Legislation, in: Human Resource 
Management Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 338ff. (340).
196 David Antill, The Effect of the Employment Relations Act 1999 on Trade Union Activity, in: New Law 
Journal, Vol. 150, No. 6961, p. 1744ff.;  Bob Simpson, Trade Union Recognition and the Law, a New 
Approach – Part I and II of the Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) 
Act 1992, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 193ff. (p. 193). 
197 John T. Addison, W. Stanley Siebert, Changes in Collective Bargaining in the UK, IZA Diskussion Paper 
No. 562, Bonn 2002, p. 21f. Available on-line from www.iza.org.  
198 Bob Simpson, Trade Union Recognition and the Law, a New Approach – Part I and II of the Schedule A1 
to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 29, 
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Still, statutory procedures are now available and were held to have a positive effect on 
union recognition, both prior to and after their enactment. However, this was believed 
to be due more to a “shadow effect” of the legislation, symbolising a different climate 
for industrial relations that encourages (voluntary) recognition agreements, than its 
actual use. At the same time, the change in Government provided for a more positive 
attitude to trade unions199. Unions reported a “change in climate”, believing that 
employers were more “receptive to union involvement”. Beside the factors mentioned 
above, this change was also attributed to opportunistic motives like employers 
regarding union agreements as advantage in the competition for public contracts under a 
Labour Government200. Consequently, recognition prompted by the new legislation has 
to a great extent been voluntarily (to an extent that most seem to regard the statutory 
procedures only as the last resort), having the advantage for employers that these are 
able to “shape agreements and minimize conflict”201. In fact, advancing voluntary 
No. 3, p. 193ff (p. 195ff., 212).
199 Linda Dickens, Mark Hall, Fairness – up to a Point. Assessing the Impact of New Labour's 
Employment Legislation, in: Human Resource Management Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 338ff. (342); 
Jo Blanden, Stephen Machin, John Van Reenen, Have Unions Turned the Corner? - New Evidence 
on Recent Trend in Union Recognition in UK Firms, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 
44, No. 2, p. 169ff. (p. 184).
200 Sarah Oxenbridge, William Brown, Simon Deakin, Cilff Pratten, Initial Responses to the Statutory 
Recognition Provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1999, in: British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 41, No. 2, p. 315ff. (p. 324).
201 Sarah Oxenbridge, William Brown, Simon Deakin, Cilff Pratten, Initial Responses to the Statutory 
Recognition Provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1999, in: British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 41, No. 2, p. 315ff. (p. 316, 324).
A study found that of 444 applications for recognition under the statutory procedures that reached 
the CAC until 2005, only 46 resulted in union recognition without a ballot. In 110 cases a ballot was 
held with unions being successful in 70. However, where recognition has been brought about by the 
legislations, a survey by Moore et. al. found employers stating that positive relationships with union 
representative had developed  (Paul Smith, Gary Morton, Nine Years of New Labour: Neoliberalism 
and Workers' Rights, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 401ff. (p. 406); 
Linda Dickens, Mark Hall, Fairness – up to a Point. Assessing the Impact of New Labour's 
Employment Legislation, in: Human Resource Management Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 338ff. 
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agreements has been a central goal of the regulations; its importance lying in a 
transformation of negotiations between unions and employers since both sides are 
aware that the union can resort to statutory procedures202. Gall stated that “the CAC will 
not intervene, ie accept an application, unless the union can show clear evidence of it 
seeking a voluntary approach first203”.
Agreements stemming from voluntary recognition are often restricted to the issues 
provided for statutory recognition (pay, hours and holidays)204.
A survey by Blanden et. al. in 2002 found a sharp increase in recognition agreements 
after 1997 but most of the new recognition occurred in places were unionisation was 
high to begin with, therefore the likelihood of this trend continuing might be small205. 
Another survey found that recognition rose between 1999 and 2001 and before 
declining again206. WERS 2004 reported that 27 percent of workplaces recognised trade 
unions, compared to 33 percent in 1998207. This has been attributed to the fact that, 
(343)).
202 Jo Blanden, Stephen Machin, John Van Reenen, Have Unions Turned the Corner? New Evidence on 
Recent Trends in Union Recognition in UK Firms, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 
44, No. 2, p. 169ff. (p. 170f.).
203 Gregor Gall, British Employer Resistance to Trade Union Recognition, in: Human Resource 
Management Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 36ff. (p. 39)
204 Linda Dickens, Mark Hall, Fairness – up to a Point. Assessing the Impact of New Labour's 
Employment Legislation, in: Human Resource Management Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 338ff. 
(p.343).
However, there was also suspicion that recognition did not have any measurable effect on firms 
since unions are no longer powerful enough to influence firms' decisions (Jo Blanden, Stephen 
Machin, John Va. Reenen, Have Unions Turned the Corner? - New Evidence on Recent Trend in 
Union Recognition in UK Firms, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 44, No. 2, p. 169ff. 
(p. 185ff.)).
205 Jo Blanden, Stephen Machin, John Van Reenen, Have Unions Turned the Corner? - New Evidence 
on Recent Trends in Union Recognition in UK Firms, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 44, No. 2, p. 169ff. (p. 185ff.).
206 Gregor Gall, British Employer Resistance to Trade Union Recognition, in: Human Resource 
Management Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 36ff. (p. 49).
207 Linda Dickens, Mark Hall, Fairness – up to a Point. Assessing the Impact of New Labour's 
Employment Legislation, in: Human Resource Management Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 338ff. (342).
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while unions initially were successful in singing a number of agreements using “strong 
cases”, once theses strong cases had been used up, they were left with anti-union 
employers from which recognition was much harder to win208. However, most of the 
decline occurred in workplaces with less than 25 employers, so the new regulations are 
unlikely to change this phenomenon. It was also found that recognition in areas without 
at least some tradition of unionisation was rare; most workers newly covered either 
worked in a workplace with some recognition already prevalent or in a sector with 
traditional union presence209. Consequently, new recognition was found to be most 
likely in manufacturing firms210.
Oxenbridge at. al. attributed the changes in recognition less to the new regulations, 
rather they held that these have had the effect “of speeding up a process of managed 
trade union recognition, re-recognition or (in some workplaces) exclusion that had 
already got well under way during the 1990s”, coming to the conclusion that 
“collective representation of workers is expanding once again. It is true that, on the 
whole, this takes the form not of traditional collective bargaining, but rather of 
consultative and representational arrangements that are less dependent than in the 
past upon the potential for collective worker action. The 1999 Act and the drift of 
EU influence have accelerated the rate at which employers are redesigning their 
relationships with unions”211.
208 Gregor Gall, British Employer Resistance to Trade Union Recognition, in: Human Resource 
Management Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 36ff. (p. 49).
209 Linda Dickens, Mark Hall, Fairness – up to a Point. Assessing the Impact of New Labour's Employment 
Legislation, in: Human Resource Management Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 338ff. (342).
210 Jo Blanden, Stephen Machin, John Van Reenen, Have Unions Turned the Corner? New Evidence on 
Recent Trends in Union Recognition in UK Firms, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 44, No. 
2, p. 169ff. (p. 178).
211 Sarah Oxenbridge, William Brown, Simon Deakin, Cilff Pratten, Initial Responses to the Statutory 
Recognition Provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1999, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 41, No. 2, p. 315ff. (p. 331).
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 The ERA 2004 amended the statutory recognition procedures, mainly by granting 
unions better access to workers. Additionally, the CAC is now requested to consider 
management's view when deciding on the appropriate bargaining unit and pay now does 
not include pensions212.
Labour has made other changes in the field of industrial relations: important examples 
are the introduction of the National Minimum Wage in 1999 and reversion of the opt-
out from the Maastricht social chapter. Both measures strengthened the role of the law 
in industrial relations.
212 Paul Smith, Gary Morton, Nine Years of New Labour: Neoliberalism and Workers' Rights, in: British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 401ff. (p. 407f.).
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Graphs
Graph I
(Data from: Forschungsgruppe Weltanschauungen in Deutschland, Gewerkschaftsmitglieder DGB 195 – 
2005, available on-line at 
http://www.fowid.de/fileadmin/datenarchiv/Gewerkschaftsmitglieder_DGB__1950-2005.pdf)
The steep rise in membership in the early 1990s is attributable to German unification. 
While the DGB initially gained about 3 million new members, 50% of the total eastern 
German workforce, about half of those left the DGB-union in the next 6 years. Reasons 
have been found in a vast reduction of jobs due to privatisation and resulting high 
unemployment, de-industrialisation and the end of the building boom that commenced 
immediately after unification. Women have been ousted from the labour market (the 
rate of female employment has been significantly higher in the GDR than in the Federal 
Republic) and older workers have been sent to early retirement. Unions, at the same 
time, failed to orientate their agendas towards the different needs of workers in the New 
Laender213. 
213 Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Dinosaurier der Dienstleistungsgesellschaft? Der Mitgliederschwund deutscher 
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Graph II
Data from Alan Campell, Nina Fishmann, John McIlroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics – 
The Post-War Compromise, 1945 – 64, p. 103 (Table 3.2); Alan Campell, Nina Fishmann, John McIlroy, 
British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics – The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79, p. 120 (Table 
4.1);  Department of Trade and Industry, http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file12479.pdf, last accessed January 
22nd, 2006; John McIlroy, Trade Unions in Britain Today, Manchester 2002, p. 201 (Table 8), Jens Peter 
Frølund Thomsen, British Politics and Trade Unions in the 1980s: Governing Against Pressure, Aldershot 
199, p. 176 (Table 6.2).
A decline in membership and density since 1979 can be observed.
Gewerkschaften im historischen und internationalen Vergleich, MPIfG-Working Paper 02/3, 2002. 
Available on-line at http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp02-3/wp02-
3.html#3_2%20Mitgliederschwund.
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Graph III
Data from Neil Millward, Alex Bryson and John Forth, All Change at Work – British employment Data 
Relations 1980 – 1998, as portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey Series, London 2000, 
p. 96 (Table 4.5)
No data for recognition before 1980 or after 1998 was available. Still, a vast decline in 
recognition in the private sector can be observed while the decline in the public sector 
has been less dramatic. There is no system of recognition similar to the British in 
Germany, therefore no figures are presented214.
214 Collective agreements in Germany are predominantly conducted at industry level and are binding between 
the members of the parties; that is, the union members and the members of the employers' association. 
Individual employers might therefore be bound by agreements without ever having negotiated with a union. 
At the same time, figures for membership in employers' associations or for companies bound by agreements 
would not present data comparable to recognition in the UK, since many employers apply terms of collective 
agreements without being member of an employers' association.
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Chapter II
Chapter II will deal with the second channel of industrial relations, workers' 
representation by other means than trade unions. While in Germany a second channel is 
long established (and will be dealt with in the first part of this chapter), the UK 
traditionally adhered to a principle of single channel, relying wholly on trade unions. 
The second part of Chapter II will deal with developments in the UK – mostly brought 
about by EC law – towards non-union representation. While it will be held that a second 
channel is emerging, the British system still seems a far cry from the strongly divided 
German one.
Part I – Works Councils in Germany
A dual system of interest representation and assertion of collective rights with 
unions outside of and works councils within the plant is a specific feature of the 
German industrial relations system. 
The two actors are technically separated, but in fact there are numerous instances 
of co-operation and their development is integrated with one another. The focus 
of the thesis is mainly on trade unions, therefore their relationship to councils is 
important to fully understand their development and to gain a full picture of the 
system of collective rights in German industrial relations. 
This part will provide an overview on the history of works councils and how the 
development  of  this  institution  influenced  the  development  of  the  union 
movement.
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Early Beginnings
Representation  in  the  19th century  was  done  solely  by  unions,  having  been 
legalised  in  1869.  They  provided  the  only  channel  for  an  improvement  of 
workers’ employment and living conditions215. 
First attempts at permanent representation structures in the workplace failed or 
had little effect216. Although there had been sporadic instances of works council-
like structures,  the vast  majority  of enterprises operated under  the maxim of 
‘master in the house’ (a concept that might be linked to the English principle of 
‘freedom  of  contract’).  Social  Democrats  and  unions  then  were  opposed  to 
workers  committees;  Social  Democrats  perceiving  them  as  ‘fig  leaf  of 
capitalism’ and unions fearing a fragmentation of their movement217.
215 Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, 
Baden-Baden 2000, p. 47.
Although they had been legalised with the abandonment of the prohibition of coalition in 
1869 through §§ 152, 153 of the Gewerbeordnung, they still encountered numerous 
obstructions and retaliatory measures by employers and state. Nevertheless, a collective 
agreement of 1890 first recognised gewerkschaftliche Vertrauensleute in the plant 
(Däubler, cit. opp., p. 47)
216 The  Frankfurter  Nationalversammlung  conferred  in  1848  on  a  draft  proposal  of  a 
Gewerbeordnung,  including  a  factory  council,  albeit  without  result.  The  Frankfurter 
Nationalversammlung was the first freely elected parliament comprising all of Germany. It 
drafted a constitution after the 1848 revolution, which, due to the refusal of Prussia's King 
Friedrich  Wilhelm  IV  t  accept  the  Kaiser's  crown,  was  never  enacted.  In  1891,  the 
Arbeiterschutzgesetz provided for voluntary worker comittees but had little practical effect 
(Wkipedia,  Frankfurter  Nationalversammlung, 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurter_Nationalversammlung,  last  accessed  April  30th, 
2006;  Reinhard Richardi,  Gregor  Thüsing,  Georg Annuß,  Betriebsverfassungsgesetz mit 
Wahlordnung – Kommentar, 9th Edition, München 2004, p. 54ff; Gerrick von Hoyningen-
Huene, Betriebsverfassungsrecht, 3rd Edition, München 1993, p. 11; Wolfgang Däubler, 
Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, Baden-Baden 2000, 
p. 48.)
217 Reinhard Richardi, Gregor Thüsing, Georg Annuß, Betriebsverfassungsgesetz mit 
Wahlordnung – Kommentar, 9th Edition, München 2004, p. 57.
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First World War – 1945
First World War
A law of 1916 made workers’ committees (albeit with only insignificant rights 
of co-determination) obligatory for all kriegswichtige218 plants with more than 50 
employees219.
Revolution 1918
The idea of councils played an important role in the revolution of 1918. While 
revolutionary sentiment had long been ripe220, the revolution itself was set off by 
It has been suggested that those entrepreneurs that allowed for Fabrikausschüsse (factory 
councils) did so for three reasons: first, they hoped for a harmonisation of relations in the 
enterprise; secondly, for a softening of social effects of industrialisation and thirdly, they 
hoped to keep the unions at bay (Gloria Müller, Zwischen Betriebsgemeinschaft und 
Betriebsdemokratie – Aus der Geschichte des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes, in: Die 
Mitbestimmung 1988, p. 301ff. (p. 301)). 
218 Literally ‘important for the war’; might be translated as ‘strategic’.
219 Gerrick von Hoyningen-Huene, Betriebsverfassungsrecht, 3rd Edition, München 1993, p. 
11; Reinhard Richardi, Gregor Thüsing, Georg Annuß, Betriebsverfassungsgesetz mit 
Wahlordnung – Kommentar, 9th Edition, München 2004, p. 55.
 These regulations and its participation rights, especially the realisation of these rights by 
way of councils, can be traced back to the French anarchist Proudhon (v. Hoyningen-
Huene, opp. cit.).
220 Prior to the November revolution 1918, mass strikes had broken out in Berlin and the Ruhr 
district (at that time still predominantly characterised by mining and steel industry, 
therefore a working class region par excellence). Taking place at the end of January/early 
February 1918, about 800,000 workers participated, led by highly organised metal-industry 
Obleute (a form of shop-steward), which had ceased to support government's policies, as 
the metal workers' union was still doing. The Obleute therefore constituted a “militant 
opposition to the official trade unions”.
Strikers demanded peace and workers' representation in peace negotiations, making it a 
political rather than an economical strike. In Berlin workers’ councils were set up that 
demanded a general democratisation of the state and suffrage for all over 20 years of age, 
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the sailors’ mutiny in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. It soon spread to the mainland221 
and for  some time,  Germany was  de  facto ruled by councils222.  The council 
movement  reached Berlin on November 9th,  coinciding with a general  strike, 
called  the  night  before.  By noon,  the  Kaiser had  abdicated  and before  1pm 
Friedrich  Ebert  (SPD)  had  been  appointed  as  chancellor.  The  republic  was 
proclaimed twice on this day: at 2pm by Social Democrat Phillip Scheidemann 
and at 4pm by Karl Liebknecht as “free socialist republic”223. 
men and women alike. After government was only willing to negotiate with the strikes 
commission in Berlin if it was accompanied by official delegates of trade unions, the 
leaders decided to call off the strike. At this time most of the strikes in the rest of Germany 
had already been ended. 
Those strikes can be seen as part of the general strike wave that swept through Europe in 
the winter of 1917/18, due to food shortages and the outrage on Germany's refusal of 
making peace with revolutionary Russia  (Horst Möller, Weimar – Die unvollendete 
Demokratie, 3rd Edition, München 1990, p. 19; A. J. Ryder, The German Revolution of 
1918 – A Study of German Socialism in War and Revolt, Cambridge 1967, p. 116f.).
221 A. J. Ryder, The German Revolution of 1918 – A Study of German Socialism in War and 
Revolt, Cambridge 1967, p. 140. 
On October 28th, 1918, the fleet was ordered to sail out in order to hinder British troops 
from reaching the Continent. However, since the British fleet by far outnumbered the 
German, any attempt to fight them must lead to defeat. Sailing out was equal to a suicide 
commando and, besides, even a victory could not have influenced the outcome of the war. 
Crews of battleships in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven refused order and did so again after the 
order was repeated on October 30th. The command was withdrawn and even though the 
sailors were arrested and imprisoned, they had won a moral victory.
(A. J. Ryder, cit. opp. p. 140)
222 Simon Taylor, Germany 1918 – 1933 – Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Rise of 
Hitler, London 1983, p. 7; A. J. Ryder, The German Revolution of 1918 – A Study of 
German Socialism in War and Revolt, Cambridge 1967, p. 148; Donny Gluckstein, The 
Western Soviets – Workers' Councils versus Parliament 1915 – 1920, London 1985, p. 108.
223 Simon Taylor, Germany 1918 – 1933 – Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Rise of Hitler, 
London 1983, p. 8; Donny Gluckstein, The Western Soviets – Workers' Councils versus Parliament 
1915 – 1920, London 1985, p. 115; Horst Möller, Weimar – Die unvollendete Demokratie, 3rd 
Edition, München 1990, p. 24f.
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Weimar Republic
This  Rätebewegung224 was  mainly  a  political  movement  for  which  industrial 
democracy  was  just  one  aim  among  others225.  Nevertheless,  the 
Tarifvertragsordnung226 of December 23rd, 1918 was passed and provided for a 
general  implementation  of  factory  councils  by  making  them  compulsory  in 
Betrieben227 with at least 20 employees, giving workers for the first time a legal 
right to participation228. 
However, the defeat of the political council movement (the Weimar Republic 
was  a  parliamentary  rather  than  a  council  republic)  meant  a  restriction  of 
councils  to  the  shopfloor;  consequently,  Art  165 of  the  Weimar  constitution 
regarded them merely as an economic principle with the first stage being works 
councils229.
224 Council movement.
225 Gerrick von Hoyningen-Huene, Betriebsverfassungsrecht, 3rd Edition, München 1993, p. 
12; Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th 
Edition, Baden-Baden 2000, p.50.
226 Regulation on collective agreements.
227 The translation of Betrieb is company, enterprise, shop or plant; however, under German law the 
term is defined as “organisational entity of means for work by means of which the employer, 
together with his employees, pursues one or several work-related ends”. A Betrieb is characterised 
by a uniform organisation, it is therefore crucial where the decision of the employer regarding the 
employees are taken  (Manfred Löwisch, Arbeitsrecht, 7th Edition, Düsseldorf 2004, p. 122, Rn. 
415ff.)
228  Reinhard Richardi (Ed), Betriebsverfassungsgesetz mit Wahlordnung – Kommentar, 10th 
Edition, München 2006, Einleitung Rn 10 (p. 55); Gerrick von Hoyningen-Huene, 
Betriebsverfassungsrecht, 3rd Edition, München 1993, p. 11.
229  Gerrick von Hoyningen-Huene, Betriebsverfassungsrecht, 3rd Edition, München 1993, p. 
12; Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th 
Edition, Baden-Baden 2000, p.50; Reinhard Richardi (Ed), Betriebsverfassungsgesetz mit 
Wahlordnung – Kommentar, 10th Edition, München 2006, Einleitung Rn 10 (p. 55).
The middle stage of Bezirksräte (district councils) was never to come into being and the 
final stage came only about as a preliminary Reichswirtschaftsrat (Reich’s economy 
council) (Richardi, cit. opp., Rn. 10).
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Works  councils  in  Weimar  eventually  developed  to  be  part  of  the  union 
movement and an accepted means of representation of interests230, but initially, 
unions had been opposed231.  Carl Legien, chair of the general commission of 
unions in Germany and then most important union leader, explained: 
“ ... councils would arrange terms and conditions according to the particular 
profitability of the Betriebe and would thus abandon the principle for which 
the unions fought for decades,  that  workers of stronger economical rank 
have to stand for those of economically weaker rank. Union structure would 
be eliminated without something equal taking its place.”232
The Betriebsrätegesetz (BRG)233 of 1920 guaranteed union influence over issues 
on the shop-floor234. Works councils were to be elected in all enterprises with 
more than 20 employees and given an independent function next to unions235. 
230 Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, 
Baden-Baden 2000, p. 51.
231 Gerhard A. Ritter, Die Entstehung des Räteartikels 165 in der Weimarer Verfassung, in: 
Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 258, No. 1, p. 73ff. (p. 85). 
Carl Legien, union leader and SPD member (and in 1913 president of the international 
trade union confederation), voiced his opinion of the impossibility of integrating the 
councils in the frame of union organisation on a speech before union leaders in 1919 
(Ritter, cit. opp, p. 85, Fn 36; wikipedia, Carl Legien, 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Legien, last accessed May 1st, 2006).
232  Gerhard A. Ritter, Die Entstehung des Räteartikels 165 in der Weimarer Verfassung, in: 
Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 258, No. 1, p. 73ff. (p. 86).
233 Law on Works Councils.
234 Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic, Oxford 1981, p. 167f.
It was clarified that collective agreements had priority to co-determination rights on plant 
level and works councillors were obliged to safeguard its application. Unions were given a 
right to take part in works council meetings and plant assemblies. The very existence of 
unions was furthermore secured by § 8 BRG that explicitly upheld the functions of unions 
next to councils (Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – 
Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, Baden-Baden 2000, p. 51).
235 Gerrick von Hoyningen-Huene, Betriebsverfassungsrecht, 3rd Edition, München 1993, p. 
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However,  they  were  required  to  support  the  employer  in  Erfüllung  des 
Betriebszweckes236 and to safeguard the plant from disruptions237.  This clearly 
divided  councils  from the  trade  union  movement  (decidedly  not  expected  to 
foster the profitability of the enterprise or to protect industrial  peace), but in 
practice they were “prolonged arms of the unions”238. The fact that there was not 
much margin for wage negotiations at plant level and that the frequent strikes 
could not have been conducted without union support helped integrate councils 
into the union movement – in fact, council elections were generally carried out 
according to electoral lists supplied by the unions239.
Third Reich
Under Hitler the Führerprinzip240 was the all-encompassing doctrine. By law, a 
12; Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th 
Edition, Baden-Baden 2000, p.50;  
236 Literally ‘fulfilling the purpose of the plant’. 
237 Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, 
Baden-Baden 2000, p. 50; Gloria Müller, Zwischen Betriebsgemeinschaft und 
Betriebsdemokratie – Aus der Geschichte des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes, in: Die 
Mitbestimmung 1988, p. 301ff. (p. 301).
238 Flatow, Gewerkschaften und Betriebsräte, in; Kaskel (Ed.). Koalition und 
Koalitionskampfmittel, Berlin 1925, p. 157ff. (p. 165), quoted in: Wolfgang Däubler, 
Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, Baden-Baden 2000, 
p. 50; Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th 
Edition, Baden-Baden 2000, p. 50.
239 Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, 
Baden-Baden 2000, p. 51.
240 The Führerprinzip (literally ‘leader principle’) was a main principle of national socialistic 
Weltanschauung, applied not only in politics but also in economical and social life. It is 
based on a restructuring of power on strict order lines. Instead of democratic structures, 
Führer are given the power to govern on the principle of ‘order and obedience’, in fact 
blind obedience (Führer befiehl, wir folgen – Leader, command and we will follow) is a 
main characteristic of the principle. All political power was concentrated in Hitler as the 
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Betriebsführer241 was supposed to run the enterprise and lead the work force in 
his own responsibility. Vertrauensräte242 were selected by the employer without 
employee partcipation in accordance with the NSDAP. They had only advisory 
functions243. 
Unions had been annihilated by the national socialist  government already on 
May 2nd, 1933244.
1945 – 1952
Councils  played  an  important  role  in  the  rebuilding  of  German  industrial 
relations.  Initially,  works  councils  constituted  the  primary  organisation  of 
workers and some plants were in fact governed by councillors. Since the aim of 
these first (and illegal) councils was the development of a strong and powerful 
union movement, many councillors later found their place as union officials. The 
importance of these first “unofficial” councils diminished with the emergence of 
organisational  structures  in  enterprises,  administration  and  especially  unions, 
since neither the allied forces, nor union officials were willing to allow a “dual 
most superior Führer (Bundeszentrale  für politische Bildung, 
http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/PY85WF,0,0,F%FChrerprinzip.html, last accessed March 
11th, 2006).
241 Literally works manager. 
242 Literally trust councillors.
243 Gerrick von Hoyningen-Huene, Betriebsverfassungsrecht, 3rd Edition, München 1993, p. 
12; Reinhard Richardi (Ed), Betriebsverfassungsgesetz mit Wahlordnung – Kommentar, 
10th Edition, München 2006, Einleitung Rn 12 (p. 56).
Under the principle of ‘Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer – a people, a country, a Führer’ a 
separate representation wasn’t necessary. The different class interests were supposed to be 
assimilated by the national interest; within the united German nation as holy principle there 
was no room for class antagonism. 
244 Wikipedia, Gewerkschaft, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gewerkschaften#Geschichte, last 
accessed March 10th, 2006.
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power” system of unions and strong councils245.
Even  though  councils  did  exist  immediately  after  the  war,  they  were  only 
legalised through Law No. 22 of the Allied Control Commission in 1946 that 
allowed  the  first  election  of  works  councils.  It  was  only  a  law  providing 
guidelines and could thus, although valid throughout Germany, not establish a 
unitary system of  workers’  representation.  Councils  were given a  number  of 
rights traditionally filled by unions, e.g. the right to confer with employers on 
the application of collective agreements; but no explicit co-determination rights. 
It  required  compulsory  co-operation  with  “recognised  unions“246,  thus 
acknowledging their inter-cooperation247. 
The  Länder248 filled the frame with their own regulations, often providing for 
more extensive economic co-determination and aiming for a democratisation of 
management; those concepts, however, were soon abandoned by the British and 
245 Theo Pirker, Die blinde Macht – Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Westdeutschland: Erster Teil 1945 
– 1952 – Vom ‚Ende des Kapitalismus’ zur ‚Zähmung der Gewerkschaften’, München 1960, p. 32.
246 Otto Ernst Kempen, Ulrich Zachert, Tarifvertragsgesetz – Kommentar für die Praxis, 3rd 
Edition, Köln 1997, p.60; Gerrick von Hoyningen-Huene, Betriebsverfassungsrecht, 3rd 
Edition, München 1993, p. 12; Reinhard Richardi (Ed), Betriebsverfassungsgesetz mit 
Wahlordnung – Kommentar, 10th Edition, München 2006, Einleitung Rn 13 (p. 56); Uwe 
Rosenthal, Matthias Loeding, Stadien der Betriebsrätebewegung in der SBZ – eine Skizze, 
in: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 1999, No 1, p. 35ff. (p. 49). 
The term “recognised union” is to be understood differently from the British concept. 
While in Britain recognition depends on the employer, in Germany it is an objective 
characterisation of a union, depending on its size, independence and ability to take 
industrial action. The German words are anerkannte Gewerkschaft, which literally 
translates as “accepted” or “acknowledged union”.
247 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
72.
Unions however would have rather had the councils limited to definite rights than giving 
them negotiation leeway that might develop a momentum the unions didn't wish for.
(Hermann Reichold, Betriebsverfassung als Sozialprivatrecht – Historisch-dogmatische 
Grundlagen von 1848 bis zur Gegenwart, München 1995, p. 362.)
248 The federal states in Germany are called Länder.
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American  powers249.  The  different regional  systems  and  pressure  by  the 
Americans made it necessary to establish a national law on works councils after 
the foundation of the Bundesrepublik in 1949250. 
 BetrVG 1952
Prehistory and Development
A first draft was called a serious deterioration of the legal situation by the DGB; 
assuming that government’s aim was to push unions out of the workplace251. 
249  Gloria Müller, Zwischen Betriebsgemeinschaft und Betriebsdemokratie – Aus der 
Geschichte des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes, in: Die Mitbestimmung 1988, p. 301ff. (p. 
303); Gemeinschaftskommentar zum Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, Band I, Einleitung, p. 69.
Especially the law on works councils in Hesse (Hessisches Betriebsrätegesetz) gave strong 
rights to the unions: it copied the first paragraph of the BRG 1920, providing for the 
establishment of works councils, nearly word by word, but added that those rights should 
be operated „under inclusion of the unions“. The works council was furthermore 
empowered to co-determinate in social, personnel and economic matters on equal footing 
with the employer in consultation with the unions (§ 30 I HessBRG). Even more, even 
works council agreements should only be concluded in cooperation with the unions (§ 35 
I).
(Hermann Reichold, Betriebsverfassung als Sozialprivatrecht – Historisch-dogmatische 
Grundlagen von 1848 bis zur Gegenwart, München 1995, p. 364)
250  Gerrick von Hoyningen-Huene, Betriebsverfassungsrecht, 3rd Edition, München 1993, p. 
12; Hanns Martin Schleyer, Zehn Jahre Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Schriftenreihe Der 
Betrieb, Beiträge zum Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – 10 Jahre Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, 
Düsseldorf 1962, p. 9ff. (p. 10).
In his first government declaration, Chancellor Adenauer (Christian Democrats) proclaimed 
the new organisation of works constitution one of the most important tasks of legislation 
(von Hoyningen-Huene, cit opp., p. 12 ; Schleyer, cit. opp. p. 10). 
251 Dieter Schuster, Die Deutschen Gewerkschaften seit 1945, 2nd Edition, Berlin 1973, p. 40f.
The DGB formulated its politico-economical principles and its ideas for representation and 
participation on its founding congress in 1949; however, these were mainly concerned with 
co-determination rather than participation. The long term goal was an “economic system in 
which social injustices and economic affliction are eliminated and every person willing to 
work is assured of job and existence”. It regarded participation as a measure to reach this 
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However,  the  Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG)252 was  passed  against  its 
opposition in 1952253. 
Legal Details
The BetrVG brought a number of impairments when compared with Law No. 22 
and the  BRG. Councils now had fewer competences in hiring and firing, and 
‘plant changes’ that required the employer to consult with the council were more 
narrowly defined. Councils’ duty to foster the economic well-being of the plant 
goal; however, it should be restricted to union members: “Co-determination of all organised 
workers in all personnel, economical and social issues of economic leadership and 
economic arrangement (Wirtschaftsführung und Wirtschaftsgestaltung)”. Unions 
furthermore were to have a decisive influence in all supervisory and administrative bodies. 
However, even though those ideas show that unions rather advocated representation by 
unions than by elected representatives, these examples nevertheless regard co-
determination and not works councils.
Other demands were for the socialisation of key industries and social justice by appropriate 
participation of all workers in the economic output. The DGB Bundesvorstand (federal 
committee) issued a declaration in its meeting on 10 April 1952 declaring the draft 
insufficient, especially regarding the intention to draft a special bill regarding 
representation of civil service employees. The managing committee was enabled to take all 
necessary measures to lend weight to the demand for a unified, progressive works 
constitution  (Schuster, cit. Opp., p. 34ff., p. 40f.; (H. C. Nipperdey, Die Ersatzansprüche 
für Schäden, die durch den von den Gewerkschaften gegen das geplante 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz geführten Zeitungsstreik vom 27. – 29. Mai 1952 entstanden 
sind, Köln 1953, p. 5f.).
The circumstances surrounding the development of the BetrVG 1952 were very different to 
that of 1920. While employers in 1920 welcomed unions as a mean to stave off the more 
radical works councils, in the 1950s the tendency for employers was rather to try to keep 
unions out of the plant and thus trying to diminish workers' influence by concentrating on 
councils; not only by definition more factory-orientated and particularistic, but also by law 
forced to be more devoted to the wellbeing of the company than to the interests of the 
workers (in general). (Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar 
Germany, London 1991, p. 64, 75, 76.)
252 Works Council Constitution Act. 
253 Dieter Schuster, Die Deutschen Gewerkschaften seit 1945, 2nd Edition, Berlin 1973, p.41f. 
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and their autonomy from unions was stressed, thus weakening ties to unions. 
Furthermore,  councils  were  made  responsible  for  securing  that  no-one  was 
discriminated  against  on  grounds  of  union  membership,  thus  forbidding  a 
preferential treatment of union members. The obligation to safeguard the plant 
from disruption in the 1920 law was now extended to a prohibition to strike254. 
Unions therefore lost facilities to influence councils and establish a shop floor 
presence255.
Assessment
The BetrVG 1952 was never used as widely as expected. When works councils 
were elected under its provisions for the last time in 1968, it was estimated that 
only about 25,000 of ca. 400,000 plants that were eligible held elections256.
Employers’ side seemed to be contented, regarding it as a useful compromise, 
able to communicate its ideas onto the social partners. It was argued that the law 
254  Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
75f.
255  It is worth noting that union presence in works constitution can be derived from the 
constitution. Art 9 III GG provides for freedom of coalition and autonomy of collective 
bargaining (Tarifautonomie). However, while this doesn’t give unions a monopoly on 
representation (see BVerfG, March 1st, 1979, 1 BvR 532/77, 1 BvR 533/77, 1 BvR 419/78, 
1 BvL 21/78, ‘Mitbestimmungsurteil’ – Judgement on Co-Determination), a restriction by, 
for example, works councils is only admissible when the system of Tarifautonomie will in 
principle be obtained and functioning. Furthermore, since works constitution might impede 
the freedom of coalition it can only be compatible with Art 9 III GG when freedom of 
coalition is guaranteed within the works constitution. Art 9 III GG therefore provides for 
union activity in the works constitution (BVerfG, cit. opp.).
256 Walter Arendt, Die Reform der Betriebsverfassung, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 273ff. 
(p. 274).
However, those 25,000 plants employed about two-thirds of all employees (Arendt, cit. 
opp., p. 274).
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had proved its  worth,  encouraging a trustful  co-operation between employers 
and employees257. 
Reactions and Criticism by Unions
Unionists declared that “the law stands quasi as a barrier between the plant and 
the  union”.  IG Metall  considered  the  BetrVG “a  open challenge  by  German 
employers and their political allies against the unions” and a DGB publication 
stated that 
“all reports that the Works Constitution Act is a compromise between the 
position of the employers and the unions are  false.  This law has to  be 
changed because it is clearly against workers”258.
The DGB criticised the law inter alia because it did not include public services, 
implied  a  separation  between  councils  and  unions  and  provided  only  for 
unsatisfactory union rights in the plant, providing no direct access to the shop-
floor.  The obligation to co-operate trustfully with the employer,  the fact  that 
councils were not allowed to strike and had to maintain silence on matters that 
might harm their employers (but benefit unions in collective bargaining) and the 
virtual  restriction  of  co-determination  to  social  issues,  especially  the  lack  of 
rights  of  councils  in  terms  of  dismissals  were  criticised  too259.  The  DAG 
257  Hanns Martin Schleyer, Zehn Jahre Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Schriftenreihe Der 
Betrieb, Beiträge zum Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – 10 Jahre Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, 
Düsseldorf 1962, p. 9ff. (p. 16); wikipedia, Hanns-Martin Schleyer, 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanns_Martin_Schleyer, last accessed March 11th, 2006.
258 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
77f. 
259 Ursula Engelen-Kefer, 25 Jahre Betriebsverfassungsgesetz und die Zukunft der 
betrieblichen Mitbestimmung, in: Mitbestimmung und Beteiligung : 
Modernisierungsbremse oder Innovationsressource?, Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-
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criticised  the  BetrVG’s  failure  to  offer  any  participation  rights  to  individual 
employees260. 
Unions regarded the  BetrVG as a defeat  and initially responded by trying to 
enhance union presence at plant level mainly in two ways: they made an effort in 
fostering  Vertrauensleute261 committees  as  a  counterpoint  to  (and  check  on) 
councils  and  advocated  in  the  plants  in  order  to  fill  councils  with  union 
members262. Both initiatives were successful (the percentage of union members 
on councils  has  constantly  been above 75% since 1957)  and also eventually 
helped to stop the negative trend in membership263, while initially, the law led to 
a fall in union density from 56.2% in 1952 to 37.7% in 1963264.  
Relationship between Unions and Works Councils 
The  development  of  centralised  bargaining  after  the  war  (see  Chapter  I) 
necessarily led to agreements that didn't push the envelope for many employers, 
At the same time the economically very favourable conditions of the late 1950s 
Ebert-Stiftung, Abt. Arbeits- und Sozialforschung, Bonn 1998, 
http://www.fes.de/fulltext/asfo/00226006.htm, last accessed March 3rd, 2006; Andrei S. 
Markovits, The Politics of the West German Trade Unions – Strategies of Class and 
Interest Representation in Growth and Crisis, Cambridge 1986, p. 119.
260 Herbert Anders, Das neue Betriebsverfassunggesetz aus der Sicht der DAG, in: 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 299ff. (p. 299f.).
261 Union workplace representatives. These are to be distinguished from British shop 
stewards in that they have no right to bargain or any other participative functions. Their 
task is to provide a link between the union and the members in the workplace.
262 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
78f.
263 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
79f; DGB, Betriebsrat ist besser, http://www.betriebsrat-ist-besser.dgb.de/betriebsrat, last 
accessed May 1st, 2006.
264 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
77f. 
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resulted in greater shop floor power and a system of informal “seconds rounds” 
of wage bargaining, conducted by works councils on shop floor level, developed. 
Even though this practice was technically illegal (§ 77 III and § 87 I BetrVG bar 
councils  from  negotiating  on  matters  usually  determined  by  collective 
agreements),  councils  in  the  metal  industry  succeeded  in  negotiating  wage 
additions of on average 22.5%. These additions became an important part  of 
workers'  earnings  and  thus  gave  the  councils  noticeable,  albeit  unofficial, 
power265. Unions welcomed this development since it helped contain opposition 
towards the central  bargaining system, which became more vocal  in  the late 
1960s and their perception of councils changed266. In the 1970s, unions started to 
foster  councils  by  weakening  the  status  of  their  own  Vetrauensleute267 and 
making them more ancillary to the councils268.
Thus  Unions,  having  secured  shopfloor  presence  through  union  members  in 
works councils, obviously had made their peace with centralised bargaining, the 
265 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
82f.
266 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
85f.  
The wildcat strikes in 1969 were calls for decentralised bargaining, more power and 
autonomy within the Betrieb (see Chapter I, for a definition of Betrieb see footnote 228), 
caused by the unions' insistence on centralised bargaining and wage restraints after the 
recession of 1966/67. At the same time, works councils were powerless to deter employers 
from refusing to negotiate the informal „second round“, which added to the discontent of 
the workers. However, unions managed to deflect demands for more shop-floor influence 
within the union into discussions about extended rights for the works councils. This came 
to be reflected in the BetrVG 1972 that gave councils more rights against management 
(Thelen, cit. opp, p. 85f.).
267 Union workplace representatives. These are to be distinguished from British shop 
stewards in that they have no right to bargain or any other participative functions. Their 
task is to provide a link between the union and the members in the workplace.
268 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
99.
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dual system of representation and their role as a representative outside the plant. 
They tried to keep down opposition to the councils that were severely restricted 
in their bargaining rights by law and posed no threat to the unions' array269.
BetrVG 1972
Reasons for the Amendment
Work environments and social conditions changed dramatically during the 1960s 
and 1970s and the  BetrVG thus  needed updating.  Technical  innovations  like 
computerisation had an influence on jobs and the governing Social Democrats, 
having opposed the BetrVG 1952, felt that workers should have the possibility to 
act instead of merely react270.
The Process of Amendment 
When discussions over an amendment of the  BetrVG started, the DGB strived 
269 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
82f., 93.
Mathöfer, “head of the IG Metall’s education department and SPD member of parliament”, 
put it that at the turn of the decade unions “had learned to live with works councils, and 
recognized that they were a stabilising force, not a threat”  (Thelen, cit. opp, p. 93,96). 
270  Walter Arendt, Betriebsrätewahlen 1972 nach besserem Recht - 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz: Ein gutes Stück innerer Reform, in: Sozialdemokratischer 
Pressedienst, P/XXV/236, December 14th, 1970, p.1ff. (p. 1); Fred Zander, 
Betriebsverfassung im Meinungsstreit – Am Regierungsentwurf scheiden sich die Geister, 
in: Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, P/XXVI/39, Februar 26th, 1971, p. 3ff. (p. 4).
Walter Arendt was then Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs in the Social 
Democrats-Liberal coalition under Brandt.
Due to the dual system, union had little influence on how these changes were implemented 
at plant level.
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for  a  closer  co-operation  between  councils  and  unions  and  for  the  right  of 
council  members  to  be  active  for  their  union  in  the plant271.  Eventually, the 
BetrVG 1972 was passed  and came into force on January 19th, 1972272. Being a 
fundamental reorganisation it was designated as a profound turning point in the 
history of works constitution273.
Changes and Innovations
A number of regulations the unions had opposed in the BetrVG 1952 were kept: 
the  duty  to  peaceful  cooperation  with  the  employer  and  the  prohibition  for 
councils to take industrial action for matters of the works constitution274. Unions’ 
rights were strengthened (see below), while the general division between works 
councils in the plant and unions outside of the plant was upheld. Although more 
271 Vorschläge des DGB zur Änderung des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes (I), in: Arbeit und 
Recht 1969, p. 80f. (p. 80f.); Wolfgang Schneider, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz aus 
der Sicht des DGB, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 292ff. (p. 292f.); Fritz Auffarth, Das 
neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Arbeit und Recht 1972, p. 33ff. (p. 33). 
This has to be seen in connection with the demand of the shop floor to have more power 
within the unions that has been detailed in Chapter I.
272 Friedhelm Farthmann, Grundzüge der neuen Betriebsverfassung, in: Gewerkschaftliche 
Monatshefte 1972, p. 4ff. (p. 5f.); Walter Arendt, Die Reform der Betriebsverfassung, in: 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 273ff. (p. 273).
273 Jobst-Hubertus Bauer, 25 Jahre Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Neue Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsrecht 1997, p. 233ff. (p. 234).
274 This of course meant that the institution of Einigungsstelle, an arbitration board, was 
furthermore needed. This institution was already present in the 1952 law.
There are basically two ways to solve industrial conflicts, by industrial action or arbitration. 
Since industrial action is prohibited for the sake of Betriebsfrieden, an arbitration board 
was necessary to ensure participation, for otherwise the employer (without the fear of 
industrial action) would retain the sole power to decide.
(Fritz Auffarth, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Arbeit und Recht 1972, p. 33ff. (p. 
40). 
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than 75% of councillors  are  union members,  works councils  continued to be 
independent representation bodies obliged to represent the interests of the whole 
workforce, regardless of union membership275. 
Works Council Rights
Participation rights of councils were extended to merit pay and the right to object 
in  personnel  matters  expanded  (§99).  A  hearing  right  in  dismissals  was 
introduced (§102), and matters like hiring, relocating, pay scale grouping and 
change of pay group were made subject to approval by the councils in plants 
with more than 20 elective employees276. 
Under  the  1952  law  participation  rights  had  only  been  given  for  individual 
personnel  matters  immediately pending;  now,  councils  were  given a  right  to 
participate in personnel planning as well (§ 92). Furthermore, employers now 
had a duty to not only inform but also consult the council on proposed changes 
in jobs or production systems or introduction of new technology (§ 90) 277. Full 
co-determination rights were given in § 87 
“on issues such as working time arrangements in the plant, short-time work, 
275  Fritz Auffarth, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Arbeit und Recht 1972, p. 33ff. (p. 
34, 35); Walter Arendt, Die Reform der Betriebsverfassung, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 
273ff. (p. 274).    
276  Fritz Auffarth, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Arbeit und Recht 1972, p. 33ff. (p. 
38).
277  Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany London 1991, p. 
100f; Friedhelm Farthmann, Grundzüge der neuen Betriebsverfassung, in: 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 1972, p. 4ff. (p. 8); Wolfgang Schneider, Das neue 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz aus der Sicht des DGB, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 292ff. (p. 
295); Fritz Auffarth, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Arbeit und Recht 1972, p. 
33ff. (p. 38).
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overtime,  work  breaks,  the  establishment  of  vacation  times,  plant  wage 
systems and the setting of piece rates”. 
Consultation  rights  were  introduced  to  issues  of  work  organisation278.  An 
important  introduction  was  the  possibility,  under  certain  circumstances  the 
obligation, to access conciliation and arbitration procedures when council and 
employer didn't succeed in concluding an agreement. Works councils are not 
allowed to take industrial action, the obligation to go through arbitration thus 
gives their demands more force – if no agreement was reached the employer can 
not just reassume the old status quo. While each party has an interest to avoid 
arbitration  (after  all,  the  board  can  decide  either  way),  the  employer  has  an 
added incentive in that he has to pay for it279.
Important in economic crises, § 111ff. require information and consultation of 
the works council in the event of ‘major changes’ in the plant. Employers and 
councils  have  the  possibility  to  conclude  an  Interessenausgleich and/or  a 
(enforceable)  Sozialplan280, while the dual  system with centralised bargaining 
meant that unions generally had little or no influence on those matters. 
Works councillors and candidates were better protected against dismissal: while 
278  Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany London 1991, p. 100f.
279  Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
101.
280  Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 
1991, p. 101.
Interessenausgleich may be translated as “reconciliation of interests”, while a Sozialplan is 
a social compensation plan, designed to alleviate the economic disadvantages employees 
may suffer due to the changes.
If employer and works council do not succeed in concluding an Interessenausgleich, they 
can appeal to either the head of the Federal Employment Office for arbitration (§ 112 II 1 
BetrVG) or to the normal arbitration board. A Sozialplan can be enforced by appealing to 
the arbitration board (§ 112 IV BetrVG). This shows the importance negotiations between 
councils and employers are given.
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under the 1952 law only contractual notices of dismissal were prohibited, now 
also  extraordinary  notices  of  dismissal  were  complicated  by  making  the 
agreement of the works council obligatory (§ 103)281.
Union Rights
Unions' right to access the plant was extended and qualified, according to § 2 II 
BetrVG union delegates (not necessarily full time officials) now had the right to 
enter a plant in relation to their duties and responsibilities under the new law; 
something that had been problematic under the old law. They were given the 
right to submit their own lists with candidates for councils elections and to call a 
plant assembly to create an election committee (however, these rights were only 
applicable  in  plants  without  an  existing  council);  if  no  committee  was 
forthcoming they could appeal to the labour court for establishing one. Unions 
could now, under certain circumstances, demand that the council  call  a plant 
assembly and they were to be informed of time and topics of any other plant 
assemblies. Councillors were given the right to “perform functions and activities 
in the plant on behalf of the union”, however, the principle of neutrality in § 75 
meant  that  discrimination on grounds of  union-membership was (and is)  not 
allowed,  so  works  councils  are  obliged  to  treat  members  and  non-members 
281 Fritz Auffarth, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Arbeit und Recht 1972, p. 33ff. (p. 
36).
This was connected with an amendment in §§ 15, 16 KSchG, which prolongs the 
prohibition of contractual dismissal for half a year after tenure. This intends to provide the 
ex-councillor with a period of time to catch up with “ordinary” work life and a period in 
which eventual disagreement with the employer that might have come up during his term of 
office can cool down. §§ 15, 16 KSchG furthermore extended that protection of contractual 
dismissal to candidates for election and members of the election committee
(Auffarth, cit. opp. p. 36).
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alike282.  This  reveals  a  fundamental  difference  between  unions  and  works 
councils: while works councils are obliged to represent all workers in the plant, 
unions have the right to only care for their members. 
Councillors  were allowed “to participate  in union seminars at  the company's 
expense  and  on  paid  leave”  -  innovations  that  clearly  strengthened  the  tie 
between unions and councils283,  giving unions stronger standing in the plant. 
282 Heinz Gester, Zur Stellung der Gewerkschaften im Betrieb nach dem neuen 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 1972, p. 19ff. (p. 21); 
Walter Arendt, Die Reform der Betriebsverfassung, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 273ff. 
(p. 275); Wolfgang Schneider, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz aus der Sicht des DGB, 
in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 292ff. (p. 297); Fritz Auffarth, Das neue 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Arbeit und Recht 1972, p. 33ff. (p. 35).
The right to enter is not restricted to visits the works council but gives the right to visit 
employees as well. There is no need to obtain the approval of the employer, he does need to 
be informed beforehand, though (and might deny access under certain, narrowly defined 
circumstances)
Before the amendment the right to be active for a union while being a works councillor was 
sometimes disputed by literature and judicature. The BAG as well as the BVerfG and the 
BVerwG had sometimes decided that works council members were not allowed to recruit 
for their union; this could not be upheld under the new provisions (Auffarth, opp. cit, p. 
35).
283 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
102; Heinz Gester, Zur Stellung der Gewerkschaften im Betrieb nach dem neuen 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 1972, p. 19ff. (p. 21); 
Walter Arendt, Die Reform der Betriebsverfassung, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 273ff. 
(p. 275); Wolfgang Schneider, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz aus der Sicht des DGB, 
in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 292ff. (p. 297); Fritz Auffarth, Das neue 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Arbeit und Recht 1972, p. 33ff. (p. 34); Herbert Anders, Das 
neue Betriebsverfassungsrecht aus der Sicht der DAG, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 
299ff. (p. 303); Reinhard Richardi (Ed.) , Betriebsverfassungsgesetz mit Wahlordnung – 
Kommentar, 10th Edition, München 2006, Einleitung Rz 24.
The right to obtain access to the plant according to § 2 II BetrVG was given to any 
representative of a union, not necessarily an official, as far as necessary to fulfil the rights 
and obligations given to them under the statue. It included the right to visit the whole plant 
and individual employees, not only the works council. There is no need to obtain consent of 
the employer, however, he has to be informed and may object under special circumstances 
(Auffarth, opp. cit. p. 34).
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Furthermore,  an  obligation  for  works  councils  to  co-operate  with  unions 
represented on the shopfloor in matters specified by the law and “to the best of 
employees and enterprise” was introduced284.
Apart form these more “internal” rights, unions were given the power to take 
legal action against a councillor, a works council or an employer violating their 
obligations under the BetrVG. At the same time, they were given the power to 
lodge a complaint against anyone who committed an offence laid down in § 119 
BetrVG against works constitution organs or their members285.
Assessment by Unions and Employers 
Despite some criticism regarding the continuing division between unions and 
councils, peace obligation and duty to cooperate with the employer, the DGB 
regarded the new BetrVG as far more progressive than its predecessor286. 
The  DAG  welcomed  a  number  of  amendments  giving  the  councils  new  or 
extended  participation  rights  and  acknowledged  that  it  brought  essential 
improvements in terms of co-determination in personnel matters, even though 
the DAG's demands to make all personnel matters depending on agreement by 
the works council were not met287.
Unions suggested that the law should be amended so as to enable unions to take 
over  responsibilities  of  works  councils  where  none  existed.  The  general 
284 Herbert Anders, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsrecht aus der Sicht der DAG, in: 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 299ff. (p. 303).
285 Herbert Anders, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsrecht aus der Sicht der DAG, in: 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 299ff. (p. 303); Fritz Auffarth, Das neue 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Arbeit und Recht 1972, p. 33ff. (p. 34).
286 Wolfgang Schneider, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz aus der Sicht des DGB, in: 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 292ff. (p. 295).
287 Herbert Anders, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz aus der Sicht der DAG, in: 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 299ff. (p. 302).
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assessment  was  that  the  BetrVG  1972,  while  being  a  definite  step  forward, 
needed to be further developed to provide for a participation of employees on an 
equal footing with the employer288.
Employers' side held that entrepreneurial decision-making and planning power 
were threatened, especially by participation rights in personnel matters; the new 
law would place too great demands particularly on small enterprises, since it 
provided for a multitude of institutions and processes, slowing down decisions 
of the entrepreneur and the works council289. However, hope was expressed that 
meaningful  co-operation  would  still  be  possible,  founding  this  hope  on  the 
experiences with the BetrVG 1952290.
Despite  those  criticisms  the  number  of  works  councils  went  up  from about 
25,000 in 1968 to about 36,000 in 1981291.
Impact on the Relationship between Unions and Works Councils 
The relationship between unions and councils changed after the reform of 1972, 
288 Wolfgang Schneider, 5 Jahre Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972 – eine Zwischenbilanz, in: 
Das Mitbestimmungsgespräch 1977, p. 23ff. (p. 29, 30); Wolfgang Schneider, Das neue 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz aus der Sicht des DGB, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 292ff. (p. 
299); Herbert Anders, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz aus der Sicht der DAG, in: 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 299ff. (p. 304).
289 Alfred Wisskirchen, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsrecht aus der Sicht der Arbeitgeber, in: 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 288ff. (p. 289).
290 Alfred Wisskirchen, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsrecht aus der Sicht der Arbeitgeber, in: 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 1972, p. 288ff. (p. 292).
291 Fritz Auffarth, Zehn Jahre Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972, in: Recht der Arbeit 1982, p. 201ff. (p. 
201, 204). An explanation offered by the vice-president of the BAG held the protection of dismissal 
for members of election committees and candidates for election at least partly responsible. In his 
assessment, the BetrVG had so far (1982) stood the test in difficult times (Auffarth, cit. opp. p. 204).
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both due to the new law and to economical developments. 
§ 2 I BetrVG stipulates that works councils and unions represented in the plant 
are  obliged  to  co-operate,  taking  into  account  the  applicable  collective 
agreements. Consequently, the participation rights on issues laid down in § 87 I 
are only applicable if those topics have not been regulated by law or collective 
agreement.  While  works  councils  and  employers  are  allowed  to  conduct 
Betriebsvereinbarungen,  that  is,  agreements  between  employers  and  works 
council  on  plant  level,  wages and  conditions  that  either  are  or  typically are 
determined by collective agreements are not allowed to be regulated by those 
(§77 III). This of course gives unions (or rather, the social partners) scope to 
determine  the  responsibilities  of  the  councils,  while  councils  are  not  able  to 
constrict the constitutional guaranteed rights of unions in the plant. At the same 
time, it upholds the attractiveness of unions since the permission to adopt terms 
of a collective agreement in a Betriebsvereinbarung would extend the scope of 
the collective agreement from union members to everyone in the plant. Unions 
therefore are in a primary position292.
The impact of the reform on the relationship between unions and works councils 
cannot be fully understood without reference to the economic background of the 
1970s. While employers faced increasing competition in the aftermath of the oil-
crisis of 1973, technological innovations and their potential for rationalisation 
became more affordable. At the same time, international economics underwent a 
structural  change  as  industrialisation  took  hold  in  former  'underdeveloped' 
292  Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, 
Baden-Baden 2000, p.64f; Fritz Auffarth, Das neue Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in: Arbeit 
und Recht 1972, p. 33ff. (p. 34).
Of course, the perception of councils as unions’ agents might bear the danger of weakening 
the unions’ position when employees are of the opinion that they are well cared for by the 
council (fulfilling unions’ function) and regard membership therefore as not necessary.
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countries, making them competitors in more traditional industries (steel, textiles, 
ship  building)  traditionally  by  'advanced'  countries.  Additionally,  Japanese 
manufacturing entered the market on a big scale293. This had a profound impact 
for unions (see Chapter I) who so far had acted under very favourable conditions 
with  virtually  no  unemployment  and  secure  economic  growth.  Now  rising 
unemployment  led to  decreasing bargaining power and industrial  relations  at 
national level became less and less cooperative. Technological change and its 
perception as a “job killer” gradually became, along with the struggle against 
unemployment, a main focus of unions. In this situation, works councils were 
able to deal with conflicts arising at plant level by making use of their more 
numerous  and  stronger  information  and  consultation  rights  in  terms  of 
introduction of new technology. Due to the fact that most councillors are union 
members, councils became the main actors for unions in their relationship with 
employers specifically on the issue of technology. This co-operation on the other 
hand gave councils greater influence in the dual system294. A survey undertaken 
by  Thelen  in  1985  supports  the  notion  that  works  councils  and  unions  are 
interdependent. She found that 
“in general, a strong union presence is associated with a more aggressive use 
of  works  council  rights  across  a  broader  range  of  issues.  Stronger  legal 
rights  under  Montanmitbestimmung  and  the  greater  political  power 
associated with higher unionization are sources of strength for labor in its 
293 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
108.
294 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
109, 113, 186.
Hans Mayr, head of collective bargaining for the IG Metall in 1977 called for “an economic 
policy that gives first priority to full employment ... [and] coordinated regional and sectoral 
policies that give priority to the creation of stable jobs“ (Thelen, cit. opp. p. 113).
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dealings with employers. Where union presence is low as in depoliticized 
legalism, works councils are neither as likely to challenge management, nor 
are  they  as  successful  in  doing  so  as  in  plants  where  union  presence  is 
higher.“295
Their  legally  backed  status  and  their  legal  rights  made  works  councils  an 
important factor in maintaining workers’ influence and collective rights in times 
when  national  (centralised)  bargaining  power  decreased.  Simultaneously,  the 
division between unions at national level and councils at plant level helped to 
maintain  (relative)  industrial  peace  –  while  national  negotiations  grew 
increasingly tense and hostile, negotiations and participation at plant level were 
still characterised by the search for peaceful ways to adjustments296. 
The  shift  in  the  1980s  from  wage  bargaining  towards  'quality  bargaining' 
(Chapter  I)  also  had  implications  on  the  relationship  between  unions  and 
councils, since, as Thelen points out 
“central  negotiations  over  working-time  reduction,  ...  ,  produced  no 
universally  binding  regulations,  but  instead  defined  the  parameters  for  a 
second  round  of  negotiations  at  the  plant  level.  Opening  clauses  in  the 
central  agreements  delegated  important  responsibilities  to  plant  works 
councils, which are not to simply administer the central agreements, but to 
actively shape their implementation in the plant.”297 
Besides strengthening of the position of works councils, those agreements (the 
295 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
128.
296 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
121.
297 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
156.
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difference to the unofficial second rounds of wage bargaining of the past being 
that this time plant negotiations were ‘legal’) led also to a strengthening of co-
operation with the unions.  When the 1984 agreement of IG Metall on working 
time left the details to the councils, the union advised them to not proceed before 
instructed and dealt out information, including model agreements298. It held that 
the works councils should try to negotiate a general working week of 38.5 and 
should  resist  employers’  attempts  to  introduce  different  working  times  for 
different classes of employees. In the end, the campaign was successful,  and 
only 5.7% of employees in the metalworking industry had a regular working 
time  different  from  38.5  hours299.  This  demonstrates  the  close  relationship 
between unions and councils  and the unions'  influence on councils and plant 
negotiations, which they tried to  enhance by providing training and services to 
councillors. 
Later Amendments to the BetrVG 1972
1988 
Important  amendments  to  the  BetrVG  were  made  in  1988300.  Tenure  was 
extended from 3 to 4 years, employers' duty to inform when introducing new 
298 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
166.
299 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
166f.
(even though this might have been partly due to indifference on the employers' side, 
Thelen, cit. opp. p. 167)
300 Gesetz zur Änderung des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes, über Sprecherausschüsse der 
leitenden Angestellte und zur Sicherung der Montanmitbestimmung vom 20. 12. 1988 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I 2312).
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technologies  were  specified,  and  the  definition  of  leitender  Angestellter301 
(excluded from most of the rights  under the  BetrVG due to his  proximity to 
management)  new  phrased.  Unions  criticised  the  fortified  protection  of 
minorities  in  council  elections  and  activities,  arguing  that  ‘protection  of 
minorities’ was only a disguise to complicate unified representation of interest 
within the works constitution302.
 2001
Major amendments were made under the Social  Democrat/Green coalition in 
2001303. They concerned mainly organisational matters: a new mode of election 
for small enterprises was introduced and the differentiation between Arbeiter and 
Angestellte304 abolished305. While this complied with union demands to dispose 
of the Gruppenprinzip306, enhanced necessity to include the minority sex in the 
council  was  introduced.  Furthermore,  the  Übergangsmandat  and  the 
Restmandat307,  providing  for  continuing  representation  after  mergers  or 
301 Executive employee.
302 Michael Kittner, Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – Einleitung, in: Michael Kittner, Arbeits- und 
Sozialordnung – Ausgewählte und eingeleitete Gesetzestexte, 29th Edition, Frankfurt am 
Main 2004, p.463ff. (p. 466).
303 Betriebsverfassungs-Reformgesetz vom 23. 7. 2001 (Bundesgesetzblatt I 1852).
304 Arbeiter and Angestellte might be compared to blue- and white-collar workers. They have for a long 
been treated differently under German law, e.g. in respect to notices of dismissals. 
305 This coincided with the dissolution of the salaried employees' union DAF in the public service 
union ver.di in 2001.
306 Group-principle. Under this principle, blue- and white-collar workers did elect their representatives 
to the works council separately.
307 An Übergangsmandat results when a Betrieb (see footnote 22) is split up. The former works council 
will then remain, under certain circumstances laid down in § 21a BetrVG, in office until a new 
council is elected.
A Restmandat emerges when a Betrieb, due to closedown, demerger or merger ceases to exist. The 
works council will then remain in office as long as it is necessary to exercise the participation and 
codetermination rights in regards to the breakup (§ 21b BetrVG).
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demergers,  was explicitly laid down and social  partners were given extended 
rights to determine the betriebliche Einheit308 in § 3309.
The  possibilities  to  extend  councils'  powers  by  collective  agreement  were 
expanded and in plants where no collective agreement is applicable, expansions 
can be undertaken via Betriebsvereinbarung310 (§ 3 II). Additionally, § 3 I No. 4 
now explicitly allows for additional inter-company works council structures to 
be set up by collective agreement311. This might have an impact on unions since 
industrial relations above the single plant or enterprise had always been their 
array; but the creation of such organs can only be done by collective agreement 
and is therefore in unions' hands312.
Participation  rights,  however,  were  extended only  marginally:  the method of 
308 Company entity.
309 Michael Kittner, Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – Einleitung, in: Michael Kittner, Arbeits- und 
Sozialordnung – Ausgewählte und eingeleitete Gesetzestexte, 29th Edition, Frankfurt am 
Main 2004, p.463ff. (p. 467f); Peter Hanau, Die Reform der Betriebsverfassung, in: Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 2001, p. 2513ff. (p. 2514ff., 2519).
However, the regulations regarding the representation of both sexes require merely that the 
sex in the minority be represented in the council; this may lead to the majority sex not 
being represented at all.
(Manfred Löwisch, Arbeitsrecht, 7th Edition, Düsseldorf 2004, p, 130, Rn. 445).
310 An agreement on company level between employer and works council and subject to § 77 BetrVG.
311 Peter Hanau, Die Reform der Betriebsverfassung, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2001, 
p. 2513ff. (p. 2513).
The possibility to elect a Gesamtbetriebsrat, that is, a works council operating on 
corporation level in a corporation containing more than one Betrieb, in addition to the 
‘normal’ works councils at Betriebslevel, had been introduced earlier.
312 The DBG generally welcomed the more flexible regulations, but emphasised that those 
only were to be undertaken by collective agreement, not Betriebsvereinbarung – otherwise 
the Tarifautonomie might be endangered (Bundesvorstand des DGB, Der 
Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes, in: Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 2001, p. 135ff. (p. 135).
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determining the minimum number of employees had been changed313, therefore, 
co-determination rights in personnel matters might now also be applicable in 
small plants when there are at least 20 employees in the company. In conjunction 
with that, the threshold number for a  council right to demand the passing of 
guidelines for choosing which employees shall be subject to personnel matters 
was lowered from 1000 to 500 employees in the plant314.  
The  amendment  upheld  the  division  between  unions  on  the  outside,  works 
councils on the inside. The new possibility to elect inter-company councils might 
prove a dilution of this concept, but it has to be awaited how extensively this will 
be used – after all, the possibility can only be set up by collective agreement.
Changes due to European Influences
Changes to  the Works Constitution Act  or the dual  system due to  European 
legislation  have  been  marginal  and  mostly  regarded  technicalities,  while  the 
principal  system  of  a  statutory  representation  body  with  strong  legal  right, 
independent from unions, has been left untouched.
The Directive on Mass Redundancies, for example, enhanced the position of the 
works council by equipping it with more extensive information and consultation 
313 Betrieb has been defined in footnote 22. An Unternehmen is defined as “a organisational entity, 
defined by its economical or ideational intention, to which intention are serving one or several 
organisationally linked Betriebe of the same Unternehmen”. 
(Günter Schaub (Ed.), Arbeitsrechts-Handbuch, Systematische Darstellung und Nachschlagewerk 
für die Praxis, 11th Edition, München 2005, p. 125, § 18, Rn. 10.)
314 Michael Kittner, Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – Einleitung, in: Michael Kittner, Arbeits- und 
Sozialordnung – Ausgewählte und eingeleitete Gesetzestexte, 29th Edition, Frankfurt am 
Main 2004, p.463ff. (p. 467f); Peter Hanau, Die Reform der Betriebsverfassung, in: Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 2001, p. 2513ff. (p. 2518).
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rights315.  Likewise,  the Directive on Information and Consultation was hardly 
noticed  in  the  German  public.  No  special  implementation  measures  were 
undertaken since it was believed that the BetrVG was sufficient316.
Conclusion
Works councils helped develop the centralised system of collective bargaining. 
315  The decision in Junk v Kühnel (C-188/03) led to a further strengthening of the works council in 
relation to the employer. It was decided that, for the purposes of the Directive on Mass 
Redundancies, the term ‘dismissal’ (Entlassung) is to be understood as ‘declaration of dismissal’ 
(Kündigung) by the employer. This had implication for German practice since before that decision it 
was widely assumed (and in fact permanent jurisdiction of the BAG) that it was sufficient to 
conclude consultation after the dismissals had been declared but before they became effective. The 
ECJ explained that the aim of consultation had to be to possibly prevent dismissal and of course, 
therefore consultation had to be completed before the dismissals are declared. After all, the aim of 
the Directive and decisive for its interpretation is the protection of employees, combined with the 
principle of adaptation of working conditions by way of progress as laid down in Art. 11 EC Treaty.
This of course enhances the possibilities of the works council to actually propose measures that 
might render a few dismissals unnecessary. 
(Helga Appel, Die “Junk”-Entscheidung des EuGH zur Massenentlassung – Nur eine Aufforderung 
an den Gesetgeber?, in: Der Betrieb 2005, p. 1002ff. (p. 1002); Hellmut Wissmann, Probleme bei 
der Umsetzung der EG-Richtlinie ueber Massenentlassungen in deutsches Recht, in: Recht der 
Arbeit 1998, p. 221ff. (p. 223).
316 While the BetrVG in fact is broadly in compliance with the Directive, a few problems remain. For 
example, the BetrVG doesn't make the election of a works council mandatory; rather, employees 
have the possibility and the right to elect one. A “common declaration” of European Parliament, 
European Council and Commission on this issue merely refers to the decision of the ECJ in 
Commission v United Kingdom of June 1994. This states clearly the implications of the principle of 
subsidiarity: on the one hand the Directive of Information and Consultation is intended to lead to a 
community-wide social dialogue in enterprises, on the other hand the laws and practices of the 
individual member states rate high in the process of implementation. The ECJ thus demands an 
Untermaßverbot (prohibition to fall short of the protection provided for in the Directive): the social 
dialogue at the workplace must not be at will of the employer, rather the implementations of the 
member states have to ensure the effectiveness of the Directive. The BetrVG thus is regarded as 
sufficient, since it provides for a standing representation body independent from the good-will of the 
employer (§§ 14 – 17a BetrVG). However, it needs to be ensured that information and consultation 
will take place where there is no standing body of representation. 
(Additionally it was held that the Directive was based on Art 137 II 2 in connection with Art 137 I 
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Unions had the chance to (and, due to the fact that the  BetrVG 1952 virtually 
banned  them from the  plant,  were  forced  to)  concentrate  on  negotiations  at 
national or district level while councils undertook the day to day representation 
on plant level. However, even though the two systems are technically divided, 
unions  managed  to  exert  influence  on  councils  by  filling  them  with  union 
members and offering services to councillors. Rights of unions’ within the works 
constitution have been strengthened under the BetrVG 1972, giving them greater 
options to exert their influence. The existence of councils therefore might not 
only have attributed to the unions role as a central negotiator but also to their 
role as service provider for members – where there is no strong union presence 
lit.e of the European Treaty, which only allows for the passing of Directives on Information and 
Consultation and not on Art 137 III of the Treaty that  allows for the passing of regulations on 
representation  and  collective  attending  to  interests,  and  therefore  implies  no  duty  to  provide 
representation bodies.)
The DGB noted that the rights of the works council regarding information and consultation are to be 
extended with respect to decisions that might bring about material alterations of works organisation 
or  employment  contracts.  For  example,  information  regarding  decisions  resulting  in 
Änderungskündigung (dismissal with the option of altered conditions of employment) or transfer of 
employees will have to be undertaken earlier than under §§ 99, 102 BetrVG; apart from that, the 
DGB states that the administration fine in § 121 BetrVG does not constitute a adequate sanction of 
offences against the directive; the Nachteilsausgleich (making good the financial prejudice sustained 
by an employee through his employer’s failure to effect an Interessensausgleich in connection with 
Betriebsänderungen)  in  §  113  BetrVG for  offences  against  §§  111ff.  BetrVG,  however,  might 
provide such an adequate sanction. The  Personalvertretungsgesetz  (works councils for the public 
service) will have to be supplemented by such a provision (and by information and consultation 
rights like those in § 111 BetrVG) in order to comply with the Directive.
(Hermann Reichold, Durchbruch zu einer europäischen Betriebsverfassung – Die Rahmenrichtlinie 
2002/14/EG  zur  Unterrichtung  und  Anhörung  der  Arbeitnehmer,  in:  Neue  Zeitschrift  für 
Arbeitsrecht 2003, p. 289ff. (p. 294f.); DGB, Analyse zu den Auswirkungen der Verabschiedung 
der Richtlinie 2002/14/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 11. März 2002 zur 
Festlegung eines allgemeinen Rahmens für die Unterrichtung und Anhörung der Arbeitnehmer in 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf das Betriebs- und Personalvertretungsrecht, in: einblick, Vol. 20 
2002, 11. 12. 2002, http://www.einblick.dgb.de/archiv/0220/tx022001.htm, last accessed December 
26th,  2005;    Europäische  Gemeinschaft,  Arbeitsdokument  für  die  Sitzung  des 
Vermittlungsausschusses am 17. 12. 2001, C 5-0687/2001 (1998/0315 (COD) Anhang).
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on  the  shop-floor  and  representation  in  important  issues  like  dismissals  is 
primarily  undertaken  by  councils,  unions  needed  to  find  other  ways  to  be 
attractive to members.
It has been asserted that one reason for the development of the dual system is to 
be  found  in  a  desire  on  employers’  side  to  avert  a  unified  interplant 
representation of workers’ interests – and there is indeed danger that due to its 
plant-centred position a council might concentrate on achieving merely better 
conditions for their constituents (Betriebsegoismus317) while neglecting broader 
aims. Although possibilities of Betriebsegoismus are restricted under a system of 
centralised bargaining that gives councils, as shown above, only limited rights in 
classic areas of collective bargaining,  the increasing use of Öffnungsklauseln in 
collective agreements, allowing for an impairment of collectively agreed terms 
on plant  level  via  an agreement  between works council  and employer,  gives 
greater scope for Betriebsegoismus. Yet, councils rely on unions in a number of 
ways and this might well help to keep those tendencies in check318. Still, works 
councils  are plant-centred, and by law they are obliged to keep an eye on the 
well-being of the plant. Since managers have to get the approval of the council 
in important decisions they tend to take the social consequences of their decision 
more into account than would otherwise be the case; councils, on the other hand, 
have  an  interest  in  decisions  that  provide  for  long-term  economic  and  job 
security.  Industrial  relations  on  plant  level  are  therefore  characterised  by 
317 Literally ‘plant egoism’.
318 Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, 
Baden-Baden 2000, p.65; Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar 
Germany, London 1991, p. 124, 151, 153.
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compromise rather than conflict319. While this might lead to  Betriebsegoismus 
especially in hard times, councils are generally well integrated within the union 
movement, asserting union influence within the plant. It might therefore be said 
that the feared, or, depending on the standpoint, wished for division of workers' 
representation did not occur.
The dual system has advantages: the fact that councils are legal institutions with 
enforceable legal rights brings collective rights especially to smaller plants and 
sectors without a strong union tradition or presence where they would otherwise 
be hard to come by. However, this might also weaken unions since employees 
might have the impression that no union is needed besides a works council320. 
That said, councils are often viewed as union organs by employees and in this 
way the positive influence councils have on workplace issues is reflected back 
upon the union, thus helping to strengthen their position321.
Because they are plant-centred, councils have to deal with new problems on the 
shop floor (new technologies etc.) much sooner than unions. They therefore can 
be regarded as experimenters on those matters, long before unions have found 
solutions to the problem. In that way, councils might help keep unions in touch 
with work place reality. In fact, German unions appear to have done more than 
most  of their  European counterparts  on issues  such as environment  and new 
technologies322.
319 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
122.
320 Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, 
Baden-Baden 2000, p.66.
321 Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, London 1991, p. 
152f.
322 Wolfgang Däubler, Gewerkschaftsrechte im Betrieb – Handkommentierung, 10th Edition, 
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It seems therefore that while a danger of  Betriebsegoismus especially in hard 
times is present  that there are union resources available to keep it in check. It 
thus appears that the parties concerned managed to make the best out of the dual 
system.
Baden-Baden 2000, p.66.
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Part Two – Second channel in British industrial relations due to European 
Influences?
It has been shown that the industrial relations systems in the UK and Germany are fairly 
different. The traditional system of representation in the UK, in accordance with its 
voluntaristic tradition, relied on trade unions323; with collective bargaining and, 
especially, workplace bargaining undertaken by shop stewards being the main means of 
workers’ involvement324. In contrast to most other European countries, collective 
bargaining in the UK was traditionally not only concerned with the ‘classic’ issues, for 
example terms and conditions (pay, holidays etc.), but widely also covered matters such 
as 
“organization  and pace  of  work,  technological  innovation  and a  wide  range  of 
issues relating to control over the processes of production, as well as encroaching 
into areas of managerial responsibility such as recruitment, work allocation and the 
exercise of disciplinary sanctions”;
areas that in Germany, as has been detailed above, are covered by works councils325. In 
the UK’s traditional system of single channel, ‘representation’ and ‘participation’ are 
part  of  collective  bargaining.  This  wide  interpretation  of  bargaining  explains  the 
assessment of the Donovan Commission that “properly conducted collective bargaining 
323 Michael Terry, Employee Representation: Shop Stewards and the New Legal Framework, in: Paul 
Edwards (Ed.), Industrial Relations – Theory & Practice, 2nd Edition, Oxford 2003, p. 257ff. (p. 
257); Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 105).
324 Even though there have been phases of systems of representation that were more detached from 
trade unions, for example the joint consultation committees after WW II (Sid Kessler, Fred Bayliss, 
Contemporary British Industrial Relations, 3rd Edition, Houndsmill 1998, p. 124)
325 Michael Terry, Employee Representation: Shop Stewards and the New Legal Framework, in: Paul 
Edwards (Ed.), Industrial Relations – Theory & Practice, 2nd Edition, Oxford 2003, p. 257ff. (p. 
266).
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is the most effective means of giving workers the right to representation in decisions 
affecting their working lives”326.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether and to which extent significant EC 
legislation has led to changes in the British system, especially to the development of a 
“second channel” of industrial relations, independent from trade unions.
Directives regarding Workers’ Participation 
Statutory information and consultation rights within the voluntaristic system, distinct 
from collective bargaining, have been present in the UK for a long time. The Health and 
Safety  at  Work  Act  1974  obliged  employers  to  consult  with  representatives  of 
recognised trade unions on matters of Health and Safety327 and from the mid 1970s on 
Directives  have  forced  employers  to  consult  with  their  employees  on  transfer  of 
undertakings,  mass  redundancies  and  other  things328.  These  regulations,  however, 
326 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1965 – 1968, Report, London 
1968, para 212; Howard Gospel, Paul William, Dilemmas in Worker Representation – Information, 
Consultation and Negotiation, in: Howard Gospel, Stephen Wood (Ed.), Representing Workers – 
Union Recognition and Membership in Britain, London 2003, p. 144ff. (p. 146). 
327 Paul Davies, Mark Freedland, Labour legislation and Public Policy, Oxford 1993, p. 343f.; Paul 
Davis, Claire Kilpatrick, UK Worker Representation After Single Channel, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 33, No.2, p. 121ff. (p. 122).
The regulations were a result of the report of the Robbens committee that recommended that 
“workpeople must be encouraged to participate fully in the making and monitoring of arrangements 
for health and safety at their place of work. There should be a general statutory obligation on 
employers to consult with their workpeople on measure for promoting safety and health. Guidance 
on methods of consultation and participation should be provided in a code of practice”
(Report of the Committee 1970-72, Chairman Lord Robens, Health and Safety at Work, London 
1972, para 462)
Interestingly, the requirement to consult solely with recognised trade unions was introduced by the 
Labour Government, the Conservatives, when drafting the bill, had favoured a tripartite model 
(Davies et. al., cit. opp., p. 344).
328 Roger Welch, Steve Williams, The Information and Consultation Regulations – Much Ado about 
Nothing?, Cambrian Law Review, Vol. 36, p. 29ff. (p. 32); Mark Hall, Mike Terry, The Emerging 
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mainly sustained unions’ monopoly on representation329.
Directive on Transfer of Undertakings
The Council Directive 77/187/EEC330 was a reaction to a rise in merges in the EEC in 
the late 1960s331 and a result of the Social Action Programme of 1974, adopted to ensure 
that social policy wasn’t left behind by economic integration332.
System of Statutory Worker Representation, in: Geraldine Healy, Edmund Heery, Phil Taylor (Ed.), 
The Future of Worker Representation, Houndsmills, Basingstoke 2004, p. 207ff. (p. 207); Mark 
Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulation, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 34, p. 103ff; Manfred Weiss, Arbeitnehmermitwirkung in Europa, in: Neue Zeitschrift 
für Arbeitsrecht 2003, p. 177ff. (p. 178).
However, Davies and Kilpatrick argue that the realisation of the British Government of an 
“information and consultation function for worker representation” was only partly due to EC-
influences while Government also responded to domestic policy, especially in the area of health and 
safety. For example, the “consultation requirements of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 
predated the Community's efforts in this area”.
(Paul Davis, Claire Kilpatrick, UK Worker Representation after Single Channel, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 33, No.2, p. 121ff. (p. 122).
329 Paul Davis, Claire Kilpatrick, UK Worker Representation after Single Channel, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 33, No.2, p. 121ff. (p. 122).
330 Council Directive of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employee’s rights in the event of transfer of undertakings, businesses 
or parts of businesses. 
331 Bob Hepple, Workers' Rights in Mergers and Takeovers: The EEC Proposals, in: Industrial Law 
Journal Vol. 5, No.4, p. 197ff. (p. 198).
In 1970, there were 3.5 times as many as in 1962 and the rate of increase between 1966 and 1970 
was twice as high as that between 1960 and 1966. Respective numbers for the UK in manufacturing, 
distribution and services had increased threefold between 1964 and 1968, a trend that generally 
continued in the 1970s. 
(Bob Hepple, cit. opp. p. 198)
332 One of the aims of the Social Action Programme was the protection of employee participation in 
changes of ownership or company control; another reason for the adoption of the Directive was “the 
economic liberalism of the Treaty of Rome directed against the restriction of competition by 
concentrations”. The main aim of the Treaty of Rome indeed was of an economic nature: to create a 
common market with free movement of goods and services as well as labour and capital; therefore, 
in order to facilitate real free competition, constraints on enterprises and social costs, mostly to be 
borne by enterprises, needed to be aligned.
104
Employee protection allowed for two solutions, both represented in the Directive: either 
the employees are merely given the same rights against their new employer as they had 
against the old or additionally the right to have a say in the decision to transfer333. 
The Directive obliged both transferor and transferee to inform employee representatives 
of  “the  reasons  for  the  transfer,  the  legal,  economic  and social  implications  of  the 
transfer for the employees” and “measures envisaged in relation to the employees” (Art 
6(1)). It contained neither provisions regarding the nature of those representatives nor 
an obligation to provide some. Instead, Article 6 (5) provided that 
“Member  States  may  provide  that  where  there  are  no  representatives  of  the 
employees  in  an  undertaking  or  business,  the  employees  concerned  must  be 
informed in advance when a transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1) is about to 
take place.”
The UK implemented the Directive more than three years late with the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, containing the automatic 
transfer of the contract of employment and introducing a “duty to inform and consult 
representatives of recognised trade unions”334. They presented an “important extension 
(Paul Davies, Mark Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, Oxford 1993, p. 577f.; Bob 
Hepple, Workers' Rights in Mergers and Takeovers: The EEC Proposals, in: Industrial Law Journal 
Vol. 5, No.4, p. 197ff. (p. 203); Catherine Barnard, EC 'Social' Policy, in: Paul Craig, Gráinne de 
Burca, The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford 1999, p. 479ff. (p. 479f.); Linda Hantrais, Social Policy in 
the European Union, Houndsmills, Basingstoke 1995, p. 1; Michael Shanks, Introductory Article: 
The Social Policy of the European Communities, in: Common Market Law Review Vol. 14 (1977), 
p. 375ff. (p. 375f.).)
333 Paul Davies, Mark Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, Oxford 1993, p. 578.
334 Bob Hepple, The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations, in: Industrial 
Law Journal Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 29ff. (p. 29).
Even though the final bill was far less extensive than the first draft from 1978, it was passed “with 
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of statutory support  of collective bargaining”335 and thus helped to affirm the single 
channel system of representation by strengthening the position of trade unions by giving 
them a legal right to information and consultation.
Directive on Collective Redundancies
The Directive on Collective Redundancies was the first European Community Directive 
to deal with information and consultation of employees336.  In 1972, the Commission 
created a first draft, stating that the differences in protecting workers in case of mass 
redundancies had a 
“direct effect on the functioning of the Common Market in as far as they create 
disparities in conditions of competition which are likely to influence the decisions 
by undertakings, whether national or multinational, on the distribution of the posts 
they have to be filled. It must for example be expected that any form intending to 
reorganize  itself  by  a  plan  including  the  partial  or  total  closedown  of  certain 
departments, will decide which departments to close down on the basis, at least in 
part, of the level of protection offered to the workers. This and other situations can 
exert pressure against social progress and [be] prejudicial to a balanced overall and 
regional  development  within  the  community  since  it  creates  areas  of  mass 
unemployment.”337 
remarkable lack of enthusiasm”, solely because the European Commission was about to start 
proceeding against the UK for failure of implementation 
(Hepple, cit. opp. p. 29).
335 Bob Hepple, The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations, in: Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 11, No 1, p. 29ff. (p. 29, 38).
336 Annemarie Mauthner, Die Massenentlassungsrichtlinie der EG und ihre Bedeutung für das deutsche 
Massenentlassungsrecht, Heidelberg 2004, p. 28f.
337 Commission of European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonization of 
the legislation of the Member States relating to redundancies, COM(72) 1400, November 8th, 1972, 
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It held that
“economic  changes  and  closures  of  undertakings  which  these  can  involve  are 
however an integral part of a development towards more promising activities. It is 
therefore  necessary  not  to  hinder  them,  but  to  place  this  professional  mobility 
within a framework of appropriate guarantees”338.
The Directive was eventually prompted by multi-national Akzo that based its decision 
which plant to close down when restructuring on the most “advantageous” dismissal 
and collective redundancies laws339. This strategy led to a demand for a “European rule 
to make such strategies impossible  in  the future and to lay down a European wide 
minimum floor of protection in the case of collective dismissals”340 and the Directive on 
Mass Redundancies was finally adopted in 1975341.
It  required  consultation  with  “workers’  representatives”  on  proposed  mass 
redundancies. Hepple and Byre argued in 1989 that it did 
p. 1,  http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/labour_law/docs/com72_1400_en.pdf, last 
accessed 20th January 2006.
338 Commission of European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonization of 
the legislation of the Member States relating to redundancies, COM(72) 1400, p 2, November 8th, 
1972, p. 2,  http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/labour_law/docs/com72_1400_en.pdf, 
last accessed 20th January 2006.
339 Oda Hinrichs, Kündigungsschutz und Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung bei Massenentlassungen, Baden-
Baden 2001, p. 23.
340 Roger Blanpain, European Labour Law, 6th Edition 1999, Nr 549 (p. 334).
341 Jeff Bridgford, John Stirling, Employee Relations in Europe, Oxford 1994, p. 229; Jari Hellsten, On 
Social and Economic Factors in the Developing European Labour Law – Reasoning on Collective 
Redundancies, Transfer of Undertakings and Converse Pyramids, Work Life in Transition 2005:11, 
p. 15, http://ebib.arbetslivsinstitutet.se/aio/2005/aio2005_11.pdf, last accessed April 20th, 2006; 
Annemarie Mauthner, Die Massenentlassungsrichtlinie der EG und ihre Bedeutung für das deutsche 
Massenentlassungsrecht, Heidelberg 2004, p. 29.
In fact, however, trying to figure out the cheapest way to dismiss as many workers as possible may 
be seen as “common market effect”. (Hellsten, cit. opp., p. 15).
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“not seek to interfere with the machinery and structural arrangements at national 
level and [did] not define the term ‘workers’ representatives’ except to state that 
they  be  the  representatives  designated  by  the  laws or  practices  of  the  member 
states”342.
The UK decided  therefore,  in  accordance  with the  tradition of  “single  channel”,  to 
restrict  the  right  to  consultation  to  recognised  trade  unions.  At  the  time  of 
implementation through the Employment Protection Act 1975 there was still a statutory 
recognition process,  but when this  was removed in  1980 employers were given the 
power to avoid the obligation to consult by simply not recognising a union343, putting 
the  effectiveness  of  the  rights  provided  for  by  Community  law  in  the  hands  of 
employers.
This was one of the issues leading to proceedings against the UK, culminating in the 
decision of the ECJ in Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of  
Great Britain and Northern Ireland344.
Commission v UK
After a formal note of complaint in 1989 the UK acknowledged its non-compliance in 
all  respects  except  the  issue  of  representation  by  recognised  trade  unions  only345. 
342 Bob Hepple, Angela Byre, EEC Labour Law in the United Kingdom – A New Approach, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 129ff. (p. 138).
343 Bob Hepple, Angela Byre, EEC Labour Law in the United Kingdom – A New Approach, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 129ff. (p. 138) (The authors proposed already in 1989 that 
the UK might not be in compliance with the Directive – a view that was confirmed by the ECJ 
ruling of June 1994 (see below).), Mark Hall, Mike Terry, The Emerging System of Statutory 
Worker Representation, in: Geraldine Healy, Edmund Heery, Phil Taylor (Ed.), The Future of 
Worker Representation, Houndsmills, Basingstoke 2004, p. 207ff. (p. 208).
344 Case C-383/92, June 8th, 1994.
345 Commission of the European Communities, Report by the Commission to the Council on progress 
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Subsequently, two implementation reports were issued by the Commission. The first 
one from 1991 on the Directive on Collective Redundancies346 considered, inter alia, the 
issue of representatives  problematic, since the limitation of consultation to recognised 
unions made it possible for an employer to not recognise any union and so to avoid the 
duty  to  consult.  Also,  if  consultation  took  place,  UK  law  didn't  require  it  to  be 
conducted “with a view to reaching an agreement”, as demanded by the Directive347. 
The  second  report  from  1992  on  the  Directive  on  Transfers  of  Undertakings  also 
criticised the issue of recognition of unions; additionally, fault was found in that “there 
is also no legal provision for cases where there is no 'institutional representation’”348. 
The Case before the European Court of Justice and its Decision
with regard to implementation of the Directive on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to collective redundancies (Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975), 
SEC(91) 1639 final, Brussels, 1991, p. 77f.; Commission for the European Communities, 
Commission Report to the Council on progress with regard to the implementation of Directive 
77/178/EEC relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 
1977), SEC(92) 857 final, Brussels 1992, p. 136
346 Commission of the European Communities, Report by the Commission to the Council on progress 
with regard to implementation of the Directive on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to collective redundancies (Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975), 
SEC(91) 1639 final, Brussels, 1991.
(http://aei.pitt.edu/3451/01/000602_1.pdf, last accessed April 20th, 2006).
347 Commission of the European Communities, Report by the Commission to the Council on progress 
with regard to implementation of the Directive on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to collective redundancies (Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975), 
SEC(91) 1639 final, Brussels, 1991, p. 77.
348 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Report to the Council on progress with 
regard to the implementation of Directive 77/178/EEC relating to the safeguarding of employees' 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (Council Directive 
77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977), SEC(92) 857 final, Brussels 1992, p. 135.
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The  ECJ  decided  in  two  rulings  from June  8th,  1994349 that  the  UK  had  failed  to 
implement the Directives properly in that the national rules only required an employer 
to consult representatives and “consider” their views, if rejecting them he was merely 
obliged to “state his reasons”; whereas the Directive itself required consultation “with a 
view to reaching an agreement”350. More importantly, however, were the parts regarding 
the restriction of information and consultation rights to recognised unions. The Transfer 
of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 and the Employment 
Protection Act 1975 had imposed no duty on employers to consult with any other body 
or indeed to comply with the requirements of the Directives in absence of recognised 
unions. While at the time of passing of the EPA there were still statutory recognition 
procedures  so  that  representation  could  be  forced  upon  an  employer,  those  were 
repealed in 1980351. The Commission held that the Directives required 
“employers in every instance ... to inform and consult. If representatives are not 
designated on a voluntary basis, the Member State in question must then provide 
appropriate rules under which they can be designated”,
 while the UK argued that “those provisions impose an obligation to inform and consult 
workers' representatives only if national law and practice provide for representatives”352. 
The Advocate General followed the opinion of the Commission that 
“to make the activity of workers'  representatives totally dependent on voluntary 
recognition  by  employers  is  incompatible  with  the  protection  of  workers  as 
349 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom, cases C-382/92 and C-383/92 
([1994] IRLR 392).
350 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Case C-383/92; Brian Bercusson, (Case Comment), in: Common Market Law Review Vol. 
33, No. 3, p. 589ff. (p. 589).
351 Opinion of the Advocate General, para 6.
352  Opinion of the Advocate General, para 9.
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apparent  from  the  directives  in  the  light  of  their  objective,  structure  and 
wording353”, 
concluding that
“on the basis of the foregoing, I cannot accept the United Kingdom's argument that 
national rules may be regarded as compatible with the fundamental objectives of 
the two directives in question if they render the provision of information to, and 
consultation of, workers' representatives in matters of such importance to workers 
as collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings entirely dependent on the 
free choice of individual employers354”.
The argument brought forward by the UK in defence was that the Directives were not 
designed  to  change  existing  laws  or  practices  regarding  the  determination  of 
representatives. In fact, they merely required representatives “provided for by the laws 
or practices of the member states”355. However, even while accepting this argument, the 
Court pointed out “that national legislation which made it possible to impede protection 
unconditionally guaranteed to workers was contrary to EC law”356. 
Therefore,  the  UK  failed  to  provide  effective  representation  by  “not  providing  a 
mechanism for the designation of workers’ representatives in an undertaking where the 
employer refuses to recognize such representatives”357, instead relying on representation 
by voluntarily recognised unions. The provision asking for representatives appointed 
353 Opinion of the Advocate General, para 9.
354 Opinion of the Advocate General, para 12.
355 Simon Deakin, Gillian S Morris, Labour Law, 3rd Edition, Reed Elsevier 2001, p. 794.
356 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Case C-383/92, para 20.
357 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Case C-383/92, para 12.
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according to  laws or  practices  of  the  member states were held to  mean that,  while 
member states had the power to decide how representatives are determined, the British 
interpretation would allow “an employer  to  frustrate  the  protection  provided for  by 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive [and] must [therefore] be regarded as contrary to those 
Articles”358.
Since the Directive was designed to provide protection for employees, the employers' 
ability to deny this protection had to be seen as contrary. Additionally, member states 
were  generally  required  to  “take  all  appropriate  measures  to  ensure  that  employee 
representatives  are  designated  with  a  view  to  complying  with  the  information  and 
consultation obligations laid down in both Directives”359.
The failure to correctly imply the Directives was aggravated by the fact that trade union 
recognition had steadily declined since the 1980s (see Graph III), leaving an increasing 
number of workers without the protection of information and consultation under the 
directives. 
Evaluation of Decision
The decision of the ECJ rendered representation based on voluntary recognition of trade 
unions insufficient. When the Directive had been implemented with the Employment 
Protection Act 1975, limiting information and consultation to recognised trade unions, 
unions were (as can be sen at the membership numbers shown in Graph II) at the height 
of their power (further enhanced by the statutory recognition procedure contained in the 
358 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Case C-383/92, paras 14, 27.
359 Mark Hall, Paul Edwards, Reforming the Statutory Redundancy Consultation Procedure, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 299ff. (p. 301).
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Act). They thus insisted on their monopoly of representation360. The decision of the ECJ 
deals with the power of the employer to determine whether consultation takes place by 
recognising or not recognising a union, its requirements to make consultation available 
independent from the employer could in principle also have been met inside the existing 
structure of “single channel”, by, for example, introducing new statutory recognition 
procedures. However, also statutory recognition is unlikely to be achieved in enterprises 
without a strong union support and would thus leave a large number of workers without 
representation. Introducing new channels of representation therefore was unavoidable361. 
The TUC (whose changed attitude might be seen in their strong support for the EWC 
Directive362) was well aware that the introduction of new statutory recognition 
procedures would not be enough to fulfill the requirements of the ruling and therefore 
explained and stressed to unions that the days of trade unions as only channel of 
representation were over363. 
360 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 22).
361  Paul Davies, A Challenge to Single Channel?, in: Industrial Law Journal Vol. 23, p. 272ff. (p. 
276ff, 279).
362 John Monks, general secretary of the TUC, welcomed the implementation of the Directive in the 
UK:
"European Works Councils are an important development in UK industrial relations. Workers in this 
country were excluded from Works Councils by the Conservatives. I'm pleased the Government has 
reversed this decision, bringing one step closer the day when UK employees can take their seats 
alongside their European colleagues on these important bodies."
Press release, issued 5th July 1999, http://www.tuc.org.uk/international/tuc-2175-f0.cfm, last 
accessed February 7th, 2006.
363 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 22).
It has also been argued that the decision is a “significant development of [the courts] influence over 
Member States' labour laws”, it being “the first time that the Court has required a Member State to 
amend the collective representation structures themselves in order to bring them into line with 
Community norms.“ (Paul Davies, A Challenge to Single Channel?, in: Industrial Law Journal Vol. 
23, p. 272ff. (p. 275))
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Thus Government was forced to implement for the first time representation structures 
different from the prevalent voluntaristic tradition in order to ensure that consultation 
would take place even where employers did not voluntarily recognise unions. While it 
might be argued that, therefore, the decision of the ECJ effectively put an end to the 
traditional  method  of  ‘single  channel’  representation364, Davies  pointed  out  that  the 
Government could comply with the decision without having to change too much: for 
once, the Directives require only consultation, not collective bargaining or any other 
more intensive mean of employee-employer relationship.  Additionally,  there was no 
obligation for the UK to generally change the system of representation as the decision 
only applies to the fields of collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings365. 
The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertaking (Protection of Employment)  
(Amendment) Regulations 1995
The  Major  administration  introduced  the  Collective  Redundancies  and  Transfer  of 
Undertaking (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 1995, which have 
been described as a “grudging, minimalist response to the ECJ's decision, coupled with 
anti-union  and  deregulatory  measures  to  sugar  the  pill”366.  They  provided  for 
consultation with ‘appropriate representatives’ of those concerned by redundancies or 
transfers.  Representatives  from  a  recognized  union  or  employees  of  the  company 
364 Jeff Kerner, European Labour Law – The Soft Option, in: New Law Journal Vol. 145, No. 6705, p. 
1090ff.; Mark Hall, Paul Edwards, Reforming the Statutory Redundancy Consultation Procedure, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vo. 28, No. 4, p. 299ff. (p. 314).
(Paul Davies, A Challenge to Single Channel?, in: Industrial Law Journal Vol. 23, p. 272ff. (p. 279).)
365 Paul Davies, A Challenge to Single Channel?, in: Industrial Law Journal Vo. 23, p. 272ff. (p. 276).
366 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law Journal, 
Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 17).
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elected  as  representatives  by  the  affected  employees  are  deemed  appropriate367. 
Additionally, the provisions allowed for “one-off” representation in the form that the 
employees in question elect representatives when required, standing bodies were not 
obligatory368. To ensure their independence, representatives had to be given protection 
of  dismissal and certain facilities369.  The employer  retained the right  to  decide with 
which kind of representative he wishes to consult,  thus having the freedom “of by-
passing existing union machinery and consulting elected representatives instead”. He 
also had the power to determine the election process and the number of representatives 
to be elected370. 
From an  employees’  point  of  view,  the  new  regulations  were  a  pejoration  in  two 
respects: first, the threshold number of proposed redundancies was raised to 20 where 
367 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 17); Mark Hall, Paul Edwards, Reforming the Statutory 
Redundancy Consultation Procedure, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 299ff. (p. 301f.). 
The regulation provides no mode for the election and no procedure for employees unhappy with the 
election-mode provided by the employer to complain, nor are there mechanisms to make sure 
representatives are independent form the employer. Hall consequently noted that “these two factors 
in particular appear to expose the whole consultation process to potential employer control and will 
inevitable give rise to dispute over whether the regulations are consistent with the terms of the ECJ 
judgements, especially the Court's strictness against allowing employers to impede or frustrate the 
protection provided for employees by the two Directives.” (Hall, opp. cit. p. 17).
368 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 17).
369 Paul Davies, A Challenge to Single Channel?, in: Industrial Law Journal Vol. 23, p. 272ff. (p. 281).
370 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 17); Mark Hall, Paul Edwards, Reforming the Statutory 
Redundancy Consultation Procedure, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 299ff. (p. 302).
However, a study undertaken by the DTI suggests that hardly any use was made of the possibility of 
union avoidance: only 4 out of 2048 cases seem to have taken advantage of that route, in one case 
only after the employees, given the choice between union representation and representation by 
elected representatives, chose the second. As one manager put it: “If there is a recognised union, 
there is no reason why you shouldn't use them. It is the sign of a working relationship, so the worst 
thing is to exclude them”. (Hall and Edwards, cit. opp., p. 307).
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one used to be enough; secondly, consultation now had to take place “in good time” 
where it used to be at “the earliest opportunity”. Both changes were perfectly in line 
with the Directive, nevertheless they impaired the situation of British employees; the 
Department for Trade and Industry estimated that due to the new threshold about 96% 
of UK businesses would be freed from the duty to consult371. 
However,  British  law  now  provided  explicitly  for  “non-union,  statutory  employee 
representatives”  even  though  restricted  to  mass  redundancies  and  transfer  of 
undertakings  and  supplementary  to  trade  union  representation372.  But  criticism 
questioning  whether  the  new  regulations  fulfilled  the  EC  requirements  persisted373, 
focussing on the fact that employers were able to avoid (even) recognised unions for 
consultation and on the problem of representatives’ independence from the employer374. 
It  was  also  pointed  out  that  there  were  neither  procedures  laid  down  as  to  how 
representatives were to be elected nor any under which employees could challenge the 
election  mechanisms  proposed  by  the  employer375.  Finally,  the  idea  of  ad  hoc 
371 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 17f.)
372 Mark Hall, Andrea Broughton, Mark Carley, Keith Sisson, Works Councils for the UK? - Assessing 
the Impact of the EU Employee Consultation Directive, London 2002, p. 26; Mark Hall, Paul 
Edwards, Reforming the Statutory Redundancy Consultation Procedure, in: Industrial Law Journal, 
Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 299ff. (p. 314); Manfred Weiss, Arbeitnehmermitwirkung in Europa, in: Neue 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 2003, p. 177ff. (p. 178).
The ECJ ruling also led to the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996 
(Hall and Edwards, opp. cit, p. 314).
373 Mark Hall, Paul Edwards, Reforming the Statutory Redundancy Consultation Procedure, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 299ff. (p. 299); see Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - 
Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 17).
374 Mark Hall, Paul Edwards, Reforming the Statutory Redundancy Consultation Procedure, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 299ff. (p. 306, 310); Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - 
Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 18).
375 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 18).
The only remedy available were tribunal applications for a protective award  (Hall, cit. opp., p. 18).
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representatives being able to provide for meaningful and effective consultation in such 
rather  complicated  situations  as  transfer  of  undertakings  or  mass  redundancies  was 
questioned376  -  in  fact,  one  could  assume  that  the  Government  was  intent  on 
implementing  the  ruling  of  the  ECJ  with  the  aim  of  rendering  information  and 
consultation as ineffective as possible while still adhering to the letters of the decision. 
After all, it is a striking contrast between the elaborate regulations concerning ballots 
and elections within unions and the absence of procedures for election or complaints 
under the 1995 regulations377.
The regulations were challenged by Britain's two largest unions, UNISON & GMB, and 
the  teaching  union  NASUWT.  Counsel  for  the  applicants  stated  that  the  Directive 
required consultation to be undertaken with “a view to reaching agreement”. Therefore, 
representatives needed to be properly independent and have sufficient resources. The 
regulations were held to be defective because the choice of representatives was partly 
left  to the employer378,  and because representatives were not  substantially equipped; 
furthermore, no adequate provision for complaint was provided. Another criticism was 
that in order to comply with the regulations, not only was it enough for the employer to 
simply invite for elections (no matter if they subsequently took place) but also to invite 
any of the employees who might be dismissed - therefore an employer might chose to 
just  invite  especially  apathetic  employees;  thus  avoiding  elections  and  therefore 
consultation. Since the employer nevertheless would be in compliance with the Act, a 
376 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 18).
377 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 18).
378 Even  if  an  election  had  taken  place,  it  was  up  to  the  employer  to  consult  with  the  elected 
representatives, a recognised trade union or representatives elected for some other purpose.
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dismissee not invited would have no reason to bring a complaint379.
The court held, however, that 
“the Regulations do properly implement the Directives 75/129 and 77/187 so far as 
they concern consultation with affected employees, in particular the Regulations do 
not  leave  open  the  possibility  that  employers  may  impede  protection 
unconditionally guaranteed to employees by Directives 75/129 and 77/187, and are 
thus not incompatible with Community law”380.
Lord Justice Otton stated that the Directives did not require member states to lay down 
detailed mechanisms as to how elections of representatives had to take place and that 
the  term  “appropriate  representatives”  implied  that  those  were  objective  and  not 
dependent from the employer381. 
The case brought by UNISON, GMB and NASUWT raises the question as to what 
constitutes effective consultation. In the view of the court, effective consultation was 
guaranteed because sanctions were present should the employer fail to comply with his 
obligations to provide representatives; furthermore, employees dismissed without there 
having  been  consultation  or  invitation  to  consultation  could  log  a  complaint382.  It 
appears, however, as if  the most important issues of effective consultation were not 
addressed in the judgement. While the way representatives are elected is important, the 
question which rights those representatives have is more significant. In order to be able 
379 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte. UNISON and Others [1997] 1 CMLR 459 at 
473, para 30, 31, 35; Paul Skidmore, Worker Rights – A Euro-Litigation Strategy, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 225ff. (p. 229).
380 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte. UNISON and Others [1997] 1 CMLR 459 at 
480, para 54.
381 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte. UNISON and Others [1997] 1 CMLR 459 at 
480, para52. 
382 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte. UNISON and Others [1997] 1 CMLR 459 at 
477, para 48.
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to effectively represent employees, information rights are necessary. But a simple right 
to  be  “heard”  does  not  constitute  effective  consultation.  Without  a  possibility  to 
influence the employer's decision, be it a veto-right or the right to impose sanctions, 
“consultation” is just a democratic fig leaf. It must be guaranteed that consultation is 
meaningful and the employer will not have the opportunity of simply going through the 
motions in order to fulfil his obligations. It was explained in Moore v Clares Equipment  
Ltd383 that
“the  very  process  of  consultation  is  one  where  parties  attempt  to  reach  an 
agreement on a fair exchange of views and by reason of the fact that the applicant 
did not  see the basis  of  the decision against  him and have an opportunity  of 
challenging it and putting his own side of the matter and indeed any further or 
wider suggestions that he wished to make, we hold that there was not proper and 
effective consultation in this case... ."
However, the Act did succeed in securing that it is now in the hands of the employees 
whether  there  are  representatives or  not.  The  situation is,  in  fact,  similar  to  that  in 
Germany,  where  consultation  by  works  councils  is  deemed  sufficient  under  the 
Directives. The BetrVG allows for the election of representatives, if those actually are 
elected is up to the employees.
The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)  
(Amendment) Regulations 1999
The Blair Administration amended the regulations in 1999. The Government had been 
of the opinion that the 1995 Regulations “still [did] not provide a clear and satisfactory 
383 Moore v Clares Equipment Ltd. EAT 322/94.
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framework for the necessary information and consultation”384, but there had also been a 
fresh complaint  by the Commission,  claiming that  the Directives  still  had not  been 
properly implemented, especially in view of the determination of representatives and the 
sanctions provided385. 
The amendments, coming into force on July 28th, 1999 and applying to transfers taking 
place from November 1st, 1999, made consultation with a recognised trade union, where 
present,  mandatory  and  thus  shut  off  the  possibility  for  employers  to  avoid  union 
structures386. They still allowed for one-off consultation; standing representation bodies 
were allowed but not required387.
The regulations have been criticised for the fact that the decision whom to consult is in 
the discretion of employers when there is no recognised trade union present. Employers 
can largely determine how many representatives are to be elected,  too, and whether 
different groups shall elect different representatives. There is no provision to ensure that 
representatives  are  independent388.  Although there is  now a right  to  complain to  an 
384 Mark Hall, Paul Edwards, Reforming the Statutory Redundancy Consultation Procedure, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 299ff. (p. 300).
385 Simon Deakin, Gillian S Morris, Labour Law, 3rd Edition, Reed Elsevier 2001, p. 795; Mark Hall, 
Paul Edwards, Reforming the Statutory Redundancy Consultation Procedure, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 299ff. (p. 303).
386 Michael Terry, Employee Representation: Shop Stewards and the New Legal Framework, in: Paul 
Edwards (Ed.), Industrial Relations – Theory and Practice, 2nd Edition, Oxford 2003, p. 257ff. (p. 
275); Mark Hall, Paul Edwards, Reforming the Statutory Redundancy Consultation Procedure, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 299ff. (p. 299, 304).
387 Department of Trade and Industry, Employees’ Information and Consultation Rights on Transfers of 
Undertakings and Collective Redundancies, 1998, quoted in: Mark Hall, Paul Edwards, Reforming 
the Statutory Redundancy Consultation Procedure,  in:  Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 
299ff. (p. 316).
The reason given by Government for the facility to elect one-off representatives was that it would be 
“unnecessary and unreasonable to require that appropriate representatives be in place regardless of 
whether  or  not  a  transfer  of  an  undertaking  or  a  collective  redundancy  situation  is  actually  in 
prospect” (Hall and Edwards, cit. opp., p. 316).
388 Simon Deakin, Gillian S Morris, Labour Law, 3rd Edition, Reed Elsevier 2001, p. 802f.
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employment tribunal that representatives were not appropriate or that the election was 
faulty389,  Deakin  and  Morris  still  argue  that  “the  lack  of  any  requirement  for 
representatives  to  be  independent  would  appear  to  allow  employers  even  now  to 
frustrate the protection for workers provided by the Directive”390.  However, the new 
regulations restored the primacy of trade unions and thus strengthened single channel.
The Directive on European Works Councils 
The Commission made a first proposal for a Directive on European Works Councils in 
December 1990; pointing out that
“the  completion  of  the  internal  market  is  bound  to  generate  a  process  of 
concentrations  of  undertakings,  cross-border  mergers,  take-overs,  joint-ventures 
and  consequently,  a  transnationalisation  of  undertakings;  whereas,  if  economic 
activities  are  to  develop  in  a  harmonious  fashion,  this  situation  requires  that 
undertakings and groups of undertakings operating in more than one Member State 
must inform and consult the representatives of their employees affected by their 
decisions391”.
This was thought to have a “direct effect on the internal market and consequently needs 
to be remedied392”. In principle such consultation could have been done with national 
389 Simon Deakin, Gillian S Morris, Labour Law, 3rd Edition, Reed Elsevier 2001, p. 803.
390 Simon Deakin, Gillian S Morris, Labour Law, 3rd Edition, Reed Elsevier 2001, p. 803.
391 Proposal for a Council Directive on the establishment of a European Works Council in Community-
scale undertakings or groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting 
employees, COM(90) 581 final, submitted by the Commission on 12 December 1990 (91/C 39/11), 
in: Official Journal of the European Communities, 15. 2. 1991, No c 39/10.
392 Proposal for a Council Directive on the establishment of a European Works Council in Community-
scale undertakings or groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting 
employees, COM(90) 581 final, submitted by the Commission on 12 December 1990 (91/C 39/11), 
in: Official Journal of the European Communities, 15. 2. 1991, No c 39/10.
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representation bodies, but 
“...procedures for informing and consulting employees as embodied in legislation 
or practice in Member States are often inconsistent with the transnational structure 
of the entity which takes the decisions affecting those employees; whereas this may 
lead to unequal treatment of employees affected by the decisions of one and the 
same undertaking, or group of undertakings393”.
It  was  also  held  that  the  Directives  on  Transfer  of  Undertakings  and  Collective 
Redundancies  would  not  cover  all  situations  that  might  arise  and,  especially,  those 
would not “extend to situations in which the decision-making centre is not situated in 
the Member State in which the employees affected by its decision are employed394”. 
Therefore, 
“..appropriate  provisions  must  be  adopted  to  ensure  that  the  employees  of 
Community-scale undertakings or groups of undertakings are properly informed 
and consulted in cases where decisions likely to affect them are taken outside the 
Member State in which they are employed395”. 
The Commission was therefore of the opinion that “a European Works Council must, in 
principle, be set up396”.
393 Proposal for a Council Directive on the establishment of a European Works Council in Community-
scale undertakings or groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting 
employees, COM(90) 581 final, submitted by the Commission on 12 December 1990 (91/C 39/11), 
in: Official Journal of the European Communities, 15. 2. 1991, No c 39/10.
394 Proposal for a Council Directive on the establishment of a European Works Council in Community-
scale undertakings or groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting 
employees, COM(90) 581 final, submitted by the Commission on 12 December 1990 (91/C 39/11), 
in: Official Journal of the European Communities, 15. 2. 1991, No c 39/10.
395 Proposal for a Council Directive on the establishment of a European Works Council in Community-
scale undertakings or groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting 
employees, COM(90) 581 final, submitted by the Commission on 12 December 1990 (91/C 39/11), 
in: Official Journal of the European Communities, 15. 2. 1991, No c 39/10.
396 Proposal for a Council Directive on the establishment of a European Works Council in Community-
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The Directive on European Works Councils (EWCs) was adopted in September 1994 
under  the  Protocol  on  Social  Policy.  Connected  to  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht,  this 
allowed, due to the British opt-out, the adoption of Social Policy Issues without the 
agreement of the UK397. Thus originally the Directive did not apply to the UK, but since 
it aimed at undertakings with a certain number of employees in at least two member 
states, a number of UK-based enterprises employing the threshold number of workers 
elsewhere in the scope of the Directive had to comply with it nonetheless398. After the 
“opt-in” to the Social Chapter with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the EWC Directive 
was extended to the UK in December 1997399.
Implementation was undertaken via the Transnational Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations 1999, coming into force on January 15th, 2000, a month after 
the deadline for implementation400. Members of “Special Negotiation Bodies” (SNBs) 
are to be determined by ballot of the UK workforce; if  a consultative committee is 
existent, members are to be selected by it. For statutory EWCs, UK members are either 
to be elected by representatives representing all UK employees or, again, by ballot in 
which  all  affected  UK  employees  are  taking  place401.  Trade  unions  therefore  are 
scale undertakings or groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting 
employees, COM(90) 581 final, submitted by the Commission on 12 December 1990 (91/C 39/11), 
in: Official Journal of the European Communities, 15. 2. 1991, No c 39/10.
397 Herman Knudsen, Employee Participation in Europe, London 1995, p. 136; IDS Brief Employment 
Law and Practice No 526, October 1994, p. 16ff. (p. 16).
398 IDS Brief Employment Law and Practice No 526, October 1994, p. 16ff. (p. 17); Mark Carley, Mark 
Hall, The Implementation of the European Works Council Directive, in: Industrial Law Journal, 
Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 107).
In 1994 it was estimated that more than 100 UK enterprises had to set up EWCs. (IDS Brief, opp. 
Cit).
399 Mark Carley, Mark Hall, The Implementation of the European Works Council Directive, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 103, 112f.).
400 Mark Carley, Mark Hall, The Implementation of the European Works Council Directive, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 113).
401 Mark Carley, Mark Hall, The Implementation of the European Works Council Directive, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vo. 29, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 114f.)
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virtually  excluded from the  process;  union  representatives,  however,  have,  as  other 
employee representatives, the right to request information and prompt the procedure of 
setting up a SNB402.
The implementation of EWCs into British Law has been dubbed a “further landmark in 
the ‘Europeanisation’ of UK labour law”, because it created a “statutory standing 
works-council-type employee representation body”and because it required the 
Government to implement another issue-specific representation machinery into the 
law403. Additionally, neither did the Directive require union participation on EWCs or 
on the procedures on information and consultation404, nor did the British implementation 
require unions or union membership; rather, representatives were to be elected by the 
whole work-force405. While the regulations therefore could be interpreted as another step 
away from unions’ monopoly on representation; it has to be kept in mind that their 
actual scope is restricted to certain issues and larger companies. Whether they actually 
have any impact on national industrial relations therefore remains doubtful. 
While a study by Eberwein, Tholen and Schuster conducted in 2002 found that the EWC 
402 Mark Carley, Mark Hall, The Implementation of the European Works Council Directive, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vo. 29, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 114).
403 Mark Carley, Mark Hall, The Implementation of the European Works Council Directive, in: 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 123).
The representation machinery was necessary for electing UK members to Special Negotiation 
Bodies and EWCs where there is no recognized trade union or other representation arrangement 
(Carley and Hall, cit. opp., p. 123)
404 Dieter Krimphove, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht, 2nd Edition, München 2001, p. 424.
However, a participation of unions is possible either by an agreement of the social partners 
according to Art 139 of the European Treaty or by special arrangements when concluding 
understandings under Art 6 of Directive 94/45/EG. (Krimhove, opp. cit., p. 424).
405 Howard Gospel, Paul William, Dilemmas in Worker Representation – Information, Consultation 
and Negotiation, in: Howard Gospel, Stephen Wood (Ed.), Representing Workers – Union 
Recognition and Membership in Britain, London 2003, p. 144ff. (p. 148).
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Directive had lead to a discussion in the UK about representative structures above the 
workplace level and, according to responses by union representatives, EWCs had also 
led to the “establishment of new national structures of worker representation”; this 
assessment is contrasted by the responses of employers, who only “partly saw the 
necessity to think over the structure of national worker representation”406 . Whatever 
their practical impact maybe, the regulations constitute a marked difference, if only in 
principle, from TUPE 1999, enacted at roughly the same time, which had asserted the 
primacy of unions.
An effect of the regulations, according to British and German trade unions, has been a 
strengthening of the cooperation between trade unions in Europe and an enhancement of 
the importance of European trade union federations who play a significant role in the 
setting up of EWCs and in coordinating their work407. 
The Directive on Information and Consultation
Background 
Demands  for  European  legislation  on  consultation  and  workers’  involvement  were 
triggered by Renault's decision to close its Vilvoorde plant in Belgium408. After UNICE 
406 Wilhelm Eberweis, Jochen Tholen, Joachim Schuster, The Europeanisation of Industrial Relations – 
National and European Processes in Germany, UK, Italy and France, Aldershot 2002, p. 46f.
407 Wilhelm Eberweis, Jochen Tholen, Joachim Schuster, The Europeanisation of Industrial Relations – 
National and European Processes in Germany, UK, Italy and France, Aldershot 2002, p. 47.
408 Brian Bercusson, The European Social Model Comes to Britain, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 31, 
No 3, p. 209ff. (p. 216f.).
In February 1997 Renault released a press statement regarding the closure of its Vilvoorde plant 
(encompassing about 3,100 redundancies and a further loss of about 1,000 jobs at sub-contractors) 
without having informed the workers affected beforehand, thereby breaking Community and 
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(European Employers’ Association) had refused to negotiate with the European Trade 
Union  Conference  (ETUC)  on  a  framework  agreement,  the  European  Commission 
drafted  a  Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  on  Information  and  Consultation  in 
November 1998409. Eventually, Directive 2002/14/EC410 of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 11th March 2002, which provided for a “general framework for informing 
and consulting employees in the European Community”, was adopted411.  
Implementation in the UK and proposed Effects
The  Directive  was  implemented  into  UK  law  by  amendments  to  the  Employment 
Relations Act in 2004 and the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 
Belgian law. The decision was called final, thus rendering possible discussion with workers’ 
representatives useless. Vilvoorde in fact was one of the most productive plants in which an 
agreement on flexibility and investment had been signed four years earlier to secure employment. 
Renault claimed to adhere to the letter of Community law, claiming that since the decision to 
restructure was of a transnational nature, it was not covered by Community law and the Directive on 
Collective Redundancies did not apply. Apart from that, it held to have signed an agreement with 
the European Metalworking Federation, the International Federation of Professional and Managerial 
Staff in the Metalworking Industry and French, Belgian and Portuguese unions that didn’t require 
consultation prior to a decision. However, a ruling of the Belgian Labour Court from April 1997 
declared that Renault had adhered neither to the obligations to inform and consult nor to procedures 
arising from collective labour agreements no. 9 and 24. The Court cancelled the closure of the plant 
until the duties to inform and consult had been obliged.
(Isabelle Schönmann, Stefan Clauwaert, Wiebke Warneck, Information and Consultation in the 
European Community, Implementation Report of Directive 2002/14/EC (Draft Report), Brussels 
2005, p. 10f.).
409 Brian Bercusson, The European Social Model Comes to Britain, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 31, 
No 3, p. 209ff. (p. 216f.).
410 However, major changes were necessary for the passing of the Directive, especially the UK and 
Ireland only agreed after an extension of the period for implementation to 4 years 
(Schönmann/Clauwaert/Warneck, cit. opp., p. 7).
411 Isabelle  Schönmann,  Stefan  Clauwaert,  Wiebke  Warneck,  Information  and  Consultation  in  the 
European Community,  Implementation Report of  Directive 2002/14/EC (Draft  Report),  Brussels 
2005, p. 7.
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2004 (No. 3426), which came into force on April 6th, 2005412. 
While it has been argued that it “will take the UK further away from its voluntaristic 
traditions”413;  the practical impact of the regulations remains to be seen. There now is, 
for the first time, a statutory right to be informed and consulted on a wide range of 
issues, but the regulations allow for flexibility in the way representation is provided for; 
in particular they do not prescribe the setting-up of national works councils. Indeed, a 
main  objective  of  the  Government  when  implementing  the  Directive  has  been  to 
provide enterprises with as much flexibility as possible414. 
The creation of new representation structures under the regulations depends on either a 
request by 10%  of the employees (but at least 15 employees), or the employer initiating 
the  process.  If  a  pre-existing  agreement  (PEA)  is  present,  a  ballot  is  necessary  in 
addition to a valid employee request in order to set up new structures. An approval by 
40% of  the employees  and a  majority  of  those who vote,  will  oblige  employers  to 
negotiate an information and consultation agreement with representatives of employees; 
if in these  negotiations no agreement is met, the standard procedures of the regulations 
will apply. If the necessary margin of approval is not reached, the PEA will continue to 
412 Isabelle Schönmann, Stefan Clauwaert, Wiebke Warneck, Information and Consultation in the 
European Community, Implementation Report of Directive 2002/14/EC (Draft Report), Brussels 
2005, p. 16.
413 Mark Hall, Mike Terry, The Emerging System of Statutory Worker Representation, in: Geraldine 
Healy, Edmund Heery, Phil Taylor (Ed.), The Future of Worker Representation, Houndsmills, 
Basingstoke 2004, p. 207ff. (p. 219).
414 Pascale Lorber, Implementing the Information and Consultation Directive in Great Britain: A New 
Voice at Work, in: The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 231ff. (237); Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 111); Mark Hall, 
Duncan Adam, Aristea Koukiadaki, Results of the WMERF information and consultation survey, 
http://www.wbs.ac.uk/downloads/research/wmerf-1205.pdf, last assessed November 26th, 2006. The 
survey was carried out by the Warwick Business School in September/October 2005.
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exist and a three-year moratorium for a new request will apply415. This preference for 
PEAs might be explained with the fact that CBI as well as TUC were eager to protect 
existing  agreements  where  in  place416.  The  standard  procedures  provide  for  elected 
representatives;  negotiated  agreements  may  either  provide  for  elected  or  appointed 
representatives or direct consultation. Since the parties may decide how representatives 
are chosen, they are free to agree on union representatives or even union officials to 
represent  unionised  parts  of  the  workforce417.  Trade  unions,  while  not  explicitly 
mentioned, may also act as information and consultation partners via PEAs.
The fact  that  employers  need not  provide information and consultation mechanisms 
unless 10% of the employees request so might seriously undermine the impact of the 
legislation. Furthermore, PEAs (which are hard to overturn) are able to pre-empt use of 
the regulations418,  so  that  employers  are  in  a  position  to  considerably  weaken their 
effect. They able to pursue a policy of “risk assessment” by hoping that employees will 
not trigger negotiations, and they might also install “employer-friendly” PEAs in line 
with  the  requirements  of  the  regulations.  In  fact,  they  might  even create  PEAs not 
415 Pascale Lorber, Implementing the Information and Consultation Directive in Great Britain: A New 
Voice at Work, in: The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 231ff. (243, Table 1).
416 Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, in: Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 110); Pascale Lorber, Implementing the Information and 
Consultation Directive in Great Britain: A New Voice at Work, in: The International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 231ff. (237f.).
The TUC did hold, however, that there must be a way to overturn agreements not based on genuine 
workforce approval  (Hall, cit. opp., p. 110).
417 Pascale Lorber, Implementing the Information and Consultation Directive in Great Britain: A New 
Voice at Work, in: The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 231ff. (248); .Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 114).
418 Mark Hall, A cool response to the ICE Regulations? Employer and trade union approaches to the 
new legal framework for information and consultation, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 37, 
Issue 5, p. 456ff. (p. 4567).
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fulfilling the requirements, hoping those will not be challenged by employees419. 
At the time of writing, the regulations have been in force for about 20 months. While 
this is still too early for a profound assessment, there are a few indicators as to their 
effects. 
For  example,  according  to  a  2004  survey  by  CBI,  numbers  for  companies  with  a 
permanent mechanism for information and consultation rose from 35% in 2002 to 47% 
in  2003  and  49%  in  2004.  Another  20%  were  stating  that  they  were  planning  to 
introduce mechanisms over the next 12 months420. In an IRS survey from autumn 2005, 
68% of employers reported some sort of permanent consultation body while only 49% 
had done so in 2004421. 
Of those being able to state when the consultation body had been set up, 20% reported it 
had be done in 2005 and a further 22% in 2003 or 2004. Moreover, when directly asked 
whether they had made any changes to the information and consultation practices in the 
last two years and, if so, whether this was in order to comply with the new legislation, 
49% answered that they had made changes but only 32% of these held that the changes 
were made with respect to the ICE regulations (in 2004, 25% had reported they had 
made changes in the previous year as a response to the regulations and 32% planned to 
do so over the next 12 months). However, if including those who said that the changes 
were  made  partially  to  comply  with  the  legislation,  the  number  rises  to  65%. 
Furthermore, 16% said they were planning changes over the next two years, nearly all 
419 Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, in: Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 118, 124).
420 Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, in: Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 120).
421 Sara Welfare, High on the Agenda: Employee Information and Consultation, in: IRS Employment 
Review 833, October 2005, p. 8ff. (p. 14).
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of which were planned in order to or at least partly in order to comply with the ICE 
Regulations.  However,  the  majority  of  these  group  merely  planned  reviewing  or 
improving existing agreements,  only a  small  minority  planned or  were setting up a 
consultative forum422. This number correspond with findings from the Warwick survey 
(2005) that found that 37% of respondents had modified their arrangements, another 
20% intended to and 7% planned to introduce new arrangements423. 
Information  and consultation  under  the  ICE Regulations  depends,  when no  PEA is 
present, on initiative from employees. However, only two of the 160 respondents to the 
IRS survey reported a request for new information and consultation agreements made 
by employees and only 5 (3%) expected such a request in the future. Furthermore, in the 
two workplaces that had reported in 2004 that they were expecting a request, no such 
challenge  had  been  forthcoming;  however,  this  might  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
organisations in question had improved their consultation mechanisms424. 
When in 2004 only 20% of the respondents to the IRS survey had put up PEAs for 
approval, in 2005 that number had risen to 32% (plus another 14% reporting that they 
planned to do so), 92% of which had sought the approval in the previous year, a strong 
indicator that the new legislation had been the motive425. 
While  these figures show a clear  rise  in information and consultation arrangements 
422 Sara Welfare, High on the Agenda: Employee Information and Consultation, in: IRS Employment 
Review 833, October 2005, p. 8ff. (p. 14).
423 Sara Welfare, High on the Agenda: Employee Information and Consultation, in: IRS Employment 
Review 833, October 2005, p. 8ff. (p. 12ff.); Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation 
of Employees Regulations, in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 120), Mark Hall, 
Duncan Adam, Aristea Koukiadaki, Results of the WMERF information and consultation survey, 
http://www.wbs.ac.uk/downloads/research/wmerf-1205.pdf, last assessed November 26th, 2006.
424 Sara Welfare, High on the Agenda: Employee Information and Consultation, in: IRS Employment 
Review 833, October 2005, p. 8ff. (p. 14).
425 Sara Welfare, High on the Agenda: Employee Information and Consultation, in: IRS Employment 
Review 833, October 2005, p. 8ff. (p. 14).
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ascribable to the new regulations, an IRS survey from 2006 depicts a downturn not only 
in the setting up of new arrangements, but also in the total number of information and 
consultation bodies in respect to the figures for 2005. When in 2005 76% of employers 
responding said they kept staff informed on changes to products or services, only 60% 
said  so  in  2006.  Similarly,  when  in  2005  74%  of  workplaces  had  a  permanent 
consultation body in place, only 55% did so in 2006, a number closer to the 2004 figure 
of 49%. Of those that reported changes in 2006, only 19% held that the changes were 
wholly or partly in order to comply with the regulations426.
Although these figures are not based on matched samples, they do show a trend for 
information and consultation to peak in the year of implementing the ICE regulations 
and to approach the “normal” figures thereafter; however, there is still an indication that 
the regulations are making an impact. After all, almost a third of the consultative bodies 
found in the survey had been set up in 2003 or later and thus obviously in response to 
the regulations427.
Unions profit from the new regulations. Findings by the TUC show that the percentage 
of  recognition agreements including information and consultation rose from 59% in 
2001/02 to 79% in 2002/03.  Results from a Labour Research Department survey in 
2004 picture an increase in the number of unions being informed and consulted but also 
a  recent  “sharp  increase”  (from 11% in  2002  to  25% in  2004)  in  information  and 
consultation bodies involving non-union employees428. Also, a survey by the Warwick 
426 A two-way process: informing and consulting employees, IRS Employment Review 859, November 
2006, p. 9, 12, 15. 
427 A two-way process: informing and consulting employees, IRS Employment Review 859, November 
2006, p. 9, 12, 15. 
428 Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, in: Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 120).
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Business School held in autumn 2005 found that 50% of the respondents consulted via 
recognised  trade  unions,  while  41%  had  an  information  and  consultation  body  or 
employee forum429.  Not surprisingly, the Warwick survey found in 2005 that union-
based information and consultation was most popular in unionised workplaces, being 
present in 77% of these. Information and consultation bodies were present in 46% of 
unionised  workplaces,  slightly  above  the  average  of  all  respondents430.  However, 
according  to  the  Warwick  survey,  the  most  popular  practice  was  to  consult  with 
employees  directly,  done  by  almost  60%  of  respondents  and  64%  of  unionised 
workplaces, whereas only 5% reported they had no current agreements (obviously, most 
organisation used more than one method)431.
Conclusion
While these figures show that information and consultation procedures are in motion, it 
is still too early to determine the final effects of these changes.
According to surveys, information and consultation arrangements are becoming more 
widespread on a wider range of topics; and, while the available data has shown that a 
significant percentage of those agreements involves unions that still do play a major role 
in  workplace  industrial  relations,  with  recognition  rates  of  about  30% and  a  union 
density around 30% (see Graphs II and III) representation under the new regulations can 
429 Mark Hall, Duncan Adam, Aristea Koukiadaki, Results of the WMERF information and 
consultation survey, http://www.wbs.ac.uk/downloads/research/wmerf-1205.pdf, last assessed 
November 26th, 2006.
430 Mark Hall, Duncan Adam, Aristea Koukiadaki, Results of the WMERF information and 
consultation survey, http://www.wbs.ac.uk/downloads/research/wmerf-1205.pdf, last assessed 
November 26th, 2006.
431 Mark Hall, Duncan Adam, Aristea Koukiadaki, Results of the WMERF information and 
consultation survey, http://www.wbs.ac.uk/downloads/research/wmerf-1205.pdf, last assessed 
November 26th, 2006.
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not solely rely on unions. Therefore, non-union channels of representation are becoming 
more widespread.
Still,  this  does  not  (necessarily)  mean  the  end  of  representation  by  trade  unions. 
Tradition plays an important part, as can be seen on the one hand in the number of 
employers responding that they had trade union representation structures and on the 
other on the fact that the TUC reported more information and consultation agreements 
had been signed with unions  in response to  the new regulations.  A kind of “single 
channel  plus”system  seems  (at  the  moment)  likely  to  evolve  –  trade  union 
representation where unions are recognised supplemented by elected representatives for 
non-union workplaces432.
While a slow and gradually movement of the British system towards a more continental 
style  representational  system  not  exclusively  relying  on  trade  unions  thus  may  be 
detected, it still is markedly different from the German system with its strict separation 
between bargaining unions  outside  of  and representing works  councils,  independent 
from unions, inside the plant. 
Conclusion
The conclusion of  this  part  will  mainly deal  with changes  to  the British system of 
employee representation brought about by EC law. An assessment whether a German-
style system of dual-channel representation or a British-style system of single channel is 
preferable will be presented in the first section of Chapter V.
432  Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, in: Industrial Law Journal, 
Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 113)
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The  Directives  on  Transfer  of  Undertakings  and  Mass  Redundancies  left  it  to  the 
member states to determine how information and consultation was provided, as long as 
they would take “all measures necessary to ensure that workers are informed, consulted 
and in a position to intervene through their representatives in the event of collective 
redundancies”433. In accordance with “single channel”, the implementations by the UK 
assigned the right to information and consultation to recognised trade unions only434. 
The first important change in the traditional system of representation is nevertheless 
connected  to  these  Directives.  National  legislation  was  changed  in  1995  after  the 
decision  in  Commission  v  UK  so  that  in  cases  of  redundancies  and  transfers  of 
undertakings employers had the choice between consulting with a recognised union and 
elected  representatives435.  This  introduced  for  the  first  time  a  second  channel  of 
representation equal to the trade union channel and therefore opened up the possibility 
of departure from traditional trade union representation436. However, trade unions still 
remained  consultation  partners  and  their  role  was  strengthened  with  the  1999 
Amendments  to  the  regulations.  It  has  also to  be noted that  the scope of  the  Mass 
Redundancies Directive and the Directive on Transfer of Undertakings is rather limited, 
so that  developments in  this  sector might not  have a  great influence on the overall 
picture of industrial relations. 
433 Joe O’Hara, Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining in Britain and the Influence of 
European Law, London 1996, p. 12.
434 Joe O’Hara, Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining in Britain and the Influence of 
European Law, London 1996, p. 24.
435 Simon Deakin, Gillian S Morris, Labour Law, 3rd Edition, London 2001, p. 760.
In 1999 this was amended again, so that now employers could only consult elected representatives 
where there was no independent union recognised, however, “the concept of alternative-channel 
representation” remained
(Deakin et. al. cit. opp., p. 760).
436 Joe O’Hara, Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining in Britain and the Influence of 
European Law, London 1996, p. 26.
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Apart  from  the  duty  to  consult  in  cases  of  mass  redundancies  and  transfer  of 
undertakings, statutory representation other than collective bargaining is also provided 
for with the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations of 1996, (in 
response to the ECJ ruling from June 1994437) and in this case the procedure is very 
much trade union related. If a recognised and independent union is present, it has the 
right to appoint a representative from among the employees; this representative then has 
to be consulted by the employer on health and safety issues (S.2 (6) Health and Safety at 
Work etc Act 1974). If no trade union is recognised, the employer is obliged to either 
consult with the employees directly or with elected representatives438. These regulations 
are likely to have (had) a profound impact on workers representation, since they brought 
a duty to consult to non-unionised workplaces and, because these consultations are a 
constant  requirement,  might  be  more  influential  in  a  suspected  change  of  British 
representational systems than the Directives on Collective Redundancies and Transfer 
of  Undertakings,  which  allow  for  “one-off”  consultation  bodies  on  restricted  and 
infrequent events439.
The Implementation of the EWC Directive demanded election of representatives by the 
whole workforce, unless (in cases of statutory EWCs) all employees are represented by 
recognised unions440. While the regulations therefore are a departure from the tradition 
437 Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees regulations, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 106).
438 IDS Employment Law Supplement, Information and Consultation regulations 2004, London 2005, 
p. 74f.; Michael Terry, Employee Representation: Shop Stewards and the New Legal Framework, 
in: Paul Edwards (Ed.), Industrial Relations – Theory & Practice, 2nd Edition, Oxford 2003, p. 257ff. 
(p. 260).
439 Michael Terry, Systems of Collective Employee Representation in Non-Union Firms in the UK, in: 
Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 16ff. (p. 20).
440 Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, in: Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 106).
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of representation by unions, it has to be kept in mind that their scope is fairly limited. 
Their effect on traditional national industrial relations therefore remains doubtful.
The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations will have an effect on the 
development  of  UK industrial  relations;  however,  it  remains  to  be  seen  as  to  what 
extent. They did prompt a number of employers to introduce ‘preventive’ consultation 
measures441,  and  they  might  dissemble  the  ‘single  channel’.  The  regulation 
implementing earlier Directives have always only provided for consultation rights on 
very limited and restricted topics and UK law now, for the first time ever, gives a right 
to information and consultation procedures on a wide scope of issues. It also further 
underlines the trend away from a voluntaristic system to a more tightly legally regulated 
one442. Even though it would be possible to restrict representation under the Directive to 
trade unions where recognised, the fact that in 1998 75%443 of workplaces in the private 
In the case of SNBs, a consultative committee representing all UK employees would have to 
nominate the members of the SNB. (Hall, cit. opp., p. 106).
441 Hall mentions findings that show that “companies have increasingly been putting information and 
consultation arrangements in place in anticipation of the new legislation”. He also reports that “data 
from the TUC on voluntary union recognition agreements from November 2002 to October 2003 
show that 79% included information and consultation rights over a range of issues – a 'significant 
improvement' on the 59% which did so over the previous year” and that a survey by the Labour 
Research Department likewise showed a rise in information and consultation arrangements between 
2002 and 2004. This survey also showed “a 'sharp increase' [in] the reported incidence of 
information and consultation bodies involving employees who were not union members – from 11% 
of responses in 2002 to 25% in 2004 and that over a quarter of these had been set up recently (in 
2002 or later)”.
He also argued that experience with the EWC regulations suggests that the new legislation might 
lead to “legislatively-prompted voluntarism”. 
(Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, in: Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 120, 122).)
442 Mark Hall, Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, in: Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 103ff. (p. 104f.).
443 Neil Milward, Alex Bryson, John Forth, All Change at Work? – British Employment Relations 1980 
– 1998, as portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys, London 2000, p. 96, Table 45.
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sector have not recognised any unions makes clear that a strict system of single channel 
is not workable any more. Against  the background of the 1994 decision workplaces 
without unions will have, if procedures are triggered by employees, to provide for other, 
that is elected, representation structures444. 
However, the regulations allow for information and consultation done by trade unions 
and  the  number  have  shown  that  trade  unions  are  consultation  and  representation 
partners quite frequently. 
Still,  British  unions  need  to  become comfortable  with  the  fact  that  other  forms  of 
representation are becoming more institutionalised. The TUC took first steps in that 
direction  in  1993  in  the  House  of  Commons  when  it  demanded  a  legal  right  to 
representation  for  employees.  Preferably,  of  course,  to  be  achieved  by  a  right  to 
recognition  for  trade  unions;  but  it  acknowledged  that  there  were  other  forms  of 
representation, for example works councils, and that unions would have a role in those 
systems  as  well445.  Its  1995  publication  Your  Voice  at  Work advocated  non-union 
election-based representation as “fall-back” where no trade unions are recognised. Even 
though this  still  regarded trade unions  as the  primary channel  for representation,  is 
didn’t see it as the only channel any more. However, the TUC did miss the opportunity 
to  explore  opportunities  for  trade  union  representation  to  be  strengthened  by  other 
forms  of  involvement446.  In  1997,  it  accepted  that  other  channels  of  workers’ 
However, in the public sector only 13% of enterprises did not recognize trade unions in 1998 
(Milward et. al., p. 96, Table 4.5).
444 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 19).
445 Mark Hall, Beyond Recognition? - Employee Representation and EU Law, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 15ff. (p. 19).
For example, unions members elected to such bodies in workplace without union recognition would 
have legal rights and could use their position to open doors for unions. (Hall, cit. opp., p. 26).
446 Joe O’Hara, Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining in Britain and the Influence of 
European Law, London 1996, p. 40.
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representation might exist alongside collective bargaining447 and it in fact welcomed the 
Directive on Information and Consultation while the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) was opposed to it, arguing that “companies need the freedom to decide how best 
to communicate with employees, taking into account culture structure and size. Good 
employee  relations  should  be  home-grown”448.  The  TUC  pointed  out  the  potential 
benefits  for  unions  after  the coming into force of the Information and Consultation 
Regulations in 2005:
“Information  and  consultation  provides  unions  with  a  golden  opportunity  to 
increase  their  presence  in  workplaces,  particularly  those  where  there  are  union 
members but where the boss has until now been refusing to engage collectively 
with staff”449.
In fact, unions might try to exploit the new situation to their benefit. As can be taken 
from the comment by the CBI, employers might be opposed to the new, “foreign” forms 
of consultation and might prefer to use union structures instead, this could lead to an 
increase in recognition; however, it will not lead to a return to single channel due to the 
low union-density and recognition numbers (see Graph II and III). Additionally, as the 
German example shows, unions can try and use the new channels to exert influence on 
the workplace and thus strengthen their position. But, even though comparison to the 
German system of dual-channel representation is made quite frequently, it has also been 
447 Statutory Trade Union Recognition Joint Statement by TUC and CBI, December 1997, para 8, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmtrdind/980/8072108.htm, last 
accessed 5th December 2005.
448 David Plitt, Employee Representation, Information and Consultation in the United Kingdom, Köln 
2002, p. 126f.
However, in the key objectives set out by the TUC at its annual conference in Blackpool in 
September 2002 it argued for preference of trade union representatives over elected representatives 
for information and consultation in the implementation of the Directive (Plitt, opp. cit, p. 128,)
449  Trade Union Congress, New Information and Consultation Rights should mean no more 
‘bolts from the blue’, http://www.tuc.org.uk/law/tuc-9643-f0.cfm, last accessed April 19th, 2006.
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pointed out that conditions in Germany are fairly different. Collective bargaining there 
is mainly undertaken at  sectoral  or regional,  not at  shop-floor level;  thus the works 
council, operating mainly at shop-floor level, will not compete with trade unions and 
eventual  system of representation by collective bargaining.  In the UK, on the other 
hand, representation is mainly undertaken by collective bargaining at shop-floor level, 
thus trade unions fear competition from works councils and are eager to defend their 
monopoly of representation450. The Draft Implementation report of the Directive states 
that
“for  British  trade  unions,  in  fact,  the  right  to  information  and  consultation  is 
essentially a trade union right. The existence of this right under the Directive, or 
recognition  that  it  is  the  right  of  another,  (elected)  representative  body,  would 
encourage employers  not  to  organise.  This  might,  moreover,  reduce  the unions' 
field of action to mere consultation and could be used by less scrupulous employers 
as a means of circumventing the law on trade union representation451.”
However,  regardless  of  the voluntaristic  tradition,  the TUC had welcomed the draft 
Directive on Information and Consultation in November 1998, while Government and 
CBI were opposed. TUC general secretary Monks said:
“I have never understood while the British government is so opposed to such a 
measure. It simply requires all companies to do what successful ones already so – 
tell staff what is going on and listen what they have to say”452.
450 Paul Davies, Claire Kilpatrick, UK Worker Representation After Single Channel, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 121ff. (p. 121f.); Hugh Collins, K. D. Ewing, Aileen McColgan, Labour Law – 
Text and Materials, Oxford 2001, p. 868; see Michael terry, Partnership and the Future of Trade Unions 
in the UK, in: Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 24, N0. 4, p. 485ff. (p. 498).
451 Isabelle Schönmann, Stefan Clauwaert, Wiebke Warneck, Information and Consultation in the European 
Community, Implementation Report of Directive 2002/14/EC (Draft Report), Brussels 2005, p. 20.
Works councils will, after all, represent every worker in the plant, regardless of union membership. Thus 
there might be less incentive to join aunion.
452 European Industrial Relations Observatory, UK Reactions to Draft EU Consultation Directive, 
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http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/1998/11/inbrief/uk9811162n.html, last accessed December 22nd, 2005.
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Chapter III
The first two Chapters have provided an historical and systematical background to the 
two systems of industrial relations. This chapter will point out the core differences 
between them, so that in subsequent chapter a comparison and evaluation can be tried. 
 
Voluntarism and Legalism
British industrial relations have developed on the basis of a concept of voluntarism (a 
key feature of the common law system), whereas Germany's highly regulated system of 
industrial relations adheres to the principles of legalism453. 
This difference has its reason in history. Britain the first country to be industrialised and 
453 Jürgen Hoffmann, Industrial Relations and Trade Unions in Germany: The Pressure of 
Modernisation and Globalisation, in: Jeremy Waddington, Reiner Hoffmann (Ed.) Trade Unions in 
Europe – Facing Challenges and searching for Solutions, Brussels 2000, p. 249ff. (p. 250); Heinz 
Tüselmann, Arne Heise, The German Model of Industrial Relations at the Crossroads: Past, Present 
and Future, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 162ff. (p. 163). 
While collective bargaining itself is subject to comparably little detailed legislation in Germany 
(Tüselmann et. al. cit. opp., p. 164), the central goal of the British TUC in the late 1940s, despite the 
tradition of voluntarism, was a system of state economic policy of demand management that would 
prevent unemployment. However, full autonomy in collective bargaining was to be maintained 
(Andrei S. Markovits, Christopher S. Allan, Trade Unions and the Economic Crisis: The West 
German Case, in: Peter Gourevitch at. al., Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and 
Sweden, Boston and Sydney 1984, p. 26). 
However, it should be noted that since the 1960s the law has come to play an ever greater 
role in British industrial relations. Even after the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act 1971, quite a 
few legal regulations remain. The law provides for machinery to assist with collective bargaining by 
facilitating recognition claims or obtaining information for collective bargaining from the employer. 
Comparability claims are possible and employers are obliged to consult with trade unions over 
redundancies. To make use of this rights, trade unions have to be certified “independent” - another 
step of the law into the sphere of unions.
(Karl Mackie, Industrial Relations Law Commentary, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 10, No. 
4, p. 57ff. (p. 60).)
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industrialisation met a well prepared-workforce454. The slow commercialisation of the 
crafts,  taking  about  200  years,  had  meant  that  the  organs  and  fighting  means  of 
collective  interest  representation  were  established  before  the  rapid  process  of 
industrialisation started. A synthesis of effective social security, fighting strength and 
work place control of unions already existed and allowed British unions to rely on their 
own strength rather than the legislature. Due to the different historical development, this 
advantage  could  not  be  reproduced  on  the  continent455.  Also,  the  British  workers’ 
movement  was  a  wholly  industrial  movement,  acquiring  industrial  before  political 
power and making pragmatic rather than ideological demands. It had no political arm, 
so no demands for collective rights could be made; unions thus relied on their own 
strength  rather  than  the  law456.  Finally,  long  experience  taught  unions  to  fear 
intervention by the courts457, thus preferring immunities to positive rights.
For employers, the system of voluntarism and the connected legal immunities of unions 
454 Especially the new model unions, who organised highly qualified members and had strict 
requirements for entry, provided a densely spun web of union activities; they not only offered 
insurance but were also able to control the local labour market by means of job agencies, as well as 
the process of production, mostly by rigidly sticking to the traditional standards of the trade.
(Friedhelm Boll, Arbeitskämpfe und Gewerkschaften in Deutschland, England und Frankreich, 
Kassel 1992, p. 136f, 138f.
455 Friedhelm Boll, Arbeitskämpfe und Gewerkschaften in Deutschland, England und Frankreich, 
Kassel 1992, p. 136f, 138f; Stephen Bornstein, Peter Gourevitch, Unions in  Declining Economy: 
The Case of the British TUC, in: Peter Gourevitch et. al. Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West 
Germany and Sweden, Boston and Sydney 1984, p. 27.
456 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, Industrial Relations and the Courts, in: The Industrial Law Journal, 
Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 65ff. (p. 71f.); Bryn Perrins, Trade Union Law, London 1985, p. 30.
457 This distrust is still found today and might have its reason in the “class distinction” between workers 
and judges. The “class instincts” of judges are believed to prejudice them against union and working 
class  objectives  and  indeed,  there  has  been  a  tendency  for  judges  to  decide  against  unions  in 
judgements regarding trade unions effectiveness (Taff Vale, Osborne and Rookes v Barnard). (Karl 
Mackie, Industrial Relations Law Commentary, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4, p. 
57ff. (p. 61); Roger Welch, Judges and the Law in British Industrial Relations: Towards a European 
Right to Strike, Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 4, p. 174ff. (p. 180f.)).
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had the advantage that these gave no base for a challenge to the manager’s right to 
manage, they thus were perceived as a lesser evil  than giving unions positive rights 
under the law458. 
However,  voluntarism  has  been  seriously  impeded  by  national  and  European 
developments. 
Some  of  the  European  developments  (growing  European  legislation  in  the  field  of 
industrial  relations,  the  UK's  opt-in  to  the  Maastricht  social  chapter,  and  the  ECJ's 
decision  in June 1994) have been detailed above. On national level,  the erosion of 
voluntarism  has  started  in  the  mid-1960s  with  Rookes  v  Barnard459.  The  Thatcher 
administration  lead the British  system of  industrial  relations  to  be  one  of  the  most 
tightly regulated in Europe (see Chapter I). Traditionally, industrial relations in the UK 
had,  for  the  greater  part,  relied  on  a  system  of  “immunities”  that  denied  courts 
jurisdiction over certain areas. This stands in stark contrast to the development in most 
other European countries, where trade unions and their activities gained - to a greater or 
lesser extent – protection by positive rights460. The system of immunities had the effect 
that, legally, 
“while workers became free to organise collectively, the employer was equally free 
to  dismiss  those  who  joined  a  union;  while  unions  were  entitled  to  bargain 
collectively, employers were equally at liberty to refuse to negotiate or recognize a 
union, whatever its level of membership; and while a union could lawfully call a 
strike 'in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute', individual strikers were 
458 Joe England, Brian Weekes, Trade Unions and the State: a Review of the Crisis, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol.12, No. 1, p. 11ff. (p. 12, 13).
459 Roger Welch, Judges and the law in British Industrial Relations: Towards a European Right to 
Strike, in: Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 4 (1995), p. 175ff. (p. 179).
460 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p. 69.
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still in breach of their contracts of employment and might therefore be summarily 
dismissed (or even sued for damages)”461.
In  practice,  however,  things  were  often  different.  As  long  as  employees  were  in  a 
favourable  economical  position  and  trade  unionism  was  strong,  employers  usually 
tended to not take advantage of their legal freedoms462. 
Thatcher introduced numerous legal obligations on trade unions and narrowed the scope 
for  industrial  action.  At  the same time she restricted unions’  immunities463.  Labour, 
anxious to not appear too union-friendly and operating under much the same economical 
environment, continued the cutback on voluntarism after its return to power in 1997. It 
ended  the  opt-out  from the  social  chapter  of  the  Maastricht  treaty,  thus  laying  the 
ground for more legal regulation of the employment relationship coming from the EU. 
The introduction of statutory recognition and especially the statutory minimum wage in 
1999 marked another step away from the tradition of state-abstinence from collective 
bargaining464. 
Due to changes in the labour market – high unemployment, job insecurity, and decline 
in jobs with a tradition of unionisation – and resulting losses of union power, union 
began to see statutory rights in a different light. A symbolic change occurred when in 
1986 the TUC, that  until  then had always resisted such an intrusion into collective 
bargaining, accepted the idea of a statutory minimum wage. Two years later, it started 
461 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p. 69.
462 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p. 70.
463 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p. 104.
464 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p. 106f.
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advocating British membership of the EU and soon the adoption of the main provisions 
of the European social model was high on the agenda of most British unions. In 1994, 
the  TUC  realised  that  a  strict  model  of  “single  channel”  representation  was  not 
sustainable any longer accepted that  also non-union employees should be entitled to 
representational structures465. 
There  were  internal  influences,  too–  feminists  had  criticised  that  “free  collective 
bargaining” did little to overcome sex discrimination, thus advocating legislation in this 
field.  The  failed  Industrial  Relations  Act  1971  introduced  statutory  recognition 
procedures and unfair dismissal legislation for the first time and unions soon adopted 
the position that such rights should be strengthened rather than abolished (indeed, the 
1974 Act provided for more extensive rights than ever before)466.  
However,  while  voluntarism  has  been  restrained,  some  important  effects  are  still 
distinctive to the British system and there still is a suspicion of a legal framework by 
unions as well as employers.
One of the more obvious effects of voluntarism is that collective agreements are not 
legally  binding  in  the  UK,  whereas  the  normative  effect is  provided  for  by  law in 
Germany  (§  4  I  TVG)467.  However,  also  the  German  system allows  employer  and 
employee to individually agree on different terms if either they are more favourable for 
the  employee  (Günstigkeitsprinzip)  or  the  agreement  allows  for  variations 
465 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p. 108f.
466 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p. 108f.
467 Manfred Löwisch, Arbeitsrecht, 7th Edition, Düsseldorf 2004, p. 88, Rn. 294.
The legally binding effect occurs between the beiderseits Tarifgebundenen, that is, the members of 
the partners to the agreement (employers' association and unions). The employer can be partner 
either as a member of an employers’ association or by being partner to an agreement himself (§ 3 I 
TVG).
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(Öffnungsklausel), § 4 III TVG468.
Non-enforceable collective agreements are generally favoured by both UK employers 
and unions. Binding agreements are avoided because of the bilateral obligations they 
would bring; the regulations of collective agreements are therefore incorporated into 
individual contracts. Standing outside a legally enforceable structure may reduce rights, 
but it also avoids all obligations, thus producing flexibility for the unions concerned469.
Wages and Incomes Policies
Policies of wage restraint, expected in a legalistic rather than a voluntaristic system, 
have been discussed in Germany only for a short time in connection with the economic 
crisis of the late 1960s. They were, however, an important issue in the UK from the end 
of WW II until the 1970s.
There are several factors that may help explaining this. The economic situation in both 
countries will be taken into consideration as will the system of company bargaining that 
developed in the UK during the 1950s and 1960s.
The Economic Situation
Wage restraints in the UK were usually justified by reference to rising inflation, thought 
to be worsened by wage increases above the level of productivity.
In the 1950s,  inflation in the UK has been considerably higher than in Germany470. 
468 Manfred Löwisch, Arbeitsrecht, 7th Edition, Düsseldorf 2004, p. 88f., Rn. 295, 297,
Günstigkeitsprinzip may be translated as ‘favourability principle’; Öffnungsklausel as ‘opening’ or 
‘opt-out clause’.
469 Philip Kolvin, Collective Bargaining – Don't Cry for me Tina Lea, in: Current Law Week, 2000 
8(8), F1 – F2. 
470 The British Retail Price Index (RPI) rose from the base value of 100.00 in January 1962 to 191.8 in 
January 1974, with an especially high rise from 159.0 to 188.2 between 1971 and 1973. In relative 
terms, inflation was 9.5% in 1951, but only 0.9% in 1959. In the 1960s inflation generally was at or 
(just) below 5%, with only in 1969 a level of 5.6%. However, in the early 1970s inflation went up to 
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There,  the  average  yearly  rise  in  monthly  gross  wages  for  manual  workers  in 
manufacturing was 6.9%471.  In  the UK, average weekly earnings between 1955 and 
1960 for the same group of workers rose with an average of 5.46%472. 
While  the  German  economy  experienced  higher  average  wage  rises,  productivity 
usually kept up473, thus higher wages had no great effect on inflation. Real gross wages 
increased by 26.5% between 1951 and 1994, but productivity (real GNP per employed 
17.2% in 1974 and stayed at a high level during the following years. However, one has to be careful 
in interpreting this data as an indicator for the effectiveness of wage restraints in fighting inflation – 
after all, the oil crisis of 1974 fell into this period which accounted for greater inflation worldwide 
(see Table on Global Inflation 1870 – 1998, http://www.sfm.vwl.uni-
muenchen.de/heinemann/geldpolitik/geldpolitik-einfuehrung.pdf, last accessed November 2nd, 
2005).
Germany experienced inflation on a smaller scale with a peak of about 3.7% in 1966. From that 
level it fell to 1.9% at the end of the decade. The 1970s witnessed greater inflation in Germany as 
well, although on a much smaller scale as in Great Britain. Prices rose by 5.1% in 1971, with the 
highest rise being 7% in 1974.
(Data from: Retail Price Index, all items, Office for National Statistics, issued September 2005; 
Robert Twigger, Inflation: The Value of the Pound 1750 – 1998, House of Commons Library, 
Research Paper 99/20, Table 1 ; http://www.sfm.vwl.uni-
muenchen.de/heinemann/geldpolitik/geldpolitik-einführung.pdf, last accessed October 18th, 2005.)
471 Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, Durchschnittliche Bruttomonatsverdienste der Arbeiter/-innen 
im  Produzierenden Gewerbe, http://www.destatis.de/indicators/d/lrver03jd.htm, last accessed April 
24th, 2006
Rises varied from 12.5% in 1951to 2.3% in 1954. The highest yearly figure are to be found at the 
beginning of the decade but the average figure for the years 1955 to 1960 taken separately is 6.6% 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, cit. opp.)
472 Guy Routh, Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906 – 1960, Cambridge 1965, p. 128.
According to the Liesner Index, the biggest wage rises occurred after ca 1975 (and also after the end 
of incomes policy), however, wages then kept more or less in line with prices. 
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/labour_market_trends/century_labour_market_change_mar200
3.pdf, last accessed November 2nd, 2005.)
473 Andrei S. Markovits, Christopher S. Allan, Trade Unions and the Economic Crisis: The West 
German Case, in: Peter Gourevitch at. al., Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and 
Sweden, Boston 1984, p. 104f. 
When productivity was left behind by wages, cost-push inflation of 2.3 and 4% appeared in 
Germany between 1961 and 1962 (Markovits et. al., cit opp. p. 105)
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person) rose by 25.2%474. In the UK, however, the GDP grew with 1.0% in 1955-57 and 
with 2.2% in 1957-63475, thus wage rises outstripped productivity.
Additionally, the British economy was weaker than that of her competitors (linked to 
“stop-go”  cycles,  a  poor  investment  record  and  “unscientific  management”)  while 
workers had grown used to wage increases during the 1960s. This combination soon led 
to calls for wage restraints by government476.
Of note here is  whether and to what extent the specific British system of industrial 
relations played a part.
First,  the  UK  experienced  a  period  of  full  employment  until  about  1965,  which 
enhanced  unions'  bargaining  power  and  led  to  bigger  wage  claims.  However,  also 
Germany had full employment between about 1956 and ca. 1966, so this can only be 
part of the reason477.
474 Andrei S. Markovits, Christopher S. Allan, Trade Unions and the Economic Crisis: The West 
German Case, in: Peter Gourevitch at. al., Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and 
Sweden, Boston 1984, p. 102.
Reduction in working time during the 1950s limited the rises in productivity so that West-German 
productivity was generally below the OECD average in the mid 1950s; but since this was mostly a 
result of cheap labour being readily available up to that time, productivity kept up with wages.
(Markovits et. al., cit. opp. p. 104).
475 http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/more_isnt_better.pdf  , last accessed November 2nd, 2005.
The difference between GDP and GNP is that GDP measures all production within a given country, 
while GNP measures the production of citizens of that country, wherever they happen to be working 
(http://www.moneychimp.com/glossary/gnp.htm, last accessed November 2nd, 2005).
In general, GDP per capita in the UK has risen less fast than in Germany. The UK experienced a 
fourfold rise over the course of the 20th century, whereas the rise in Germany was 5.5 times. 
(http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-111.pdf, last accessed November 2nd, 
2005).
476 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & Society, 
London 2001, p. 98.
477 Andrei S. Markovits, Christopher S. Allan, Trade Unions and the Economic Crisis: The West 
German Case, in: Peter Gourevitch at. al., Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and 
Sweden, Boston 1984, p. 102.
A reason for wage rises keeping in line with productivity might be that German unions enjoyed 
more rights and protection by law than ever before and were afraid of endangering these freedoms 
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Secondly, collective agreements are not legally binding in the UK and there exists no 
Friedenspflicht478. This may lead to more frequent wage claims and, especially when 
labour is scarce, to more frequent wage rises. Frequent wage claims may also result in 
more frequent disruptions in forms of strikes, stoppages etc. In fact, there has been more 
strike activity and days lost through strikes in Britain than in Germany479.
 
The system of voluntarism and the ensuing disruptions might thus be a decisive factor 
in  the  less  favourable  development  of  the  British  economy  after  the  war,  whereas 
industrial peace during the validity of an agreement might have had a positive influence 
on the economical development in Germany. After all, wage rates and other important 
conditions of employment will be fixed for some time and can therefore be “planned 
by antagonizing the Government (Markovits et. al., cit. opp., p. 111). Additionally, memories of 
Weimar and the Third Reich helped ensure that the unions stood firmly on the grounds of the new 
market economy, even though the political context was not always favourable to them 
(Johan Verberckmoes, Germany, Inner Trade Union Diversity, in: Patrick Pasture, Johan 
Verberckmoes, Hand De Witte (Ed.), The Lost Perspective? Volume 1, Aldershot 1996, p. 180f.).
However, Viktor Agartz presented his theory of “expansive Lohnpolitk” (expansive wagepolicy) at 
the DGB Conference in 1954, claiming that wage policy needs to be expansive in order to 
strengthen the potential of buyers (Kaufkraft) and thus stimulate production. His speech influenced 
the rather radical Frankfurter Beschlüße – however, those did not have much success and wages 
therefore kept in line with productivity.
(“Lohnpolitik muss auch expansiv sein...”J. Viktor Agartz (1897 bis 1964) und die sozialistische 
Linke; Teil: Den Charakter des Unternehmens ändert die Mitbestimmung nicht, in: Junge Welt, 9. 
12. 2004).
In Great Britain, on the other hand, unions used their greater bargaining power gained by full 
employment. They went on strike more often and restrictive practises such as manning regulations, 
demarcation rules, work pacing, go-slows, closed shops etc. were more widely used. 
(Derek H. Aldcroft, Michael J. Oliver, Trade Unions and the Economy: 1870 – 2000, Aldershot 
2000, p. 91f.)
478 ‘Peace duty’: the obligation to abstain from industrial action during the duration of a collective 
agreement.
479 Derek H. Aldcroft, Michael J. Oliver, Trade unions and the Economy: 1870 – 2000, Aldershot 2000, 
p. 98f.
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around”480, so that wage restraints are less necessary.
Company Bargaining
The different economic development in both countries might also have been influenced 
by the specific British system of company bargaining, facilitated by the system of shop 
stewards.  While the German equivalent  to the shop steward,  the  gewerkschaftlicher  
Vertrauensmann481, has a very limited role and basically just provides a link between 
union and members on the shop floor, the British shop steward plays a much more 
extensive part. He not only acts as a communicator between unions and members but 
also as a negotiator between workers and management and is in that position able to 
negotiate agreements at plant level, while negotiations in Germany are predominantly 
480 See: Derek H. Aldcroft, Michael J. Oliver, Trade Unions and the Economy: 1870 – 2000, Aldershot 
2000, p. 99; Jürgen Hoffmann, Industrial Relations and Trade Unions in Germany: The Pressure of 
Modernisation and Globalisation, in: Jeremy Waddington, Reiner Hoffmann (Ed.) Trade Unions in 
Europe – Facing Challenges and Searching for Solutions, Brussels 2000, p. 249ff. (p. 252).
481 Vertrauensleute, although elected or ratified by union members as well, tend to rather represent the 
union and all members in general than just those who voted for them, which may partly be due to the 
stronger position of the work councils. They also seem to see themselves rather as a link between 
union and workplace, providing information about events at the shop to the unions and information 
and advice about the union, their rights and responsibilities to the members. They may have rights in 
connection with collective bargaining as well, differing from union to union; for example, the 
Vertrauensleute of the Chemical Workers' Union elect and pass recommendations to the bargaining 
committees, which carry out negotiations with the employers' federation and are responsible for the 
collective agreements. However, these rights are small in comparison with the full bargaining 
carried out by shop stewards and a study by Ebsworth concluded that Vertrauensleute “are not 
important in workplace industrial relations”.  (David Ebsworth, Lay Officers in the German 
Chemical Workers' Union: a Case Study, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 63ff. (p. 
64f., 67, 68).)           
         Furthermore, most day-to-day issues like grievances are handled by the works councils, which are 
allowed to negotiate at plant level, but only on issues not generally covered by collective agreement 
(§ 87 I BetrVG). 
(Thomas Klikauer, Trade Union Shopfloor Representation in Germany, in: Industrial Relations 
Journal, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 2ff. (p. 2)).
150
undertaken  at  regional  or  national  level.  During  times  of  full  employment  with 
managers eager to keep their work force, stewards often succeeded in negotiating huge 
wage rises to an extent that the national agreement came to be seen only as the provider 
of a form of minimum wage482, facilitated by its non-binding nature483. 
Other  factors  facilitated  the  shift,  too484.  British  joint  consultative  machinery, 
482  Hugh Armstrong Clegg, The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, Oxford 
1979, p. 13; Derek H. Aldcroft, Michael J. Oliver, Trade Unions and the Economy: 1870 – 2000, 
Aldershot 2000, p. 115.
Full employment was one reason for the rise in power of shop stewards; another was that union 
leaders and management relinquished much of their control of the situation  (Aldcroft et. al., cit. 
opp., p. 117).
The Report of the Donovan Commission considered full employment as a key feature in the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining: “Full employment encourages bargaining about pay at the 
factory and workshop level. Because they cannot easily be replaced, the bargaining power of 
individuals and groups of workers is increased; and because their employer is anxious to keep them, 
and perhaps to recruit new workers, he might be willing to ´bid up` their without much prompting” 
(Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers, London 1968, p. 20, para 74).
“The idea that shop stewards have taken advantage of market forces to push domestic wages to 
levels above that attainable through national agreements had received empirical backing from a 
number of studies” (Esmond Lindop, Workplace Bargaining – the End of an Era?, in: Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 12ff. (p. 12).) Lindop consequently also claims a revival of 
national bargaining by rising unemployment since 1968 (p. 17).
Furthermore, workplace organization is strengthened by labour shortage so that national agreements 
are in danger of not being observed if unions do not take “extreme care to secure the consent of the 
rank and file”.
(Alan Fox, History and Heritage – The Social Origins of the British Industrial Relations System, 
Boston and Sydney 1985, p. 291.)
Even though full employment cannot fully account for the rise of shop floor bargaining – after all, 
there was full employment in Germany as well but no rise in or shift to shop floor bargaining – it 
still has been crucial.
(J.F.B. Goodman, T.G. Whittingham, Shop Stewards, London 1973, p. 158ff.).
483 J.F.B. Goodman, T.G. Whittingham, Shop Stewards, London 1973, p. 158ff; Stephen Bornstein, 
Peter Gourevitch, Unions in a Declining Economy: The Case of the British TUC, in: Peter 
Gourevitch et. al., Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and Sweden, Boston and 
Sydney 1984, p. 27.
Since fixed-terms agreements that restrict claims for several years, started to become more common 
on national level, the focus of bargaining shifted towards the shop-floor level where there was still 
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established  during  and  after  World  War  II,  was  used  for  negotiations  (although 
expressively forbidden)  and some managers  had a  preference  for  dealing with shop 
stewards rather than union officials485. Also, a decline in manual employment since the 
1930s has meant that the sector traditionally covered by long-established, industry-wide 
agreements has grown smaller; generally, industry-wide agreements have often involved 
older and declining industries such as textiles, railways or shipbuilding486. Additionally, 
the chance to negotiate some improvements. (J.F.B. Goodman, T.G. Whittingham, Shop Stewards, 
London 1973, p. 158ff.)
The main focus of shop floor bargaining seems to be job-related issues like overtime, dismissal, 
discipline and redundancy. Contracting out, allocation of work and demarcation were also widely 
negotiated.
There appears also to be a correlation between size of plant and occurrence of workplace bargaining 
with more issued negotiated locally in bigger plants. (John Storey, Workplace Collective Bargaining 
and Managerial Prerogatives, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 7 No. 3, p. 40ff. (p. 51, 53).
484 There is, however, an article suggesting that the shift has been everything else but complete and that 
national bargaining is still “alive and well”; also suggesting a move back to national bargaining in 
economical more adverse conditions: “While, during times of economic expansion, workers at each 
plant and different groups within each plant can pursue their interests through fragmented workplace 
bargaining, during a recession, the need for mutual support and the security offered by company-
wide pay structures becomes more important”.
(Esmond Lindop, Workplace Bargaining – the End of an Era?, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 
10, No. 1, p. 12ff. (p. 14, 17).)
Unions also haven't always been in favour of domestic bargaining for fear that the security provided 
by national agreements in terms of minimum pay would be endangered. Also, the claim for the 
(national) rate for the job has been “a rallying call for a century”. However, in economical 
favourable times they were happy to take advantage of domestic bargaining.
(Michael P. Jackson, John W. Leopold, Kate Tuck, Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining – An 
Analysis of Recent Experience in the UK, London 1993, p. 24f.)
485 J.F.B. Goodman, T.G. Whittingham, Shop Stewards, London 1973, p. 158ff.
One reason for this is that management and shop stewards both thought it prudent to solve a 
problem as low as possible, some of them would also see it as defeat to call somebody in from the 
outside. Additionally, stewards are closer to the firm and its problems and have closer contact to the 
workforce.
486 Esmond Lindop, Workplace Bargaining – the End of an Era?, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 
10, No. 1, p. 12ff. (p. 13).
Furthermore, it is not believed that national bargaining structure will develop to set nationally 
negotiated terms for new industries such as electronics or service sector.
152
British  incomes  policies,  detailed  in  Chapter  I,   might  have  played  a  part  since 
agreements on plant and company level are less easily controllable; sometimes incomes 
policies  have  actually  fostered  workplace  bargaining  by  “special  provisions  (like 
productivity deals in the 1960s) more easily taken advantage of at company level”487. 
Moreover, “with work-place bargaining trade unions are denied an influence in broad 
company policy”, thus making it more attractive to employers.  Finally,  history may 
have played its part with a tradition of craft unionism and employer disunity488.
The shift in the level of bargaining had the effect that management and national union 
leaders had less control over matters such as production process, work methods and pay 
than their counterparts in Germany489.  This made it  more difficult  for managers and 
union leaders to gain the workers' support for implementing measures that might raise 
productivity – in fact, the system of shop stewards and workshop organisation tended to 
“reinforce the perpetuation of restrictive practises”. Plant bargaining by shop stewards 
“involved a continuous process of negotiation and accommodation between workers, 
shop  stewards  and  low level  management,  scarcely  a  recipe  for  efficient  industrial 
relations”. The results often were wage drift, unofficial stoppages and wildcat strikes490. 
487 Esmond Lindop, Workplace Bargaining – the End of an Era?, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 
10, No. 1, p. 12ff. (p. 13).
Systems like pay-by-result might also have been used to disguise pay developments at workplace 
level.
488 William Brown, Keith Sisson, Industrial Relations in the Next Decade - Current Trends and Future 
Possibilities, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 9ff. (p. 11, 20). 
489 Derek H. Aldcroft, Michael J. Oliver, Trade Unions and the Economy: 1870 – 2000, Aldershot 
2000, p. 115., 117. 
490 Derek H. Aldcroft, Michael J. Oliver, Trade Unions and the Economy: 1870 – 2000, Aldershot 
2000, p. 115, 117. 
In some cases, every little change to work practices or job specifications had to be negotiated with 
the stewards, and their approval was often only secured after a new rate for the job was agreed upon.
(Aldcroft et.al, cit. opp. p. 118).
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Even though there has been full employment in Germany as well, it didn't result in a 
shift to company bargaining. German collective agreements have legal force, and even 
though it is possible to agree on more favourable terms locally this is rarely done491. 
Also, bargaining there is carried out mainly at national or regional level by powerful 
central unions (reasons for this are to be found in the rebuilding of German unions along 
industrial  lines after WW II, detailed in Chapter I),  while the works council is only 
allowed to deal with issues provided for by law. It is prevented from negotiating on pay 
and Vertrauensleute do not engage in bargaining492.  The dominant type of agreement 
therefore is the Flächentarifvertrag493. The Friedenspflicht  and the fact that the works 
council is restricted by the rights given to it by law and prohibited from taking industrial 
action  provided  for  more  peaceful  industrial  relations.  Local  management  therefore 
retained more control494. 
491 Manfred Löwisch, Arbeitsrecht, 7th Edition, Düsseldorf 2004, p. 85, Rn 284.
In 2001, 44.6% of western German companies and 63.1% of western German employees were 
bound by sectoral agreements, while only 2.9% of those companies and 7.6% of the employees were 
bound by company agreements (http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-
68237243/hbs/hs.xsl/564_21316.html, last accessed November 1st, 2005).
492 Derek H. Aldcroft, Michael J. Oliver, Trade Unions and the Economy: 1870 – 2000, Aldershot 
2000, p. 117., 119.
Additionally, German bargaining does not only take place on a regional scale, results achievd by 
one union (notably IG Metall) are often taken as guidelines by other unions, thus further 
standardising inditions (Heinz Tüselmann, Arne Heise, The German Model of Industrial Relations at 
the Crossroads: Past, Present and Future, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 162ff. 
(p. 164); Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & 
Society, London 2001, p. 121).
493 Agreements that have been concluded between a union and an employers' organisation on regional 
or national level.
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/ta-flaechentarifvertrag.pdf, last accessed November 1st, 2005.
494 Derek H. Aldcroft, Michael J. Oliver, Trade Unions and the Economy: 1870 – 2000, Aldershot 
2000, p. 117., 119.
Additionally, German bargaining does not only take place on a regional scale, results achievd by 
one union (notably IG Metall) are often taken as guidelines by other unions, thus further 
standardising inditions (Heinz Tüselmann, Arne Heise, The German Model of Industrial Relations at 
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It is therefore likely that the system of shop stewards and company bargaining, as it 
developed in Britain, had a negative influence on the economy. Not only did it lead to 
frequent interruptions, also, if collective agreements are conducted at  a broader, e.g. 
national, level, it is easier to consider the effects on the economy as a whole495, whereas 
shop floor negotiations may take only the company in question in regard. 
Multi-Unionism
Another difference lies in the number of unions. In 2002, there were 213 unions in the 
UK496, but only eight affiliated to the DGB497.
Reasons  again  may  lay  in  history.  In  Nazi-Germany,  trade  unionism  was  brutally 
suppressed and unions liquidated. After 1945, therefore, the trade union movement had 
to be rebuild from scratch. Importance was attached to restructuring along industrial 
rather  than  partisan  lines  in  order  to  avoid  the  ideological  divisions  and  industrial 
the Crossroads: Past, Present and Future, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 162ff. 
(p. 164); Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism – Between Market, Class & 
Society, London 2001, p. 121).
495 The fact that German agreements are characterized by leading settlements in the engineering sector 
which then spread across the whole economy provides for an inherent wage restraint since the 
negotiators in the engineering sector, IG Metall and the employers' association Gesamtmetall, have 
to conclude agreements that do not endanger German competitiveness. Therefore, they have to 
consider the current rate of inflation and economy wide productivity growth and, since productivity 
growth in manufacturing is generally higher than economy-wide, have to restrain their claims.
(Heinz Tüselmann, Arne Heise, The German Model of Industrial Relations at the Crossroads: Past, 
Present and Future, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 162ff. (p. 164).)
496  Department of Trade and Industry, http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file12479.pdf, last accessed January 
16th, 2006
497 There are some 76 non-affiliated unions; however, they are generally of not much importance and 
therefore will not be considered here.
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competition of the Weimar time498. Additionally, the allied forces in some cases initially 
permitted only one union per industry499 (for a more detailed account see Chapter I).
Workplace  structure is  also important.  If  boundaries  are  clear  and difficult  to  cross 
between different groups, distinctive group identities and specific interest groups, e.g. 
unions, will develop. German inter-occupational boundaries are less rigid than British, 
training  involves  rotation  and  trades  are  less  specified  in  terms  of  production  or 
maintenance. This might not only be a factor in explaining the prevalence of industrial 
unionism, it  also seems to  encourage a  greater concentration on the (factory based) 
works council, since the point of reference for a German worker is the factory rather 
than the job description500. Also, works councils represent the entire workforce, blue- 
498  Andrei S. Markovits, Christopher S. Allan, Trade Unions and the Economic Crisis: The West 
German Case, in: Peter Gourevitch at. al., Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and 
Sweden, Boston and Sydney 1984, p. 94
“Unionists who cooperated in the Resistance agreed that their past division had eased the way for 
Hitler’s rise and that they establish a unified organization observing strict religious and political 
neutrality.”
(William L. Patch, jr., Christian Trade Unions in the Weimar Republic 1918-1933 – The Failure of 
“Corporate Pluralism”, London 1985, p. 233).
However, even though the sharp ideological division were at first avoided (the intention was for the 
whole working class “to join together in a united movement ‘democratic in character and 
independent of employers, government, denomination or party’”), there was soon to be competition 
for the DGB and its industrial unions:  in 1949 a separate organisation for salaried employees was 
founded (DAG – Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft, now merged with other unions into ver.di 
and part of the DGB). Other organisations for permanent civil servants are the Deutscher 
Beamtenbund and the Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund  (Christian Trade Union Federation), 
established in 1955.
(Helga Grebing, History of the German Labour Movement – A Survey, Leamington Spa, 1985, p. 
174).
499 Wolfgang Streek, Peter Seglow, Pat Wallace, Competition and Monopoly in Interest Representation: 
A Comparative Analysis of Trade Union Structure in the Railway Industries of Great Britain and 
West Germany, in: Organization Studies Vol. 2, Issue 4, p. 307ff (p. 320)
For example for the case of railways and the GdED (Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner Deutschlands)
(Streek et. al., cit. opp., p. 320).
500 Malcolm Warner, Arndt Sorge, The Context of Industrial Relations in Great Britain and West 
Germany, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 11, No 1, p 41ff. (p. 47).
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and white  collar  employees  alike.  This  has  an  integrating effect  and  thus,  although 
works councils are independent from unions, contributes to the prevalence of industrial 
unionism and the concentration of the trade union system501. 
Furthermore,  it  is  also  held  that  the  possibility  to  take  individual  industrial  action 
strengthens group-identity to the point of actually justifying the existence of a group502. 
Since German unions used to be more restricted in their right to call industrial action, 
small unions would have lacked this feature for building a group identity. 
British unions,  on the other  hand, did not  have the need (or  chance) to  completely 
reorganise after 1945503. Furthermore, representation in the UK is structured more along 
501 Wolfgang Streek, Peter Seglow, Pat Wallace, Competition and Monopoly in Interest Representation: 
A Comparative Analysis of Trade Union Structure in the Railway Industries of Great Britain and 
West Germany, in: Organization Studies Vol. 2, Issue 4, p. 307ff (p. 323f.).
Blue- and white-collar workers do elect different representatives, but the ensuing council represents 
the whole workforce. 
(Streek, et. al., cit. opp., p. 323f.).
502 Wolfgang Streek, Peter Seglow, Pat Wallace, Competition and Monopoly in Interest Representation: 
A Comparative Analysis of Trade Union Structure in the Railway Industries of Great Britain and 
West Germany, in: Organization Studies Vol. 2, Issue 4, p. 307ff (p. 322).
503 However, there were attempts to reform the trade union movement: at the 1942 congress the 
railwaymen advocated an investigation into the structure to discover competition and to determine if 
it was uneconomic. They also wanted to investigate where policy was “diverse within an industry” 
with the aim of discovering “the advisability of alteration of the constitution of Unions where it can 
be shown that their present basis if improving the conditions of employment of their members is 
ineffective”. Their proposals were turned down.
In 1943 the Distributive and Allied Workers proposed an investigation by the General Council into 
union structure “with special regard to: (a) Uneconomic overlapping and competition. (b) what 
amalgamations are desirable, (c) structural or other changes necessary to ensure maximum Trade 
Union efficiency in the future.” This resolution passed by 3.877,000 to 1,899,000 votes, however, 
the Organization Committee, which was allocated the task, achieved little apart from a development 
of advisory councils and committees for groups of unions by the General Council. The Organization 
Committee ended its report with the conclusion that “the outstanding fact is the only solution to our 
problem is that the unions themselves must strive for closer unity and resolutely pursue that end, 
probably making some sacrifices on the way, until it is achieved. That fact has been known for a 
long time. But it has still to be faced.”
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specific workplace roles than it is in Germany. British workers tend to be represented 
(and in  turn  to  identify)  with  their  shop steward,  who is  responsible  only  for  their 
department. Thus a stronger identification with the department is achieved which may 
lead to the development of a separate group identity and to separate unions504.
Strikes
Differences are to be found in the type of strikes, with wildcat strikes being far more 
common in the UK than in Germany505. Also, the overall number of strikes and working 
days lost through strikes used to be higher in the UK506. Again, the reason may be found 
Despite this pessimism, some mergers took place: among others, the National Union of 
Mineworkers was founded on January 1st, 1945, after roughly three years of preparation.
(H. A. Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions since 1889, Volume III 1934 – 1951, Oxford 
1994,p. 279f.)
Union mergers did occur throughout the post-war period; however, there was a peak in the early 
seventies with 61 mergers between 1969 and 1971 and 69 between 1972-74. The size of unions 
involved changed as well, while mostly small unions with an average size of 1,000 members merged 
between 1949 -62, the average membership of unions merging rose four or five fold between 1963-
79.
(Robert Buchanan, Mergers in British Trade Unions 1949-79, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 
12 No. 3, p. 40ff. (Table 1, p. 41).
504 Malcolm Warner, Arndt Sorge, The Context of Industrial Relations in Great Britain and Western 
Germany, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 41ff. (p. 47).
505 It was held that by the late 1960s about 90% of all strikes were unofficial.
(Keith Sisson, The Management of Collective Bargaining – An International Comparison, Oxford 
1987, p. 20.)
506 Between 1962 and 1984 the average working days lost per 1,000 employees and year in the UK 
were 91.91, while the corresponding number for Germany was 9.95. There was no data available as 
to the numbers of stoppages in Germany, however, the numbers of workers involved per 1,000 
employees per year has been much smaller than in the UK (an average of 1.65 over the period from 
1962 – 1984, compared to an average of 14.52 in the UK), so that it may be assumed that the overall 
number of strikes was smaller as well.
(Michael P. Jackson, Strikes - Industrial Conflict in Britain, U.S.A. and Australia, Brighton and 
New York 1987, p. 15, 17, Tables 2.2 and 2.3.).
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in differences between a voluntaristic and a  legalistic system. 
The tightly regulated German system makes it  difficult  to strike,  even though these 
obstacles are not imposed by law but by the jurisdiction of the BAG. First of all, strikes 
are only legal when called by a union and conducted on topics that might be regulated in 
a collective agreement, so political and sympathy strikes were illegal long before they 
became  unlawful  in  the  UK.  A  strike  might  only  be  called  after  the  end  of  the 
Friedenspflicht507 accompanying every agreement during its validity508. The relatively 
low  number  of  strikes  in  Germany  has  also  been  linked  to  the  system  of 
Flächentarifverträge509 in a recent study510 and, finally, a system of industrial unions, 
less likely to strike at company-level, developing in Germany after WWII. 
In pre-Thatcher Britain, on the other hand, there were hardly any regulations on the 
right to strike. Strikes could be called by shop stewards without consent of the unions511, 
507 Peace obligation.
508 Manfred Löwisch, Arbeitsrecht, 7th Ed., Düsseldorf 2004, Rn. 307, 344f, 352; Günter Schaub, 
Arbeitsrechts-Handbuch – Systematische Darstellung und Nachschlagewerk für die Praxis, 11th 
Edition, München 2005, p. 1867, § 193, Rn. 7.
509 Collective agreement concluded at national or sectoral level, thus covering an area (the literal 
translation of the term is ‘area agreement’).
510 Study by Institut für Arbeitsmarkt – und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, IAB 
Kurzbericht, Vol. 13, August 9th, 2005.
It was held that, since negotiations on industry-level are orientated at the national development of 
productivity calculated by national statistical offices and that information is more reliable and also 
more accessible to all negotiators, negotiations face less uncertainty. If the facts are present, there is 
less room for unrealistic claims and thus less inclination to strikes. Furthermore, strikes in systems 
with industry-wide bargaining are often concentrated on big employers, thus acting as Stellvertreter 
(substitute) strikes. Small and middle firms can thus avoid strikes by adapting the centrally 
negotiated agreements.
However, the difference between centralized and less centralized systems diminished in course of 
time and was not significant anymore in the 1990s.
511 While stewards, due to the relationship with rank-and-file union members, often do figure 
prominently in unofficial industrial action, the perception of them as “trouble-makers” seems to be 
somewhat of a myth, since they often influenced their members not to strike. The Donovan 
Commission observed that “it is often wide of the mark to describe shop stewards as 
‘troublemakers’. Trouble is thrust upon them. ...Shop stewards are rarely agitators pushing workers 
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political and sympathy strikes were protected. The strength of workplace organisation 
also contributed to the number of (unofficial) conflicts, as did workplace bargaining. 
Since most  issues  important  to  employment  are  settled  at  shop floor  level,  and  the 
machinery for settling disputes is often unsuited to those questions, conflicts arise more 
easily512. 
It seems therefore, that most of the differences between the German and British system 
of industrial relations might be attributed to a legacy of voluntarism in the UK on the 
one hand and a tradition of legalism in Germany on the other. Also the development of 
a  system  of  industrial  unions  in  Germany  after  1945  was  important  and,  while 
voluntarism did play a part in union decline and changes to industrial relations in the 
UK, other factors like the general economic decline after 1973, de-industrialisation and 
change in the workforce and an adverse political climate, have to be acknowledged as 
well. For a more detailed account, see Chapter I. 
The question which system was or is better able to achieve its goals and which might be 
better equipped to deal with actual problems trade unions and employees are facing will 
be dealt with in the conclusion of this thesis.
 
towards unconstitutional action. In some instances they may be the mere mouthpiece of their work 
groups. But quite commonly they are supporters of order exercising a restraining influence on their 
members in conditions which promote disorder”
(Richard Hyman, Strikes, 4th Edition, Houndsmills, Basingstoke and London 1989, p. 48f.; Report of 
the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 1965 – 1968 (Chairman: The 
Rt. Hon. Lord Donovan), London 1968, p. 28, para 110)
512 Richard Hyman, Strikes, 4th Edition, Houndsmills, Basingstoke and London 1989, p. 47, 49.
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Chapter IV
 
In the preceding chapters, a picture of the British and the German system of industrial 
relations and the core differences between them has been developed. In order to give an 
answer to the research question, which system is of more benefit to the (individual) 
worker, and which system is better adapted to changes, problems workers and unions 
are facing must be detailed, as must possible solutions to these. Only then an assessment 
as to which system might be better equipped to deal with them might be tried.
Part I will deal with problems on a national scale, while Part II will be concerned with 
problems and ways to deal with them on a European scale. The third Part will deal with 
Globalisation. 
Suggested solutions are examined.
Part I – Problems on a national scale
Unemployment and Change in Membership
Unemployment has, in recent years, been more of a threat to German than to British 
unions, resulting in a decline in membership and bargaining power. Another effect has 
been a change in the structure of the workforce. The traditional sector of membership of 
male full-time manual workers is in decline while white collar, female and part time 
employment – all areas without a strong tradition of unionisation -  amount to a greater 
part  of  the  workforce513.  Additionally,  the  manual  sector  itself  is  changing  from 
513 George Ross, Andrew Martin, European Unions face the Millennium, in: Andrew Martin, George 
Ross (Eds.), The Brave New World of European Labor, Oxford 1999, p. 1ff. (p. 11); Richard 
Hyman, European Unions: Towards 2000, in: Work Employment & Society, Vol. 5, No 4, p. 621ff. 
(p. 622, 624); Richard Hyman, Trade Unions and the Disaggregation of the Working Class, in: 
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“traditional”  industry  work  (suspected  of  generating  solidarity  and  therefore 
unionisation) to more skilled jobs and thus a more privileged workforce that might see 
less incentive to unionise. Simultaneously, there is an increase in low-skilled, insecure 
and atypical jobs,  especially among women. These workers might not only have no 
tradition of unionisation, but also might “lack the resources and cohesion for collective 
action”.514
Recruiting different Parts of the Work-Force
In  order  to  keep union influence  up,  unions  must  try  to  organise these employees. 
Under  the  favourable  conditions  of  the  1970s,  with  integration  of  unions  by 
governments and apparent successes in collective bargaining, they were able to so so 
with some success515 but things got more difficult when economic conditions worsened. 
However, as the TUC noticed in 1989, unions will need to concentrate on this “major 
source of potential membership”516.
In  order  to  recruit  more  white-collar  workers,  the  TUC proposed  offering  financial 
service packages in 1989; however, this seems to have had only a limited effect on the 
decision  to  join517.  Instead,  it  was  found  that  also  white-collar  workers  have 
Marino Regini (Ed), The Future of Labour Movements, London 1992, p. 150ff. (p. 153).
514 Richard Hyman, Trade Unions and the Disaggregation of the Working Class, in: Marino Regini 
(Ed), The Future of Labour Movements, London 1992, p. 150ff. (p. 153f.).
515 Colin Crouch, The Future Prospects for Trade Unions in Western Europe, in: Political Quarterly 
Vol. 57, No 1, p. 5ff. (p. 5).
516 Jeremy Waddington, Colin Whitston, Collectivism in a Changing Context: Union Joining ad 
Bargaining Preferences among While-Collar Staff, in: Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques 
Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 153ff. (p. 153).
517 Jeremy Waddington, Colin Whitston, Collectivism in a Changing Context: Union Joining and 
Bargaining Preferences among White-Collar Staff, in:  Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques 
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predominantly “collective” reasons for membership518. Unions are, also to white-collar 
workers,  mainly  attractive  for  traditional  union  issues  and  not  for  services  other 
organisations can offer as well or better. 
Still, trying to recruit more white-collar staff will imply paying more attention to the 
specifics  these  employees  like  to  have  addressed  via  collective  bargaining.  While 
traditional issues such as better pay, improved health and safety and more protection 
against unfair dismissal are among the most important issues for blue- as well as white-
collar workers, the latter also put importance on issues such as career development and 
fair promotion arrangements. Female employees pay more attention to career breaks and 
job sharing than men. Waddington and Whitstone took this as an indicator that 
“white-collar  staff  looks  to  unions  to  negotiate  a  fair  and  equitable  framework 
within which individualized aspects of the employment relationship – which are 
often career related – may be worked out”519. 
Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 153ff. (p. 153f.).
Those packages included different things, among them “discount on car purchase and insurance, 
travel and holidays, insurance and mortgages; advice on investments; and legal advice on non-work 
issues.” (Waddington and Whitston, cit. opp., p. 155)
518 Jeremy Waddington, Colin Whitston, Collectivism in a Changing Context: Union Joining and 
Bargaining Preferences among White-Collar Staff, in:  Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques 
Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 153ff. (p. 156).
This survey by Waddington and Whitston yielded 'to support me if I had a problem at work' and 'to 
improve my pay and conditions” as the two by far most prominent reasons for joining, with service 
packages coming in fourth at less than 10%. The survey showed also that white-collar workers are 
less “recruited” in the traditional sense but that a major proportion (just below 40%) made the 
contact to the unions themselves. Shop stewards/or local representatives made up for slightly less 
than a quarter of recruitments, branch secretaries for about 13%.
(Waddington and Whitston, cit. opp, p. 156, 158).
519 Jeremy Waddington, Colin Whitston, Collectivism in a Changing Context: Union Joining and 
Bargaining Preferences among White-Collar Staff, in:  Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques 
Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham, Brookfield, 1996, p. 153ff. 
(p. 163ff., 166).
The trend towards ‘quality bargaining’ starting to appear in the late 1980s in Germany as well as 
the UK might be a reaction to this preferences (see Chapter I).
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Unions thus might wish to think about their bargaining agendas. Adapting them more to 
the preferences of white-collar workers without neglecting the traditional areas might 
help in recruiting those520; German unions might made use of the provisions that enable 
councils to influence training opportunities521. 
However, a greater membership of white-collar workers with their better labour market 
position and different interests in union membership might change the character of the 
520 It has also been suggested that unions need to take “class” and “identity” more into account when 
organising workers – not only nationally, but also on an international scale: “Cross-border 
organizing and solidarity are essential to ensure decent standards for all and would work best if 
responsive to both class ad personal identity factors”; “identity “ being compromised from “identity 
factors” such as “race, gender, ethnicity, national origin, citizenship status, community, sexual 
orientation, and religion. ... job, social class, career, income, and wealth”.
(Maria L. Ontiveros, A New Course for Labour Unions: Identity-Based Organizing as a Response to 
Globalization, in: Joanne Conaghan, Richard Micheal Fischl, Karl Klare (Eds.), Labour Law in an 
Era of Globalization, Oxford 2002, p. 417ff. (p. 417, 424).
However, organising merely along identity lines bears dangers: it is easy for an employers to play 
different such groups in a workplace off against one another; say, blacks v women. A sense of class 
unity therefore needs to prevail:
“But the danger from fragmentation includes more than a loss of power for workers through 
numerical dispersion. More fundamentally, the fragmentation of groups into particularistic 
notions of identity prevents the forging of larger groups, and prevents the creation of common 
bonds among workers because, in such a system, employees are left emphasizing their 
incommensurate differences while ignoring their potential commonalities. Where difference 
becomes the prism through which the workplace is viewed, it becomes all too easy to lose sight 
of the economic battle between workers and management. Focusing exclusively on identity 
will detrimentally affect the ability of employees to join together in order to reconstruct 
economic relations, and may cause employees to join together in order to reconstruct economic 
relations, and may cause employees to fight for power amongst each other, a situation 
employers are likely to welcome”
(Micael Selmi, Molly S. McUsic, Difference and Solidarity: Unions in a Postmodern Age, in: 
Joanne Conaghan, Richard Micheal Fischl, Karl Klare (Eds.), Labour Law in an Era of 
Globalization, Oxford 2002, p. 429ff. (p. 436f.).)
521 Horst Kern, Charles F. Sabel, Trade Unions and decentralized Production: a Sketch of Strategic 
Problems in the German Labour Movement, in: Marino Regini (Ed.), The Future of Labour 
Movements, London 1992, p. 217ff. (p. 237).
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unions522 and thus present other problems.  
The labour movement has always been fragmented and when establishing solidarity 
above the sphere of the individual  shop-floor has demanded an effort523,  integrating 
employees with very different positions and interests will be even more difficult. For 
example, workers with a higher level of wages may be less solidary when it comes to 
egalitarian  wage  claims.  Also,  traditionally  the  role  of  vanguard  union  in  wage 
bargaining in the UK and Germany has been filled by metal worker's unions, setting the 
pace  for  the  union  movement  as  a  whole524.  Those  unions  are  now  increasingly 
undergoing the aforementioned changes in membership decline and structural change525 
and it is doubtful if a vanguard position can still be filled with declining importance of 
the represented workers and thus the union. A shift of dominance to white collar or 
public  service  unions  therefore  means  a  shift  in  bargaining  tactics,  too.  These  new 
unions organise a class of employees rather than an industry and might therefore make 
demands  without  regard  to  economic  considerations526, whereas  unions  organising 
522 Colin Crouch, The Future Prospects for Trade Unions in Western Europe, in: Political Quarterly 
Vol. 57, No 1, p. 5ff. (p. 6); Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx, Introduction, in: 
Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in 
Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 1ff. (p. 23).
523 Richard Hyman, Trade Unions and the Disaggregation of the Working Class, in: Marino Regini 
(Ed), The Future of Labour Movements, London 1992, p. 150ff. (p. 159f.).
Even collective bargaining arguably is a more pragmatic than genuinely solidly united approach, 
recognising simply that individualistic goals might be more easily and effectively attained in 
combination with others. Thus it might (and has been argued) that nothing much has changed.
(Hyman, cit. opp. p. 159f.).
524 One example for this is Germany’s IG Metall (see Chapter I), which used to be the largest German 
union until the merger of five unions to the public service union ver.di.
525 Richard Hyman, Trade Unions and the Disaggregation of the Working Class, in: Marino Regini 
(Ed), The Future of Labour Movements, London 1992, p. 150ff. (p. 154); Rainer Zoll, 
Modernization, Trade Unions and Solidarity, in: Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx 
(Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p.76ff. (p. 87); Colin Crouch, 
The Future Prospects for Trade Unions in Western Europe, in: Political Quarterly Vol. 57, No 1, p. 
5ff. (p. 6).
526 Colin Crouch, The Future Prospects for Trade Unions in Western Europe, in: Political Quarterly 
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predominantly in one industry are usually well informed about the economic situation 
of this industry. 
In  order  to  foster  union-identification  and  therefore  integration,  new  models  of 
involvement might be needed.  The “new trade unionist” is unlikely to have (yet) the 
same deep identification with his union as the traditional unionist; therefore being less 
likely to sacrifice a major part of his time to act as an official or shop-steward. Those 
new members need other ways to identify with their union and traditional methods of 
participation – the odd factory assembly – are simply not enough to do that527. However, 
the way participation is done is rooted in trade unions' history. There has always been a 
need to exert control over members, either because of prosecution by the state or to 
ensure that members would not boycott any industrial action the union might take. The 
need to develop and maintain a common central policy is also important in this regard. 
Trade unions thus traditionally favoured a more restrictive approach to participation, 
with members handing over responsibility to the officials. Realising more participative 
structures therefore might be difficult528, but it will be necessary.
Vol. 57, No 1, p. 5ff. (p. 6f.).
527 Rainer Zoll, Modernization, Trade Unions and Solidarity, in: Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, 
Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p.76ff. (p. 
81).
Zoll points out that “their [the trade unions'] policies are still conceived in terms of doing something 
'for' women, 'for' the unemployed, or 'for' any socially disadvantaged group, rather than acting 'with' 
them.”
(Zoll, cit. opp., p. 83)
528 Rainer Zoll, Modernization, Trade Unions and Solidarity, in: Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, 
Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p.76ff. (p. 
85); Ben Valkenburg, Individualization and Solidarity: the Challenge of Modernization, in: Peter 
Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, 
Cheltenham1996, p. 89ff. (p. 94).
To be fair, it has to be said that members do not appear especially eager to participate more actively 
in their unions, most seem quite contend with the delegation of tasks to the officials. One has to 
keep in mind, however, that unions do not exactly encourage participation and members therefore 
probably do not expect anything could change should they voice their wishes to become more 
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Developing a Different Approach in order to keep Influence at the Workplace up
In order to overcome declining influence, “an enterprise level, partnership-orientated 
focus” has been suggested529. Such an approach implies that employers and unions try to 
find a consensus on issues that are best resolved by joint action. For this, labour and 
capital will have to accept that improving business performance is imperative530.
A partnership approach is inconsistent with industrial action; therefore unions need to 
reconsider their traditional ways of pressing demands531. Strikes are “still the strongest 
means  of  exercising  power”  for  unions  and  securing  as  much  influence  with  a 
“partnership-oriented  approach”  without  strong  legal  rights  might  be  difficult532. 
Without the right to strike and without legal rights, unions will have no effective means 
of pressing their demands. Decisions will therefore ultimately be taken by management. 
There is, furthermore, a danger that unions might be enticed into managerial thinking. 
Additionally,  a  decision  to  refrain  from  strike  might  be  hard  to  communicate  to 
members, especially to ‘traditional’ members533.
integrated.
(Valkenburg, cit. opp., p. 104).
529 Mike Rigby, Approaches to the contemporary Role of Trade Unions, in: Mike Rigby, Roger Smith, 
Teresa Lawlor (Eds), European Trade Unions – Change and Response, London 1999, p. 18ff. (p. 
21).
530 Mike Rigby, Approaches to the contemporary Role of Trade Unions, in: Mike Rigby, Roger Smith, 
Teresa Lawlor (Eds), European Trade Unions – Change and Response, London 1999, p. 18ff. (p. 
22).
531 Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx, Introduction, in: Peter Leisink, Jim Van 
Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 
1ff. (p. 9).
532 Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx, Introduction, in: Peter Leisink, Jim Van 
Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 
1ff. (p. 14).
533 Leisink, Van Leemput and Vilkrokx comment on this: “..as strike research has shown, not only do 
more members lead to more strikes, but also, and probably to an even larger extent, strikes lead to 
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While a partnership approach may have certain benefits, ensuring at least information 
and consultation where nothing else is attainable, it seems dangerous. Information and 
consultation rights  may appear sufficient  to some workers and so detain them from 
membership534.  More importantly, it  has to be accepted that labour and capital have 
essential different interests and partnership thus is difficult. Since capital is – especially 
with high unemployment rates – in the stronger position, totally giving up on means of 
industrial action would be naïve, as would be depending on employers’ goodwill by 
relying on partnership without strong means (be it industrial action or legal rights) to 
influence decisions. As Leisink et. al. put it: 
“Even if the working class as a whole would completely give up the idea of a 
socialist society, without the threat of stoppages it would soon be at the mercy of at 
least some part of a divided capitalist class”535.
Integrate the Unemployed
More and more in Germany, being unemployed is changing from being a short  and 
passing phenomenon to a condition that might last for years, if not a lifetime. Unions 
need to try to take unemployment and unemployed into account by developing new 
more members”. This could be observed in the Spring 2006 strike of ver.di in Germany which led to 
a growth in applications for membership.
(Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx, Introduction, in: Peter Leisink, Jim Van 
Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 
1ff. (p. 15).)
534 Colin Crouch, The Future Prospects for Trade Unions in Western Europe, in: Political Quarterly 
Vol. 57, No 1, p. 5ff. (p. 10).
535 Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx, Introduction, in: Peter Leisink, Jim Van 
Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 
1ff. (p. 14).
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policies that not only try to safeguard the employed against becoming unemployed but 
also try to find ways for a more just way of distributing labour. In 1986, Crouch pointed 
out that 
“a further development is likely to be increasing division between workers with 
reasonably  secure,  full-time and legally  protected  jobs  and those  in  temporary, 
often part-time unprotected ones. This is a consequence of two forces: on the one 
hand unionised and some other groups will try to protect the gains in job security 
and working conditions made during the 1970s; on the other hand, capital will seek 
increasing  flexibility  to  face  the  more  precarious  economic  environment.  ...  If 
unions primarily represent the secure work force, the co-operation in restructuring 
may  be  bought  precisely  by  requiring  insecure  groups  to  bear  the  brunt  of 
adjustment”536. 
If they want to win the unemployed as members, they will have to take their needs, 
quite different from traditional union areas like bargaining for terms and conditions, into 
account537. In trying to deal with unemployment, unions might want to exert political 
influence;  e.g.  lobbying  for  different  economic  policies  or  at  least  better  training 
programmes and benefits for the unemployed. When continuing to concentrate on the 
more secure parts of the labour force (which would be understandable, since those are 
more  likely  to  be  members)  unions  might  no  longer  be  perceived  as  (also) 
representatives  of  the weakest  parts  of  labour,  thus inviting competition from other 
organisations, left and right538.
536 Colin Crouch, The Future Prospects for Trade Unions in Western Europe, in: Political Quarterly 
Vol. 57, No 1, p. 5ff. (p. 7, 8).
537 See: Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx, Introduction, in: Peter Leisink, Jim Van 
Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 
1ff. (p. 9).
538 Colin Crouch, The Future Prospects for Trade Unions in Western Europe, in: Political Quarterly 
Vol. 57, No 1, p. 5ff. (p. 8); Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx, Introduction, in: 
Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in 
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Part II - Problems on a European Scale
Introduction
For the impartial viewer, industrial relations still seem to happen mostly on a national 
scale.  However,  national  economies  are  increasingly involved in  international  trade, 
90%  of  which  takes  place  within  the  European  community539.  Therefore, 
Europeanization might prove more important for trade unions than globalisation. 
Furthermore,  experiences  with  European  politics  and  Directives  show  that  getting 
involved on a European level is necessary; after all, European Directives have a major 
influence on working conditions in the member states. The conflict around the Services 
Directive  highlights  not  only  the  necessity  but  also  the  possibilities  of  such 
involvement.  It is  intended  to  ease  inter-European  trade  and  part  of  the  proposed 
legislation envisaged that service-providers located in one member state should be able 
to  provide  the  service  in  another  member  state  with  as  little  or  no  legal  and 
administrative  barriers  as  possible.  The  most  controversial  provisions  are  those 
regarding  the  ‘country-of-origin-principle’.  This  shall  allow  service-providers  to 
temporarily offer their services on foreign markets while being subject to the laws of the 
country their company is located in rather than to those of the country they are operating 
in.  Thus  a  cleaning  operative  located  in  Poland  would  have  been  enabled  to  offer 
cleaning services in the UK while treating his staff according to Polish law and paying 
Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 1ff. (p. 9).
539 Richard Hyman, Trade Unions and the European Social Model, in: Economic and Industrial 
Democracy, Vol. 26, No. 1, p.9 ff. (p. 13).
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Polish wages540. National unions and the ETUC opposed the Directive in its proposed 
form for fear that it would lead to social dumping541. It also seemed to be contrary to the 
Directive on Posting of Workers, stipulating that workers who have been dispatched to 
another member  are to be treated according to the laws of the host country542. 
The ETUC lobbied the members of the Internal Market Committee of the European 
Parliament to exempt public services and certain other sectors from the scope of the 
Directive and to clarify that it shall have no effect on labour law, collective bargaining 
and industrial  relations. It  also argued that the country-of-origin principle should be 
abandoned,  since  it  would,  without  “sufficient  level  of  harmonisation  or  equivalent 
provisions … create a destructive race to the bottom”; holding that the Directive would 
harm workers’ rights and endanger the values of a social Europe543. 
In a new proposal of April  4th,  2006, including amendments made by the European 
Parliament in a first reading, the country-of-origin-principle was replaced by a provision 
regarding the freedom to provide services. The effect of this is that member states are 
still obliged to allow service providers from other member states “free access to and free 
exercise of the service activity within its territory”, including the obligation to allow the 
service provider to work under the conditions of its home country. However, member 
540 Wikipedia, Directive on Services in the Internal Market, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directive_on_services_in_the_internal_market, last accessed April 22nd, 
2006.
541 Verdi.de, Argumentation zum Herkunftslandprinzip in der EU-Dienstleistungsrichtlinie, 
http://www.verdi.de/kampagnen_projekte/eu-
dienstleistungsrichtlinie/bestellschein_vordrucke/argumentation_zum_herkunftslandprinzip_in_der_
eu-dienstleistungsrichtlinie, last accessed April 6th, 2006; ETUC, ETUC challenges Commission 
Proposal for Liberalisation of Services, http://www.etuc.org/a/436, last accessed April 22nd, 2006. 
542 Verdi.de, Argumentation zum Herkunftslandprinzip in der EU-Dienstleistungsrichtlinie, 
http://www.verdi.de/kampagnen_projekte/eu-
dienstleistungsrichtlinie/bestellschein_vordrucke/argumentation_zum_herkunftslandprinzip_in_der_
eu-dienstleistungsrichtlinie, last accessed April 6th, 2006.
543 ETUC, Letter to Members of the Internal Market Committee, found at: 
http://www.dienstleistungsrichtlinie.dgb.de/gewerkschaften/2_2.htm, last accessed April 6th, 2006. 
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states are now able to impose their own requirements if these are “justified on grounds 
of public policy, public security, public health or the protection of the environment, they 
are non-discriminatory, necessary and proportionate”544. 
Unions  played  their  part  in  this  amendment.  The  ETUC  mobilised  about  50,000 
European workers to demonstrate before the European Parliament in Strasbourg at the 
eve of the vote of the first reading of the Directive. Subsequently to welcoming the EP’s 
vote545, the ETUC very cautiously welcomed the new proposal in April 2006546.
Finding a common response to European policy is not only necessary when it comes to 
Directives. The European Council each year publishes “Broad Economic Guidelines” 
which  are  drafted  by  the  Commission  and  unfailingly  advocate  wage  rises  below 
productivity  and  greater  differentiation  between  wages  on  geographical  and 
occupational terms547.
544 Commission of the European Communities, Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council on Services in the Internal Market, Brussels 4. 4. 2006, COM 2006 
(160) Final, 2004/0001 (COD), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/services/docs/services-dir/guides/amended_prop_en.pdf, 
last accessed April 22nd, 2006.
545 The compromise “approved, by a large majority, the compromise reached by the main political 
groups in the Parliament, at the same time burying the initial Bolkestein proposal and putting a new 
text in its place”. 
ETUC, A major Victory for European Workers: the Initial Bolkestein Proposal is Dead, 
http://www.etuc.org/a/2081, last accessed April 22nd, 2006.
546 ETUC’s General Secretayr John Monk is quoted as saying: “We appreciate the fact that the 
Commission has respected its commitment, although we will need to check the various changes in 
more detail. At first sight, some amendments appear incomplete, confusing or even inaccurate. The 
ETUC will ask the Council to examine these points closely.”
ETUC, ETUC values Commission’s efforts to respect main provisions of the European Parliament’s 
Compromise on the Services Directive, http://www.etuc.org/a/2271, last accessed April 22nd, 2006.
547 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p. 4.
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Finally, it is feared that the European Monetary Union will increase wage dumping. 
Since  exchange  rates  aren’t  available  for  cushioning  out  productivity  differences 
anymore, employers more and more see labour costs as the main adjustment mechanism 
for economic difficulties548. The setting up of the ECB has already prompted continuing 
discussions between ETUC, ECB and the Commission on the relation between prices, 
wages, employment and economic performance549.
Additionally, coordination takes place on employers’ side: multinationals’ headquarters 
pressure local  managements  to  increase productivity  on the basis  of  ‘best  practice’; 
connected with a threat to unions that non-implementation of those practices will lead to 
relocation.  This  has  the  effect  of  very  similar  collective agreements  across  Europe. 
Also, multinational companies are collecting data on labour costs and use it in their 
decision where to invest or close down sites550. If European workers do not want to be 
played off against each other, this needs a European response.
Since all  of  these  are  European phenomena,  meaningful  reaction requires  European 
action. The need to become involved on a European scale thus becomes clear. This 
section will deal with different attempts undertaken by labour to become influential in 
the shaping of European industrial relations. 
548 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p. 4.
549 Keith Sisson, Paul Marginson, Co-Ordinated Bargaining: A Process for our Times?, in: British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 197ff. (p. 212).
550 eiro online, The Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining, 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/print/1999/07/study/tn9907201s.html, last accessed April 12th, 
2006; Keith Sisson, Paul Marginson, Co-Ordinated Bargaining: A Process for our Times?, in: 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vo. 40, No. 2, p. 197ff. (p. 198f).
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Suggested Solutions
 ETUC
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) seems like an obvious response by 
labour to increasing Europeanization by employers. The main trade union actor on the 
European stage; it represents about 60 million workers in 81 union federations from 36 
European countries and 12 European industry federations551. It sees its main duty not in 
collective bargaining but in lobbying EU decision making, especially in areas of social 
and  employment  policies.  It  has  thus  been  held  that  the  ETUC  “has  tried  to 
institutionalize its presence in the EU more as a political force than as a trade union 
organization”552.
The  ETUC  faces  a  number  of  problems.  Not  only  does  it,  as  a  mere  union 
confederation, not have the right to strike, it also lacks power as national unions have 
been less than willing to transfer authority to it553. The effect is that the ETUC possesses 
only a limited base for industrial action and has thus tried to become more integrated 
into the  EU's  decision making process.  While  this  has  proven to  be  a  way to  take 
influence, it has also made the ETUC less politically independent. In fact, it has been 
held that it largely depends on the European Commission on organisational, political 
551 ETUC, Our Members, http://www.etuc.org/r/13, last accessed April 22nd, 2006.
552 Mike Rigby, Approaches to the Contemporary Role of Trade Unions, in: Mike Rigby, Roger Smith, 
Teresa Lawlor (Eds.), European Trade Unions – Change and Response, London 1999, p. 18ff. (p. 
29).
553 Jeremy Waddington, Trade Unions and the Defence of the European Social Model, in: Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vo. 36, Issue 6 (Annual European Review 2005), p. 518ff. (p. 534); Graham 
Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of Change? 
Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 10, No.3, p. 267ff. (p. 271).
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and financial terms554. This dependence has had the effect that national unions in turn 
identify less with the ETUC and continue focusing on their home countries rather than 
on the EU, thus further weakening the ETUC. 
The ETUC therefore has not been able to develop a transnational European workers’ 
identity or even just  a “positive vision of social Europe”, thus failing to become an 
effective and autonomous agent of regulation within the emergent institutions of the 
EU555. Taylor and Mathers identified as its main weaknesses “a focus on institution-
building rather than mobilization,  an overdependence on the European Commission, 
and  ideological  and  tactical  division  between  and  within  its  constituent 
confederations”556.
The strategy of the ETUC, to try and be influential  by lobbying and compromising 
within the corridors of power rather than relying on traditional union methods such as 
industrial  conflict,  has,  on  the  national  level,  mostly  been  a  reaction  of  unions  to 
“defeats and weakness”557. If such a strategy is adopted as a positive one on European 
level, one gets a clear impression of the standing and influence of the ETUC.
The ETUC therefore seems to be in an unenviable position. Little support from national 
confederations forced it into closer cooperation with the European political institutions, 
which  in  turn  led  to  further  alienation  form  its  constituents.  The  integration  into 
554 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No.3, p. 267ff. (p. 271).
555 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol 10, No.3, p. 267ff. (p. 271).
556 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 267).
557 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 279).
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European politics  and  the  resulting  lack  of  radicalism also  present  the  danger  of  a 
division of the union movement, if more radical national unions take the space with 
clearly defined criticism and opposition to European social policy558. 
The question is, therefore, what the ETUC should do. 
That said, the ETUC is not as ineffective as one might believe. For example, it managed 
to pressure the European Parliament into voting against the possibility to opt-out from 
the  Working  Time  Directive  and  succeeded  in  securing  some  important  provisions 
regarding  social  security  and  labour  rights  in  the  doomed European Constitution559. 
These might be examples of making use of its position within the structures of the EC, 
however,  it  also  tried  to  influence  the  European Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  by 
collaborating with NGOs and jointly producing a campaign paper. This campaign also 
included  national  unions  and  confederations;  showing  the  general  ability  of  (and 
possibility for) the ETUC to mobilise constituents and allies. Even though it failed560, 
elements of a new strategy began to emerge: “a closer alignment with other European 
NGOs in an attempt to develop a common agenda and the mobilization of European 
trade unionists on key European issues”561. 
These actions show that the ETUC is looking for new ways to act on the European stage 
558 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 275). 
559 Jeremy Waddington, Trade Unions and the Defence of the European Social Model, in: Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. 36, Issue 6 (Annual European review 2005), p. 518ff. (p. 534).
560 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 273f.).
561 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 276).
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and is thereby “tentatively moving towards a role as ‘social movement’”. In this way it 
might succeed in developing a “distinctive identity with a positive vision of a social 
Europe  capable  of  mobilizing  European workers  around European  issues”562.  When 
trying to change its role from an “exclusive focus on institutional social partnership 
towards a more campaigning social movement model”563, another important step would 
be to develop a clear idea of the different Europe the ETUC wants to achieve – the “new 
social movements” that are so successful in recruiting supporters offer exactly this: “a 
vision of a different future”564. 
There are, however, certain problems the ETUC is facing when trying to develop in this 
way. First, it will have to try to overcome a certain inactivity acquired by three decades 
spent  within the institutions  of  the  European Community.  Secondly,  it  will  have to 
change its set-up to a more democratic one. Even the campaigns mentioned and present 
attempts at cooperation with other social actors have mostly been steered from above 
rather than below565.
562 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 277).
563 Jeremy Waddington, Trade Unions and the Defence of the European Social Model, in: Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. 36, Issue 6 (Annual European review 2005), p. 518ff. (p. 531f.).
564 Richard Hyman, Trade Unions and the European Social Model, in: Economic and Industrial 
Democracy, Vol. 26, No. 1, p.9ff. (p. 31).
However, while this might prove to be a promising route on the way to greater membership 
involvement, it has to be doubted if it will translate into gaining (better) results. Even though the 
new social movements like attac and the live8 movement of the summer of 2005 do attract a large 
number of predominantly young urban people, it seems doubtful whether these are really attracted 
by the issues (and therefore capable of contributing to solutions) or rather by some form of ‘rebel 
chic’ – after all, anti-poverty wristbands were an important fashion statement in that summer. 
565 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 278).
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A transnational  union  structure  without  traditional  union  rights  or  agendas,  another 
problem for  the  ETUC has  always  been  that  of  identity.  Traditionally,  trade  union 
identity revolves around interest representation, democratic structure, agenda framing 
and power mobilisation. Since national unions are unwilling to devolve powers to the 
ETUC, these are mostly done on national level. The ETUC therefore was not able to 
develop a distinctive identity;  an indication is “the lack of an effective strategy and 
vision  vis-à-vis  the  development  of  social  Europe” 566.  Taylor  and  Mathers  have 
suggested a strategy of “internal social dialogue”, in which a transnational identity will 
be achieved by integrating national identities and orientations567. They also suggest that 
the ETUC might want to continue the cooperation with the fashionable global justice 
movements,  thus  counteracting  the  impression  of  “elite-networking”,  that  leaves 
national unions and members with the feeling that they have no way of influencing the 
ETUC’s policy568. 
In this regard it also seems important that the ETUC gets more into contact with its 
member organisations, since “effective international solidarity is impossible without a 
‘willingness to  act’  on part  of grassroots trade unionists569”.  One way of  doing this 
might  be to change the internal  organisation,  thus giving affiliated confederations a 
566 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 270f.).
567 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 279).
568 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 280f).
569 Graham Taylor, Andrew Mathers, The European Trade Union Confederation at the Crossroads of 
Change? Traversing the Variable Geometry of European Trade Unionism, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3. p. 267ff. (p. 280f).
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greater  say  and  individual  members  more  information.  Hyman  has  dubbed  this  an 
“internal social dialogue”; an
“open-ended method of shaping unions’ own goals and methods, in which leaders 
and officials certainly offer strategic direction but in which members themselves 
contribute to shaping policies which they understand and own – and on behalf of 
which they are prepared to act collectively”570.
While the ETUC should try to free itself from its dependence of EU’s institutions, its 
“institutionalisation”  might  also  prove  of  benefit.  When  in  closer  contact  with  its 
constituents, the ETUC could put its influence to good use by lobbying for Directives or 
policy changes its affiliates deem necessary. However, it has to be kept in mind that 
Directives generally take a long time from first idea to actual adoption – the Works 
Council  Directive,  adopted in  1994,  was  first  proposed in  1980.  Additionally,  most 
Directives just  legalise what is already practice in the majority of member states571. 
Therefore, lobbying for Directives might not be the most effective or fastest way to 
bring about changes.
Bargaining on a European Level
As  yet,  there  is  no  European  style  collective  bargaining  to  speak  of;  that  is,  no 
institutionalised rounds of negotiations between the ETUC and employers or European 
employers’ associations. 
There are different reasons for this. 
First,  the  ETUC  is  thought  to  be  rather  removed  from  its  constituency.  National 
570  Richard Hyman, Trade Unions and the European Social Model, in: Economic and Industrial 
Democracy, Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 9ff. (p. 30).
571 Jeremy Waddington, Trade Unions and the Defence of the European Social Model, in: Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. 36, Issue 6 (Annual European Review 2005) p. 518ff. (p. 534).
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confederations  are  held  to  be  not  in  touch  with  the  issues  and  concerns  of  their 
members572, and this must be even more true for an international confederation that is 
one step further removed from the individual member. To make European bargaining 
possible, therefore, the ETUC first would need to try to get into closer contact with its 
base to learn about the problems and issues members think are worth dealing with. An 
easy way to do this would be to use the possibilities of modern communication methods 
and try to learn about members’ views via, for example, a dedicated website with a 
feedback form.
Additionally, the ETUC would have to try to make its presence more known to workers. 
Since it acts mostly on a European scale and is concerned with lobbying rather than 
with  bargaining,  it  does  not  feature  very  prominently  in  national  news  and  might 
therefore be not very well known. This namelessness also reinforces the fact that the 
ETUC seems not to be in touch with its members – an organisation that is unbeknownst 
to those that are supposed to benefit from it is unlikely to get a lot of feedback from 
them. 
Secondly, a number of issues that,  on national scale, are traditionally determined by 
collective agreements are taken care of by way of Directives on the European level. 
While in most jurisdictions the law provides a framework for agreements (and collective 
bargaining is done nevertheless), the situation is slightly different on European level. It 
would be very difficult to conclude an agreement that would determine, for example, 
working time for a certain sector of industry in all member states since conditions in the 
individual member states are too diverse. All the ETUC could hope to achieve therefore 
572 Mike Rigby, Approaches to the Contemporary Role of Trade Unions, in: Mike Rigby, Roger Smith, 
Teresa Lawlor (Eds.), European Trade Unions – Change and Response, London, New York 1999, p. 
18ff. (p. 30).
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would be some kind of framework agreement – which is exactly what the Directives 
provide.  Thus,  the task the ETUC could hope to fulfil  with collective bargaining is 
already administered by the EU institutions. Also, even though there is yet no European 
minimum wage,  wage bargaining on European level  faces specific problems. While 
bargaining on pay is one of the core functions of unions it is very difficult to negotiate 
on a European scale. Even though wages have become more easily comparable with the 
introduction of the single currency, the situation in the member states regarding costs of 
living, taxes, social security contributions etc. is still fairly diverse. Thus, the minimum 
wage in country A would need to be different from that in country B. This admittedly 
would make bargaining not impossible; but much more complicated. Apart from that it 
might be difficult to arbitrate different minimum wages in different member states to 
workers. 
Thirdly, European collective bargaining would have to deal with the fact that there are 
now  27 member  states,  each  with  a  distinct  and  often  very  different  tradition  of 
collective  bargaining.  To  reconcile  these  differences  might  prove  difficult  –  for 
example, should the resulting agreements be legally binding like in Germany, or not, 
like  in  the  UK?  The  different  sectoral  boundaries  within  industries  would  present 
another  problem573,  and,  furthermore,  the  idea  of  European  bargaining,  which  by 
definition would take place on (at least) the industrial level, might seem very foreign to 
countries like the UK, where bargaining is mostly done on company level.
Social Dialogue
573 Rob de Boer, Hester Benedictus, Marc van der Meer, Broadening without Intensification: The added 
Value of the European Social and Sectoral Dialogue, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 50ff. (p. 54).
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Another way for labour to influence European politics is the social dialogue. 
In 1997, the social dialogue, formerly present in the Maastricht ‘social protocol’, was 
laid down in Art 136 of the Treaty. The social partners not only have the right to be 
consulted  on  the  Commissions’  social  policy  proposals,  they  can  also  present  their 
agreements  to  the  Commission  and  the  Council  which  then  might  adopt  them  as 
Directive. Another way of implementing their agreements is for the social partners to 
“make recommendations to their members and the social partners undertake to follow 
them up at national level”, by way of codes of conduct, best practice guidelines and 
framework agreements. However, those measures are in most cases non-binding and 
rely on the actors at national level for implementation574. 
It has to be understood that even though the results of the social dialogue are named 
‘agreements’,  they  are  distinctively  different  from  national  (traditional)  collective 
agreements. First, social dialogue agreements are not concerned with wages but rather 
try to lay down social  minimum standards which naturally have only little effect  in 
member states with more advanced social security systems. Secondly, they cover only a 
small  part  of  the  issues  normally  part  of  industrial  relations;  pay,  for  example,  is 
explicitly excluded under the Amsterdam treaty575.
574 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 516); Rob de Boer, Hester Benedictus, Marc 
van der Meer, Broadening without Intensification: The added Value of the European Social and 
Sectoral Dialogue, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 11, No 1, p. 50ff. (p. 50f.).
575 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p. 3; Rob de Boer, Hester Benedictus, Marc van der Meer, Broadening 
without Intensification: The added Value of the European Social and Sectoral Dialogue, in: 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 11, No 1, p. 50ff. (p. 53); Keith Sisson, Paul 
Marginson, Co-Ordinated Bargaining: A Process for our times?, in: British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vo. 40, No. 2, p. 197ff. (p. 211).
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The Social Dialogue has never evolved into a system of ‘European industrial relations’; 
different reasons account for that. First, as mentioned above, the European Community 
is  made  up  of  27 national  states  with  very  different  traditions  when  it  comes  to 
industrial  relations.  In  addition  to  that,  the  structures  of  trade  unions,  employers’ 
associations and other actors on the industrial relations stage vary, the different sectoral 
boundaries within industries make common interest representation on European level 
difficult576. 
Secondly,  especially  on  the  sectoral  level,  labour  is  missing  a  ‘proper’  employers’ 
organisation  as  bargaining  partner.  While  UNICE  on  the  European  level  is  not 
structured along sectoral lines, the employers’ interest organisations on the European 
sectoral  level  are  primarily  “trade  or  business  organisations” representing  economic 
interests of firms, and therefore often do not possess the authorisation or competence to 
negotiate. The underlying force is a general unwillingness on employers’ side to 
“engage in sector social dialogue, at best questioning its relevance and at worst 
fearing that by providing trade unions with an institutional platform the process 
might eventually lead to European-level collective bargaining”577. 
Employers  perceive  European  (economic)  integration  as  a  chance  to  circumvent 
national  social  regulations  and  to  profit  from  increased  competition  between  the 
member  states578.  Particularly  in  Germany  they  thus  favour,  quite  contrary  to  the 
concept  of  the  social  dialogue,  a  further  decentralisation  of  bargaining  down  to 
576 Rob de Boer, Hester Benedictus, Marc van der Meer, Broadening without Intensification: The added 
Value of the European Social and Sectoral Dialogue, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 11, No 1, p. 50ff. (p. 54).
577 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 519).
578 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p. 3.
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company level,  arguing that  bargaining must  be able to react  to  different  economic 
conditions at national and local level. This of course would also, for them, have the 
advantage of continued social dumping by “exerting downward pressure” by threatening 
to “locate different kinds of production in different kinds of regime, according to the 
varying combinations of skill requirement, and wage and productivity levels”579. 
And while the unions’ side is well organised on sectoral level around the European 
Industrial  Federations,  these  too  tend  to  lack  authorisation  from their  affiliates  for 
negotiations580. 
Thirdly, the leeway for social policy on European level is narrower than on national 
level.  Because  the  “social  agenda”  is  less  extensive  on  the  European  level,  the 
Commission is less able than national governments to “force” the social partners into 
negotiations, since there is less to be gained. This has the effect of social policy still 
being  mainly  a  national  affair,  thus  social  actors  are  dealing  with  it  mostly  on  the 
national level581. As De Boer et al indicate: 
“The evident question is why one would want to discuss issues, or even negotiate 
agreements within the framework of the ESD, if a more favourable outcome can be 
achieved through other channels available in the multi-level system of European 
policy development, principally the national system of industrial relations.”582
579 eiro online, The Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining, 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/print/1999/07/study/tn9907201s.html, last accessed April 12th, 
2006.
580 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 519).
581 Rob de Boer, Hester Benedictus, Marc van der Meer, Broadening without Intensification: The added 
Value of the European Social and Sectoral Dialogue, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 11, No 1, p. 50ff. (p. 55); Keith Sisson, Paul Marginson, Co-Ordinated Bargaining: A Process 
for our Times?, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vo. 40, No. 2, p. 197ff. (p. 211). 
582 Rob de Boer, Hester Benedictus, Marc van der Meer, Broadening without Intensification: The added 
Value of the European Social and Sectoral Dialogue, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 11, No 1, p. 50ff. (p. 55f.).
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Finally, it has been held that one of the reasons the social dialogue has never become 
really effective is its failure to show a capacity for innovative regulation due to the fact 
that the social partners have the ability to obstruct each other583. 
Social Dialogue therefore is for the most part  dependent on a voluntary cooperation 
between unions and employers’ organisations, and the employers’ side has been less 
than  enthusiastic584.  However,  in  2001  the  social  partners  composed  the  Laeken 
declaration, opting for “more emphasis on autonomous, bi-partite dialogue aimed at the 
conclusion of voluntary, non-legally binding agreements”, to be implemented through 
the negotiations between unions and employers in the member states; thus rejecting the 
possibility  opened  up  by  the  Amsterdam  Treaty  to  let  agreements  evolve  into 
Directives585. 
The Social Dialogue thus has mostly been used as a form of lobbying by the social 
partners, giving them more direct access to the policy process on the wide range of 
issues that are in the competence of the Commission586.
It  might be time to say good-bye to the idea of Social Dialogue as bargaining on a 
583 Wolfgang Schroeder, Rainer Weinert, Designing Institutions in European Industrial Relations: a 
strong Commission versus weak Trade Unions?, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations Vol. 
10, No. 2, p. 199ff. (p. 201).
584 Rob de Boer, Hester Benedictus, Marc van der Meer, Broadening without Intensification: The added 
Value of the European Social and Sectoral Dialogue, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 11, No 1, p. 50ff. (p. 55).
585 Rob de Boer, Hester Benedictus, Marc van der Meer, Broadening without Intensification: The added 
Value of the European Social and Sectoral Dialogue, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 11, No 1, p. 50ff. (p. 64, 67).
586 Rob de Boer, Hester Benedictus, Marc van der Meer, Broadening without Intensification: The added 
Value of the European Social and Sectoral Dialogue, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 11, No 1, p. 50ff. (p. 62, 64, 66).
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European  scale  in  order  to  appreciate  its  potential.  After  all,  it  does  open  up  the 
possibility for the social partners to have an institutionalised channel for lobbying the 
corridors of power in the EU, thus giving them a privileged position among interests 
groups. And while lobbying for Directives might be a rather slow form of exerting an 
influence, it nevertheless does carry the possibility for change. 
The ETUC should therefore abide by the social dialogue; however, it should not regard 
it as the only way to influence things. A combined strategy of Social Dialogue, closer 
contact with member organisations and exerting its influence in the Commission seems 
to be the most promising strategy.
Coordinated Wage bargaining
Another way in which (national) unions could try to act on the European scale is to 
form co-operations  with other  unions  in  the  EC.  An example for  this  might  be  the 
Memorandum of Understanding between ver.di  (Germany) and UNISON (UK). The 
aim of  the  memorandum is  to  design  concerted  strategies  such  as  “joint  collective 
bargaining  strategies”  and  “joint  recruitment  campaigns”  for  acting  in  private 
companies that both unions have members in587. 
Due to European integration, wage policies in the member states are interconnected. 
Therefore, if the wage level decreases in one member state, the rest will have to lower 
their levels as well in order to stay competitive588. This results in an adverse situation for 
587 Jeremy Waddington, Trade Unions and the Defence of the European Social Model, in: Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. 36, Issue 6 (Annual European Review 2005), p. 518ff. (p. 531f.).
Such companies include  Sodexho, ISS, Veolia (Vivendi), RWE/Thames Water and Innology 
(Waddington, cit. opp., p. 531f.)
588 Wolfgang Streeck, Gewerkschaften zwischen Nationalstaat und Europäischer Union, Max-Planck-
Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Working Paper 96/1, p. 3 (http://www.mpi-fg-
koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp96-1/wp96-1.html, last accessed April 7th, 2006); Paul Marginson, 
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labour in which they not only have to deal with their national employers but also have 
to pay attention to bargaining in the other member states.
A  solution  may  lay  in  coordinated  wage  bargaining.  Schulten  explained  that  this 
strategy “assumes the continued existence of different national bargaining systems, but 
seeks  to  link  them  so  as  to  limit  national  competition  on  pay  and  labour  cost 
developments”589.  In  fact,  forms  of  co-ordinated  wage  bargaining  have  long  been 
practised in most industrial relations systems. An example is ‘pattern bargaining’, where 
the agreement reached in one sector (often metal industry) acts as an example for other 
sectors590.
The coordination of wage policies is an attempt by trade unions to agree upon a number 
of common ground-rules and aim for wage policies in the respective national states, thus 
trying  to  prevent  “competitive  underbidding  of  labour  costs  and  wage dumping”591. 
While the need for a European wage policy has increased with the introduction of the 
Euro, increasing European integration and coordination of politics and economy had 
made it clear earlier that purely national strategies of unions were not sufficient any 
more592. The demise of national  solidaristic wage policy due to increased competition 
between member states in  the wake of European integration makes it  necessary for 
unions to regain part of their power to “place political limitations on competition over 
Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and Industrial 
Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 523)..
589 Thorsten Schulten, quoted in: Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The 
Weak Link?, in: Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 523). 
590 Keith Sisson, Paul Marginson, Co-Ordinated Bargaining: A Process for our times?, in: British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vo. 40, No. 2, p. 197ff. (p. 202, 205).
591 Thorsten Schulten, Foundations and Perspectives of Trade Union Wage Policy in Europe, WSI-
Discussionspaper No 129, August 2004, p. 2.
592 Thorsten Schulten, Foundations and Perspectives of Trade Union Wage Policy in Europe, WSI-
Discussionspaper No 129, August 2004, p. 2.
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wages and labour costs” on  European level593. 
Coordinated  bargaining  does  not  mean  bargaining  on  a  European  level;  rather,  it 
encompasses  the  coordination  of  national  bargaining  policies  on  a  European  scale. 
Coordination does not mean a fixed set of inflexible rules; rather it shall be achieved by 
“consultation and mutual agreement on shared guidelines and targets”. In this way a 
European race to the bottom shall be prevented by giving up “trying to obtain national 
competitive advantages on the expense of neighbouring countries by means of wage 
restraint”594.
Coordinated bargaining basically takes place on three levels:  the interregional level, 
involving only a limited number of countries;  the sectoral  level,  coordinated by the 
European Industry Federations and the cross-sectoral level, coordinated by the ETUC595.
Advantages 
One of the most obvious reasons for coordinated wage bargaining is the absence of 
collective agreements on the European level. The social dialogue, even though it does 
bring employers’ organisations and unions together on that level, has its weaknesses and 
593 Thorsten Schulten, Foundations and Perspectives of Trade Union Wage Policy in Europe, WSI-
Discussionspaper No 129, August 2004, p. 5, 10f.
“Solidaristic wage policy” works on the assumption that the “price for labour is not set by supply 
and demand, as it is for a regular commodity, but instead by collective agreements, which are 
themselves the result of political struggles and regulation”. Goals of solidaristic wage policy include 
the aim that workers doing the same job should be paid the same, no matter the economic situation 
of their employer. In addition to trying to fight wage discrimination for groups like women or 
migrant workers, solidaristic wage policy is aiming “at reducing overall wage differential between 
the different groups of employees in order to get a more egalitarian wage structure”.
(Schulten, cit. opp., p. 3f.).
594 Thorsten Schulten, Foundations and Perspectives of Trade Union Wage Policy in Europe, WSI-
Discussionspaper No 129, August 2004, p. 13f.
595 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.5.
188
furthermore  does  not  deal  with  wage  and  other  core  issues  of  national  collective 
bargaining. Coordinated bargaining may fill this gap596.
Another reason for a coordination of wage policies is that bargaining power in relation 
to employers may be enhanced597. When employers are faced with similar demands all 
over Europe, the incentive to relocate is weakened and no European country will have a 
competitive advantage due to low wages/labour costs.  This,  in a way, might pose a 
balance against economic integration and internationalisation on the employers’ side598.
The  idea  to  coordinate  bargaining  has  the  advantage  of  taking  into  account  the 
differences  between  the  national  bargaining  systems  instead  of  trying  to  impose  a 
centralised  European  system.  Furthermore,  the  antagonism  between  national  and 
European  level  bargaining  is  avoided  by  implementing  national  bargaining  into  a 
European strategy, strengthening unions’ position on a national as well as a European 
level by connecting national policies. Additionally, it recognises the fact that European 
level bargaining is unlikely to come forth as long as the employers’ side refuses to 
engage in negotiations. Furthermore, a coordinated bargaining policy might just be the 
new  movement  “capable  of  independent  action”  trade  unions  are  looking  for  on 
European level in order to attract new members599.
Finally, coordinating wage bargaining by use of the widespread wage formulas would 
enable  unions  to  “take  wages  out  of  competition”  –  those  formulas  link  wages  to 
596 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 523, 535).
597 Alain Borghijs, Sjef Ederveen, Ruud de Mooij, European Wage Coordnination: Nightmare or 
Dream to come true?, European Network of Economy Policy Research Institutes, Working Paper 
No. 20/May 2003, p. 23.
598 Alain Borghijs, Sjef Ederveen, Ruud de Mooij, European Wage Coordnination: Nightmare or 
Dream to come true?, European Network of Economy Policy Research Institutes, Working Paper 
No. 20/May 2003, p. 23. 
599 Thorsten Schulten, Foundations and Perspectives of Trade Union Wage Policy in Europe, WSI-
Discussionspaper No 129, August 2004, p. 15.
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productivity and, if adhered to in all member states, wages therefore would have no 
effect on competitiveness anymore600. 
Feasibility
Different steps have already been taken. On the interregional cross-sectoral level, there 
is the so-called  Doorn-Initiative of trade union confederations and important sectoral 
unions;  concluded  in  1998  between  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and 
Luxembourg, it was the first compilation of transnational rules for collective bargaining 
strategies601. The background to the initiative is the fact that Belgian unions had to deal 
with a “law on competitiveness” (inspired by Belgium’s aim to meet the criteria for 
participation in the EMU) which introduced a “legal wage norm” limiting the wage 
increases by collective agreements to the average of those expected in Belgium’s main 
trading  partners  -  France,  the  Netherlands  and  Germany.  Belgian  unions  therefore 
invited German and Dutch unions to a seminar in 1997 in which the decision was made 
to hold regular meetings to exchange information on bargaining matters602.
In the next meeting at the Dutch town of Doorn in 1998 a declaration was adopted, 
committing  “the  unions  to  a  bargaining  coordination  rule  under  which  negotiators 
should aim for settlements consistent with the increase in the cost of living plus the 
600 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.22.
601 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 524); Thorsten Schulten, Foundations and 
Perspectives of Trade Union Wage Policy in Europe, WSI-Discussionspaper No 129, August 2004, 
p. 12.
602 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.7; eiro online, The Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining, 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/print/1999/07/study/tn9907201s.html, last accessed April 12th, 
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increase in labour productivity” 603. Furthermore, the declaration stated that
“the  participating  trade  unions  aim  to  achieve  both  the  strengthening  of  mass-
purchasing power and employment-creating measures (e.g. shorter work times); the 
participating  organisations  will  regularly  inform  and  consult  each  other  on 
developments in bargaining policy604”.
In later meetings, the scope was extended to frame strategies for the establishment of 
common standards on non-wage issues, e.g. life-long learning. Comprising all major 
trade  union  confederations  plus  the  major  affiliated  industry  federations  from  the 
participating countries, the cooperation is enhanced by information exchange between 
experts  in  between annual  meetings,  enabling  supervision  of  national  agreements605. 
Additionally, participating federations also commit themselves to “rejecting demands 
for  any  national  policy  of  wage  restraint  aimed  at  securing  cost  advantages  in 
competition  with  neighbouring  countries”606,  thus  producing  a  clear  refusal  of 
“competitive corporatism”. 
However,  the  Doorn  Initiative,  although  widely  discussed,  has  remained  a  single 
phenomenon607.
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Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.7.
605 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.6; Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The 
Weak Link?, in: Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 524).
606 eiro online, The Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining, 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/print/1999/07/study/tn9907201s.html, last accessed April 12th, 
2006.
607 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
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Other initiatives mostly take place at the sectoral level, predominantly in metalworking 
and construction. There is a strong regional concentration; coordination mainly takes 
place between Germany and neighbouring countries,  especially Benelux,  on the one 
hand,  and between the Scandinavian countries on the other.  For  example,  there  are 
different  interregional  networks  between  the  German  unions  in  metalworking,  IG 
Metall,  and construction,  IG BAU and respective unions in  neighbouring states.  IG 
Metall  has  adopted  a  nationwide  policy  for  cross-border  collective  bargaining  at 
interregional levels, stating in their 1999 “European policy demands” that “each district 
shall develop collective bargaining relations with the unions of neighbouring countries 
which range from mutual participation in each others’  collective bargaining to joint 
planning”608. 
The cooperation between the IG Metall in Nordrhein-Westfalen (comprising the former 
heavy industry region Ruhrdistrict), Belgium and the Netherlands is arguably one of the 
most  advanced  and  covers, inter  alia,  supervision  of  agreements  on  basis  of  the 
bargaining coordination rule of the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF)609. Other 
networks, like that between IG Metall in Lower Saxony and Amicus-AEEU in the UK, 
consist mainly of visits, combined seminars and exchange of information610. 
On the sectoral  level,  most European Industrial Federations (EIFs)611 have started to 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.8.
608 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.8.
609 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 525).
610 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 525).
611 The EIFs are organisations of trade unions within one or more sectors, representing workers; 
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organise  the  sectoral  bargaining  policies  of  their  affiliated  national  unions  on  a 
European  level.  The  bargaining  coordination  policy  of  the  EMF  is  “the  longest 
established, the most developed and widely regarded as the pacesetter”. It held its first 
collective bargaining conference in 1993, and adopted a rule for wage negotiations in 
1998,  which held that  “settlement  should be  equivalent  to  the cost  of  living plus  a 
balanced share of economy-wide productivity gains”. A number of other EIFs in the 
manufacturing sector have adopted similar rules. The EMF has also adopted a working 
time charter which stipulates a yearly maximum of 1750 hours plus a maximum of 100 
hours  overtime.  While  the  EMF  strategy  compromises  two  elements,  “a  joint 
commitment  to  European guidelines  for  national  collective bargaining which should 
prevent downward competition” and “the political  determination of ‘EMF minimum 
standards’ which all EMF affiliates should feel obliged to bargain for”, national unions 
keep full autonomy of how to set their priorities within these guidelines612.
Generally,  the  standards  set  by  the  EMF  are  determined  according  to  a  common 
strategy. First, the unions try to determine a collective standard they feel is appropriate. 
This  should  neither  be  the  lowest  standard  nor  the  European  average,  for  then 
coordination would only try to ensure that the countries with the lowest standards are 
catching up. Therefore, the minimum is combined with more far-reaching goals613.
interests on    European level, principally by negotiation.
(European Industrial Relations Dictionary, European Industry Federations, 
http://www.eurofound.eu.int/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/EUROPEANINDUSTR
YFEDERATIONS.htm, last accessed May 2nd, 2006).
612 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 528f.); Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of 
Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination 
of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.11ff.
613 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.11ff; Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: 
The Weak Link?, in: Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 528f.).
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There  are  great  differences  between  initiatives  in  the  individual  sectors.  Some,  for 
example in finance, are voluntary, some, like the EMF’s, are more formal. Most are 
single tier, that is, they mainly deal with sector level negotiations on the national scale 
(for example the EMF's), while others, for example UNI-Europa Finance’s, are double 
tier,  acting  on  company  as  well  as  sectoral  level,  thereby  embracing  EWCs.  UNI-
Europa Finance is  also acting in more than one sector.  More importantly,  there are 
differences in the power to implement and monitor the initiatives. Many EIFs lack the 
structures necessary to  assist  coordination of bargaining while  others,  such as UNI-
Europa Finance, have set up websites including “databases of the contents of collective 
agreements  and  key  wage  and  working  time  parameters”614.  Additionally,  EIFs  in 
sectors that are already experiencing a common labour market, like construction, tend to 
put more emphasis on lobbying for European social legislation since the impression is 
that the social problems brought about by the integrated market cannot be dealt with by 
the unions alone615.
The ETUC started working on coordination on a cross-sectoral level in 2000, declaring 
in 1999 the
“coordination  of  collective  bargaining  –  along  with  European  social  policy 
legislation, the European Social Dialogue, and the European Works Councils – as 
one of the four pillars of a ‘European system of labour relations’”.
614 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 528f.); Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of 
Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination 
of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p. 17.
615 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p. 20.
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It laid out that coordinated bargaining was to be oriented along a “European solidaristic 
pay policy” and thus should be in a position to 
“guarantee workers a fair share of income; counter the dangers of social dumping; 
counter the growing income inequality in some countries; contribute to a reduction 
in disparities in living conditions; and contribute to an effective implementation of 
the principle of equal treatment of the sexes”616. 
Before that, the ETUC had mostly been concerned with the social dialogue and only the 
development of cross-national initiatives like those of the EMF and the Doorn initiative 
and an increasing discussion within EU institutions on European macroeconomic, and 
therefore also wage, policy, subsequent to the introduction of the EMU, changed the 
focus to policies of coordination617. However, even in its 1999 proposal the ETUC saw 
its position more behind the scene: “competent for overall co-ordination, providing the 
necessary framework to guarantee the overall coherence of the process”, relying on the 
European  Industrial  Federations  to  create  “the  requisite  structures  and  instruments, 
adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  sector  concerned”618.  In  2000,  it  adopted  a  European 
guideline for coordinated collective bargaining, advocating wage settlements that would 
mirror  cost  of  living  increases  plus  a  share  of  productivity  gains  –  similar  to  the 
guidelines of the Doorn Initiative. Other intentions include a narrowing of the “gender 
pay gap” and a decrease in the number of the low-paid. Also included is a monitoring 
616 Thorsten Schulten, Foundations and Perspectives of Trade Union Wage Policy in Europe, WSI-
Discussionspaper No 129, August 2004, p. 12f.; Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective 
Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of 
Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.21. 
617 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.21.
618 ETUC, quoted in: Keith Sisson, Paul Marginson, Co-Ordinated Bargaining: A Process for our 
Times?, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vo. 40, No. 2, p. 197ff. (p. 198).
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system for agreements619.
However, there are - of course – a number of problems. First, coordinated bargaining 
has no means of forcing the participants to actually adhere to the agreed guidelines. 
Since ‘bindingness’ is one of the most important organisational means for unions in 
their fight against competition aiming at the destruction of solidarity, this might be less 
than ideal. Secondly, since unions are still mostly acting on a national level, authority of 
the European Federations is rather weak. And of course, the more national unions fail to 
follow the guidelines, the greater the pressure for the rest to depart from the agreed rules 
as well620. In fact, the EMF asserts that every year a number of national federations do 
not achieve settlements according to the rule; furthermore, it also states that it did not 
take a prominent place among negotiation priorities in many national unions621.
Tied to this is the phenomenon that national unions might not  want to adhere to the 
guidelines. “Competitive corporatism” tries to clamp collective bargaining into politics 
of  national  competitiveness,  typically  calling  for  wage  restraints  in  collective 
agreements with the aim of enhancing national competitiveness. Quite often at the end 
of the 1990s, those pacts were justified with the need to meet EMU criteria. If unions 
support such a strategy (or are too weak to resist it), there is not much that can be done, 
due to the voluntaristic nature of the coordination approach. For example, bargaining 
619 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 530).
620 Thorsten Schulten, Foundations and Perspectives of Trade Union Wage Policy in Europe, WSI-
Discussionspaper No 129, August 2004, p. 16; Wolfgang Streeck, Gewerkschaften zwischen 
Nationalstaat und Europäischer Union, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Working 
Paper 96/1, p. 16 (http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp96-1/wp96-1.html, last accessed 
April 7th, 2006); Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, 
in: Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 531f.). 
621 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 532).
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rounds in Germany in 2000 and 2001 have been heavily influenced by the national 
“Bündnis  für  Arbeit”622 that  definitely  did not  meet  the standards  laid  down by the 
guidelines623. Another problem lies on the national level: it is doubtful whether trade 
unions actually have the power to reach agreements in national negotiations conforming 
to the guidelines. In addition, employers clearly prefer a decentralisation of collective 
bargaining to company level and are therefore unwilling to participate in coordination 
efforts.  National  bargaining  systems  are  also  still  very  diverse  and  coordinated 
bargaining policy basically demands national negotiations on the national or regional 
level – something that is rather uncommon in the UK, and also the German DGB has no 
bargaining power624.   
Additionally, coordinated wage bargaining is a rather defensive concept. While it might 
succeed in taking wages out of competition, it  does not challenge the status quo of 
distribution  –  neither  between  capital  and  labour,  nor  between  different  groups  of 
workers625. It is held elsewhere in this chapter that unions need to develop a vision to 
attract new members. It is debatable if a strategy that basically perpetuated the status 
quo qualifies as “vision” and helps with attracting workers. 
  
622 Alliance for Jobs
623 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.25; eiro online, The Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining, 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/print/1999/07/study/tn9907201s.html, last accessed April 12th, 
2006.
624 Thorsten Schulten, Foundations and Perspectives of Trade Union Wage Policy in Europe, WSI-
Discussionspaper No 129, August 2004, p. 16f; Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European 
Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. 
(p. 523). 
625 Thorsten Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining – An Overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI Discussion Paper 
No. 101, Düsseldorf 2002, p.23.
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On a more basic level, finding a standard all participants can adhere to has proved to be 
difficult. When the EMF adopted its guideline about working time, there was a “heated 
debate” on the question whether the aim should be expressed in hours per week or per 
year, with some unions even arguing for a daily figure. When the decision for a yearly 
figure was taken, the next problem was where to set the standard. Taking the lowest 
standard present between the member states would have meant giving up on the idea of 
advancing  social  standards  while  taking  the  highest  standard  would  have  been  not 
feasible in a number of countries. The result was a figure “somewhere in the middle”626. 
Of  course,  outcomes  like  this,  while  preventing  social  dumping,  do  little  to  better 
conditions in the more advanced member states.
Connected to this is the fact that it seems that national issues, problems and preferences 
remain the most important determinants in bargaining strategies, so that it appears as if 
the initiatives will merely succeed in making national actors aware of an international 
context of bargaining627.
Trade union practices are rather diverse within Europe in regard to matters such as 
timing of wage bargaining and the way unions engage in national policy discussions. 
Furthermore, not only do practices differ, the systems themselves are rather diverse, too. 
For example,  sector level  bargaining is  prevalent  in Germany, while  company level 
bargaining  is  standard  in  the  UK.  Such  differences  might  make  coordination  more 
complex.
Legal  environments  are  also  fairly  varied  in  Europe.  Different  member  states  have 
different  (or  no)  regulations  regarding  minimum  wages,  unemployment  benefits, 
employment protection and taxation. All those will need to be taken into account when 
626 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 530).
627 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 533).
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coordinating wages policies and all those will make coordination, or even just agreeing 
on a combined program, more difficult628.
Finally, the weakness of the European organisations of employers and unions, already 
addressed  within  the  discussion  of  the  Social  Dialogue,  poses  another  problem for 
coordinated  bargaining,  making  it  more  difficult  for  them  to  develop  meaningful 
coordination strategies, or, if successful in that, to impose them on the national affiliates 
– although weakness (and unwillingness) on employers’ side is not that important for 
unions since one advantage of coordinated bargaining is that it can be done unilateral629.
Even though full-blown wage coordination might not have developed yet, unions have 
taken steps toward it. However, the process is much splintered: “hardly evident in some 
sectors, emergent in others and approaching a practical reality in a few”630, leading to 
“multi-speed Europeanization”631. For example, unions may discuss their strategies with 
one another, and sometimes stipulate criteria they are going to follow in negotiations. 
All this is, however, purely voluntary. Also, the ETUC is proposing guidelines for wage 
bargaining, for example holding that “the rise in wages should equal the rate of inflation 
628 Alain Borghijs, Sjef Ederveen, Ruud de Mooij, European Wage Coordination: Nightmare or Dream 
to come true?, European Network of Economy Policy Research Institutes, Working Paper No. 
20/May 2003, p. 23f; Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak 
Link?, in: Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 531).
It has also been shown that coordination might be detrimental for unions in less competitive 
countries in cases where labour market conditions are fairly different between the countries 
involved. (Borghijs, Ederveen and de Mooij, cit. opp., p. 24).
629 Keith Sisson, Paul Marginson, Co-Ordinated Bargaining: A Process for our times?, in: British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vo. 40, No. 2, p. 197ff. (p. 212).
630 Paul Marginson, Industrial Relations at European Sector Level: The Weak Link?, in: Economic and 
Industrial Democracy, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 511ff. (p. 532).
631 Keith Sisson, Paul Marginson, Co-Ordinated Bargaining: A Process for our times?, in: British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vo. 40, No. 2, p. 197ff. (p. 213).
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plus  the  gains  in  productivity,  possibly  corrected  for  developments  in  other 
determinants”632.
Conclusion 
The situation for trade unions on the European level looks rather bleak. Neither the 
ETUC nor the social dialogue has yet managed to emerge as a powerful representative 
of labour. While there are movements towards trade union policies on a European level, 
these are developing at different speeds and intensities633. However, as has been shown 
above, the potential to gain greater influence is there. It seems important that the ETUC 
gets into closer contact with its constituents. A re-valuation of the Social Dialogue also 
seems promising. 
For  individual  unions,  coordinated wage bargaining and individual  transnational co-
operations seem like a good way to deal with Europe. While there are serious obstacles 
to  mount  before a  meaningful  coordinated wage policy will  emerge,  the concept  is 
promising. Not only will coordinated bargaining help fight social dumping, it might also 
lead to a greater coordination of unions and therefore to a true European agenda of these 
still most important actors in industrial relations.
Unions  could  try  and  make more  use  of  the  structures  provided  by  the  EWCs for 
632 Alain Borghijs, Sjef Ederveen, Ruud de Mooij, European Wage Coordination: Nightmare or Dream 
to come true?, European Network of Economy Policy Research Institutes, Working Paper No. 
20/May 2003, p. 25.
633 eiro online, The Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining, 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/print/1999/07/study/tn9907201s.html, last accessed April 12th, 
2006
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information exchange634. while it i in particular depends on reliable information635, but, 
while many EWCs are explicitly prevented from dealing with issues like wages and 
conditions, studies also suggested that employees use the EWCs rather to enhance the 
position  of  their  company  in  the  internal  competition  within  MNCs636 –  a  form of 
Betriebsegoismus that can also be observed in the case of works councils in Germany 
(see Chapter IV). Integrating EWCs in a strategy of international coordination could 
counteract this tendency. Furthermore, unions should try to develop some meaningful 
ways  of  securing  compliance  with  agreed  guidelines  in  order  to  make  coordinated 
bargaining more effective.
Part III – Problems on a global Scale 
While “Globalisation” by now may appear like a catchword to either mourn or rectify 
all that happens in national economy, it indeed is a major source of concern for unions. 
More and more companies decide to relocate part  of their  enterprises abroad where 
labour  is  cheap637.  National  unions  therefore  are  confronted  with  extra-national 
634 Different reasons have been brought forth for the failure of unions to make use of the international 
structures provided by the EWCs: for once, cultural, language and organisational barriers probably 
play a role; however, more important might be the identity of EWCs in a competing system. As 
company-based institutions their emphasis is on “short-term local activities”; leading to rivalry 
rather than solidarity.
(Bob Hancke, European Works Councils and the Industrial Restructuring in the European Motor 
Industry, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 35ff. (p. 38f.).)
635 Keith Sisson, Paul Marginson, Co-Ordinated Bargaining: A Process for our times?, in: British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vo. 40, No. 2, p. 197ff. (p. 204).
636 eiro online, The Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining, 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/print/1999/07/study/tn9907201s.html, last accessed April 12th, 
2006; Keith Sisson, Paul Marginson, Co-Ordinated Bargaining: A Process for our Times?, in: 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vo. 40, No. 2, p. 197ff. (p. 211).
637 It has been suggested from various sides that labour costs actually only play a limited role when it 
comes to the decision of where to set up a production site. Labour cost is the more comprehensive 
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competition of “low-cost” employees they are helpless to fight with national measures. 
Furthermore,  unions'  or  works  councils'  influence  diminishes  when major  decisions 
affecting  their  members/constituents  are  made  in  headquarters  in  a  distant  country 
where there is no way of having an impact.
However, growing internationalisation also makes companies more vulnerable and this 
could be a chance for unions. For example, multinational companies rely on their supply 
chains  of  regional  production.  This  renders  them more  susceptible  to  interruptions, 
opening up opportunities for industrial action: “If labour were to disrupt operations at a 
single plant, the entire supply chain would be affected, assuming that production could 
term than wage cost, including the costs of accidents, costs of hiring replacement workers and so on. 
Employers in countries that have no legislation requiring the employer to compensate workers for 
accidents are facing therefore cheaper labour costs, even though wages might be higher. 
(John Hendy, International Trade and International Trade Union Rights, in: Aileen McColgan (Ed.), 
The Future of Labour Law, London 1996, p. 85ff. (p. 95).)
The United National Conference on Trade and Development, for example, stated in its Investment 
report for 1994 that 
“despite a few notable cases, transnational corporations do not often close down, on account of low 
labour cost considerations alone, production facilities in one country to re-establish them in another 
country … Broader and more important macroeconomic and cyclical factors, technological change 
and labour market inflexibilities are the principal influences on the growth and distribution of 
employment.”
(UNCTAD World Investment Report for 1994, as cited by Patrick Macklem, Labour Law beyond 
Borders, in: Journal of International Economic Law 2002, Vol. 5, p. 605ff.
Research has also indicated that low labour costs are balanced by low productivity, so that over-all 
production costs in western and developing countries are fairly similar; consequently, “enterprises 
are not likely to relocate to another state with lower nominal labour costs if there costs simply 
reflect lower productivity of workers in that state”. Productivity in facts benefits from the 
observance of core labour standards, another incentive for countries to adhere to the standards set by 
the ILO.
(Bob Hepple, as cited by Patrick Macklem, Labour Law beyond Borders, in: Journal of International 
Economic Law 2002, Vol. 5, p. 605ff.; Patrick Macklem, Labour Law beyond Borders, in: Journal 
of International Economic Law 2002, Vol. 5, p. 605ff. )
For western trade unions this might serve as an argument against relocations, which do take place, 
even if labour costs play only a limited role. 
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not be switched from the affected plant to another”638.
It therefore seems inescapable that unions (or labour more generally) get organised on 
an international scale. Different attempts have already been made and I will deal in 
more detail with two of them below.
International Labour Organisation - ILO639
The  ILO  was  founded  in  1919  to  “promote  social  justice  and  thus  contribute  to 
638 Jeremy Waddington, Situating Labour within the Globalization Debate, in: Jeremy Waddington 
(Ed.), Globalization and Patterns of Labour Resistance, London 1999, p. 1ff. (p. 11).
639 Already early in the industrial revolution reformers trying to better the situation of workers realised 
the need to establish minimum standards of work that would be applicable worldwide, since 
otherwise countries who did adopt such legislation would endure a competitive disadvantage; 
furthermore, merely national legislation could also lead to increased unemployment since consumers 
would prefer cheaper foreign goods over more expensive national ones. Over the following decades 
the idea of an international regulation of labour issues never quite died down and was proposed by 
several governments – for it had been realised that intergovernmental action was necessary to 
achieve any results.
The International Association for Labour Legislation was set up in Paris in 1900 and succeeded in 
adopting Conventions that rendered night work of women and the use of white phosphorus in 
match-fabrication illegal in 1906. Even though the association suffered a quick defeat at the hands 
of World War I, it provided valuable experiences for the setting up of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) in 1919.
Another important influence was the International Workers’ Movement. As will be detailed below, 
the International Federation of Trade Unions was set up in 1898. During war time, several 
international meetings of trade unions took place. Additionally, in many warring nations 
relationships between employers, workers and government had changed: wartime economy had 
made it necessary for governments to consult with employers’ and workers’ organisations, thus 
bringing those organisations into closer cooperation with government. As a result governments not 
only became more aware of the views of employers and workers, they also tended to view them 
more benevolently; leading to a greater understanding for the need to an international regulation of 
labour issues.
(Antony Alcock, History of the International Labour Organisation, London 1971, p. 5; G. A. 
Johnston, The International Labour Organisation – Its Work for Social and Economic Progress, 
London 1970, p. 5ff).
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universal and lasting peace”640. An outflow of the peace Conference at the end of the 
First World War, its constitution and labour principles are embodied in the treaty of 
Versailles641.  Set up under the League of Nations (subsequently surviving it to become 
part of the UNO), it features a tripartite structure by encompassing labour and employer 
organisations as well as government representatives. Its duties and responsibilities are 
“to establish international  labour  standards in the form of  Conventions,  to  persuade 
states  to  join  these  Conventions,  and  to  resolve  disputes  concerning  their 
implementation”642.  Today  almost  all  states  are  members  and  the  ILO  is  mostly 
concerned with assuring human rights  in  the employment  relationship,  trying to  set 
international  applicable  standards  by  decreeing  recommendations,  resolutions  and 
conventions.  While  members  are  expected  to  adhere  to  the  standards  set  out  in 
recommendations and resolutions under domestic and international law, those are not 
binding. However, they do provide a basic set of labour standards. Conventions, on the 
other hand, are binding at international law for all those states that have ratified them; 
their domestic effect depends on the national law of the state in question643. 
While the Conventions 
“include powerful statements concerning rights  to  freedom of assembly,  to join 
unions, and engage in collective bargaining, as well as setting standards dealing 
with important issues such as child and forced labour and the prohibition of sex 
640 International Labour Organisation, Übereinkommen und Empfehlungen 1919 – 1991, Band II (1967 
– 1991), angenommen von der International Arbeitskonferenz, 51. bis 78. Tagung, Genf 1991.
641 G. A. Johnston, The International Labour Organisation – Its Work for Social and Economic 
Progress, London 1970, p. 13.
642 Christopher McCrudden, A Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights, in: Journal of International 
Economic Law 2000, p. 43ff.
643 Patrick Macklem, Labour Law beyond Borders, in: Journal of International Economic Law 2002, 
Vol. 5, p. 605ff. 
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discrimination” 644; 
the  ILO  lacks  effective  means  to  enforce  these  standards645,  even  though  several 
mechanism are  available  to  ensure  that  countries  comply  with them. It  maintains  a 
monitoring procedure; however, this seems not to be interested in the reasons states may 
have for non-compliance nor does it take into account the different stages of economic 
development. This state-focused system of monitoring is also ill-equipped to deal with 
transnational companies. Therefore, it has been held that the ILO “relies, largely, on 
moral suasion and diplomatic pressure”. However, its very success in setting labour 
standards  may  –  ironically  –  at  least  be  partly  attributable  to  its  lack  of  coercive 
authority646.
Another point  of  criticism is  the composition of  the ILO. It  has been held that  the 
(labour)  interests  represented  are  too  narrow,  leaving  out  those  most  needy  of 
representation and most likely to suffer from the effect of globalisation: the poor,  those 
not organised, belonging to a minority group or being female647.
In 1998, the ILO adopted a Declaration on core labour rights,  addressing child and 
forced  labour,  freedom  of  association,  collective  bargaining  and  freedom  from 
644 James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: Transnational Labour Solidarity and the Obstacles 
of Domestic Law, in: Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl, Karl Klare (Eds.), Labour Law in 
an Era of Globalization, Oxford 2002, p. 379ff. (p. 381).
645 James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: Transnational Labour Solidarity and the Obstacles 
of Domestic Law, in: Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl, Karl Klare (Eds.), Labour Law in 
an Era of Globalization, Oxford 2002, p. 379ff. (p. 381).
646 Christopher McCrudden, A Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights, in: Journal of International 
Economic Law 2000, p. 43ff.; Patrick Macklem, Labour Law Beyond Borders, in: Journal of 
International Economic Law 2002, Vol. 5, p. 605ff.
647 Christopher McCrudden, A Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights, in: Journal of International 
Economic Law 2000, p. 43ff.; Patrick Macklem, Labour Law Beyond Borders, in: Journal of 
International Economic Law 2002, Vol. 5, p. 605ff.
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discrimination, but neither minimum age nor maximum hours648.  This declaration puts 
an  international  obligation  on  all  member  states  to  respect  the  rights  contained; 
furthermore, membership itself is grounded on an obligation to secure core labour rights 
(most of present day states are members). The Declaration might therefore be compared 
to customary international law649.  While these rights are of great importance to better 
the  situation  of  workers  in  developing  countries,  they  provide  a  form  of  “lowest 
common  dominator”650 and  thus  do  little  in  addressing  the  problems  arising  from 
globalisation for workers in western states. Still, this declaration – if adhered to – will 
put an end to the worst outgrowths of exploitation of labour in developing countries. 
Western trade unions could lobby for an ILO Convention that would address the right of 
workers  to  a  “living  wage”  –  this  would  not  only  benefit  workers  exploited  in 
developing  countries  but  also  those  in  the  west  competing  against  cheap  labour. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that even a “living wage” in a developing country 
would be far below western standards; so an incentive for employers to relocate might 
remain. In fact, it might even be considered unfair to rob those countries of one of the 
few attractions they can offer to foreign investors (and thus robbing their inhabitants of 
employment opportunities by imposing a living wage to western standards).
648 Christopher McCrudden, A Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights, in: Journal of International 
Economic Law 2000, p. 43ff.; Patrick Macklem, Labour Law Beyond Borders, in: Journal of 
International Economic Law 2002, Vol. 5, p. 605ff.
However, even the determination of a minimum wage would not necessarily protect western 
employees from outsourcing, since such a wage would still be markedly lower than western or 
European standards.
649 Patrick Macklem, Labour Law Beyond Borders, in: Journal of International Economic Law 2002,
Vol. 5, p. 605ff. 
650 Patrick Macklem, Labour Law beyond Borders, in: Journal of International Economic Law 2002, 
Vol. 5, p. 605ff.
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Another option for trade unions might be to lobby companies for corporate codes of 
conduct, but those are not only entirely voluntary but also generally of a lower standard 
than, for instance, those laid down in the core Conventions of the ILO and basically 
none lays down the obligation to pay a “living wage”651.
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
Since employers are increasingly acting on an international scale, it seems paramount 
that unions do so as well in order to exert influence on that level and deter employers 
from playing workers of different countries off against each other652. 
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was founded in 1949653 
651 Patrick Macklem, Labour Law Beyond Borders, in: Journal of International Economic Law 2002, 
Vol. 5, p. 605ff.
652 It has been argued that employers in multinational companies successfully managed to play workers 
in different parts of the world off against each other, thereby preventing the development of 
international solidarity. This is consistent with the observation that workers in developing countries, 
working for poverty wages, are perceived more as a threat than an object of solidarity in the west. 
However once channelled in a different direction, this fear might be brought to good use: the actions 
in the EU to ‘social dumping’ are nothing more than the fear to lose jobs to areas with cheap labour.
(Harvie Ramsay, In Search of International Union Theory, in: Jeremy Waddington (Ed.), 
Globalization and Patterns of Labour Resistance, London 1999, p. 192ff. (p. 199, 202).).
653 A harbinger of today’s organisation can be found in the International Working Men’s Association, 
London 1864, the first international federation of workers: “this Association held it first meeting at 
Geneva in 1866, and adopted a number of resolutions significant for the early formulation of 
principles which were subsequently incorporated in international conventions.”
In 1898 the International Federation of Trade Unions was founded – “a loose federal organisation to 
which the central trade union organisations of a number of important industrial countries were 
affiliated. With headquarters in Berlin, it held congresses in various European cities, at which 
resolutions were adopted relating to concrete aspects of the improvement of conditions of labour in 
the international bearings” 
(G. A. Johnston, The International Labour Organisation – Its Work for Social and Economic 
Progress, London 1970, p. 10).
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and currently has 236 member organisations (it organises national trade union centres 
rather than individual unions) in 154 countries. It thus organises 155 million workers654.
International Transport Workers’ Federation
Allied to the ICFTU is the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), founded 
1869  in  London.  European  seafarers'  and  dockers'  unions  found  that  they  had  to 
organise internationally to deal with strike breakers. Today, the ITF “organises workers 
in  ships,  ports,  railways,  road  freight  and  passenger  transport,  inland  waterways, 
fisheries, tourism and civil aviation” and “represents transport workers at world level 
and promotes their interests through global campaigning and solidarity”655. 
The  ITF  carries  out  different  campaigns,  of  which  the  struggle  against  “Flags  of 
Convenience” (FOC) is not only the most prominent but also of the most interest in 
regard to unions' choices of action with respect to globalisation. The campaign aims at 
trying to hinder ship owners to run their vessels under flags of countries that offer only 
a  minimum of  regulations  and thus  no  or  hardly  any protection  of  workers'  rights, 
enabling owners to pay very low wages656. The ITF has taken on the task of organising 
and negotiation on  behalf  of  crew members  beyond national  borders,  thus  virtually 
654 ICFTU: What it is, what it does... 
http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?DocType=Overview&Index=990916422&Language=EN
, last accessed March 29th, 2006.
655 ITF Information Sheet, http://www.itfglobal.org/about-us/whatis.cfm, last accessed March 23rd, 
2006.
656 ITF, Flags of Convenience Campaign, http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm, last 
accessed March 23rd, 2006; ITF; What are Flags of Convenience, http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-
convenience/sub-page.cfm, last accessed March 24th, 2006.
The situation of these ships, however, might be different from that of land-bound companies, since 
they have no ‘real nationality’ and therefore cannot be reached by national unions. For a ship apply 
the laws of the country of registration and since crews are often of a different nationality, their 
national governments or unions cannot help. Consequently most sailors on such ships are not trade 
union members, neither in their home country nor in the ship's country of register.
(ITF, cit. opp.).
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acting as a national union657.
The FOC-campaign consists of a political and an industrial arm. While the political part 
has as its aim to “establish by international governmental agreement  a genuine link 
between the flag a ship flies and the nationality or residence of its owners, managers and 
seafarers”, the industrial part is concerned with the rights of seafarers working under 
flags of convenience658.
Since the ITF organises also dockers' unions it has been possible to enhance pressure on 
ship owners by organising industrial action in ports, this has been and still is vital for 
the success of the campaign659.
Despite  the  availability  of  cheap  labour  in  abundance,  the  ITF  has  been  relatively 
successful in obtaining better living and working conditions for seafarers. About 25% of 
all  FOC  ships  employing  about  90,000  seafarers  are  currently  covered  by  ITF 
agreements, thus offering minimum standards to sailors. Those vessels are issued an 
ITF Blue Certificate660.
Even though it did not succeed in abolishing FOCs, the campaign still serves to show 
that international solidarity between trade unions may work: according to the ITF, “the 
industrial campaign has succeeded in enforcing decent minimum wages and conditions 
657 ITF, Flags of Convenience Campaign, http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm, last 
accessed March 23rd, 2006; ITF, What do FOCs mean to Seafarers?, http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-
convenience/flags-convenien-184.cfm, last accessed March 24th, 206.
658 ITF, Flags of Convenience Campaign, http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm, last 
accessed March 23rd, 2006.
659 ITF, Flags of Convenience Campaign, http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm, last 
accessed March 23rd, 2006.
660 ITF, Flags of Convenience Campaign, http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm, last 
accessed March 23rd, 2006, Global Policy Forum, A Brief Guide to Flags of Convenience, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/flags/guide.htm, last accessed March 29th, 2006.
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on board nearly 5,000 FOC ships”661. It may serve as an example that it is possible to 
put  pressure  on  employers  who  outsource  and  force  them to  offer  decent  working 
conditions662. 
International Metalworkers’ Federation
Another interesting way to deal with globalisation has been taken by, among others, the 
International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF), organising more than 25 million blue- 
and white-collar workers in more than 200 unions in 100 countries in traditional steel 
and  metal  occupations,  electrical  jobs  and  electronics663.  The  IMF  is  concluding 
International Framework Agreements (IFA), that is, agreements negotiated on a global 
level between a transnational company and represented trade unions. Since the aim of 
an IFA is to ensure fundamental rights of workers in all of the company's branches, they 
are implemented locally under the involvement of local unions. Such an agreement will 
be geared to the standards set by the ILO, but normaly also seeks to include a right to 
decent pay and working conditions. The “model international framework agreement” of 
the IMF thus  not  only contains  a  reference to  the  ILO standards  by  obligating  the 
employer  to  guarantee  freedom  of  association  and  respect  the  right  to  collective 
bargaining, but also requires him to pay “decent wages” that at least “meet basic needs 
of  workers  and  their  families  and  [...]  provide  some  discretionary  income”. 
Furthermore, he is required to assure that working hours are not excessive and working 
661 ITF, Flags of Convenience Campaign, http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm, last 
accessed March 23rd, 2006.
662 Of course – the minimum standards achieved by the ITF will probably be far below European 
standards.
663 IMF, About the IMF, http://www.imfmetal.org/main/index.cfm?n=11&l=2 and 
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/index.cfm?id=55&ol=2&l=2&c=2530, both last accessed March 
30th, 2006.
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conditions are decent664. It not only puts obligations on the employer directly, but also 
requires him to ensure that his contractors and sub-contractors, principal suppliers and 
licensees  observe  the  provisions  of  the  agreement665.  Agreements  modelled  on  this 
framework  agreement  have  been  signed with  Volkswagen,  BMW, DaimlerChrysler, 
Renault, Indesit, Bosch and a number of other companies666.
The IMF holds that they are mutually beneficial – by concluding IFAs transnationals 
can secure good industrial relations and a positive public image667.
However, it is doubtful whether the prospect of “good industrial relations” is worth as 
much to transnational companies as the possibility to produce as cheap as possible. 
Especially  in  developing  countries,  employers  will  have  no  trouble  in  finding 
replacements for workers who are taking industrial action. A positive public image is 
mainly important in areas that  are sensitive to consumer choice,  notably textiles.  In 
many other areas, including metalworking, seafaring and electronics, the public is much 
less well informed and, because those goods are higher priced to begin with, seems less 
to care about the circumstances under which they are produced668.
That said, IFAs are definitely a step in the right direction and those criticisms are rather 
applicable to the chances of getting a transnational to actually sign and obey by such an 
agreement than to the idea itself.
664 IMF; The Power of Framework Agreements, http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/ENG2.pdf, last 
accessed March 30th, 2006; IMF Model International Framework Agreement, Provisions.
665 IMF Model International Framework Agreement, Preamble Sec. 4.
666 IMF Publications, http://www.imfmetal.org/main/index.cfm?n=396&l=2, last accessed March 30th 
2006.
667 IMF; The Power of Framework Agreements, http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/ENG2.pdf, p. 4, 
last accessed March 30th, 2006.
668 James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: Transnational Labour Solidarity and the Obstacles 
of Domestic Law, in: Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl, Karl Klare (Eds.), Labour Law in 
an Era of Globalization, Oxford 2002, p. 379ff. (p. 382ff., 384). 
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International solidarity thus seems to be feasible and capable of bringing results, but it 
has to be kept in mind that even with IFAs wages in developing countries will still be 
far lower than those in the European Community, presenting an incentive to employers 
to relocate. While agreements like IFAs are important to secure decent conditions for 
workers in “cheap-labour” countries, they are probably less useful in protecting western 
workers  from  the  negative  effects  of  globalisation;  that  is  mostly  relocation  of 
enterprises669.
In  addition,  international organisation of  labour has to deal  with a  number of other 
obstacles,  notably  those  put  up  by  domestic  law670.  National  law  might  prohibit 
solidarity or sympathy strikes and since it is often necessary for international campaigns 
to be successful to conduct industrial action also in areas not directly affected by the 
dispute,  campaigns  can  be  severely  weakened  by  such  laws671.  Lord  Wedderburn 
669 However, it has been argued above that wages are only a small factor in the decision to relocate, 
more important are the overall labour costs. Agreement that therefore try to secure decent conditions 
and fair treatment of workers in cases of dismissal, accidents and so on might therefore very well be 
able to help in getting employers think twice about relocating. 
670 Other obstacles may lay in differences in language, culture and history.
James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: Transnational Labour Solidarity and the Obstacles 
of Domestic Law, in: Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl, Karl Klare (Eds.), Labour Law in 
an Era of Globalization, Oxford 2002, p. 379ff (p. 399).
671 James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: Transnational Labour Solidarity and the Obstacles 
of Domestic Law, in: Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl, Karl Klare (Eds.), Labour Law in 
an Era of Globalization, Oxford 2002, p. 379ff. (p. 382ff., 384). 
Atleson also provides an example for international action: When Liverpool dockers had been locked 
out, the dispute eventually reached international stage with the ITF launching a week of actions to 
which a great number of unions around the world signed on. Workers in the United States stayed off 
for a shift, many dockers worldwide refused to unload ships originating in Liverpool. There were 
direct and symbolic actions in more than 100 harbours; some ports in the US being entirely closed 
for up to 24 hours. The Liverpool dockers thus showed the vulnerability of international companies 
relying on this system of transportation and therefore the power transportation workers can exert in 
a globalised world.
Another example if the fate of the Neptune Jade: loaded in England during an industrial dispute, 
workers in ports in the United States, Canada and Japan refused to unload the ship, which sailed on 
to Taiwan where it was finally unloaded.
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characterised  the  effects  of  these  legislative  obstacles  to  international  action  as  “to 
fragment and inhibit trade union action while the power of internationalized capital is 
constitutionally guaranteed the maximum flexibility”672.
Another problem might be the fact that sometimes even unions themselves might be 
adverse  to  international  co-operation  in  an  attempt  to  secure  advantages  for  their 
national  constituency in  the  international  competition for  production facilities.  They 
might thus perceive workers in other countries as competitors rather than as potentially 
allies or at least as someone in the same situation673. This might especially be true of 
unions in developing countries whose main incentives to foreign investors are cheap 
labour and lax labour laws. 
(Atleson, cit. opp. p. 382f.)
Under British law, industrial disputes are confined to “disputes between workers and their own 
employer and at their own place of work”. In Germany, strikes are only admissible when conducted 
with the aim to conclude a collective agreement, solidarity or sympathy strikes therefore are not 
allowed.
(Atleson, cit. opp., p. 384f, 396).
672 James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: Transnational Labour Solidarity and the Obstacles 
of Domestic Law, in: Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl, Karl Klare (Eds.), Labour Law in 
an Era of Globalization, Oxford 2002, p. 379ff. (p. 395).
673 James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: Transnational Labour Solidarity and the Obstacles 
of Domestic Law, in: Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl, Karl Klare (Eds.), Labour Law in 
an Era of Globalization, Oxford 2002, p. 379ff. (p. 399).
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Chapter V - Conclusion
The conclusion will first provide an assessment of the differences between the German 
and the British system of industrial relations that have been detailed in Chapter. It will 
be tried to determine which system is of more benefit to the individual worker and 
which is better equipped to deal with the problems presented in the previous chapter. 
Finally, some suggestions as to possible future courses of action for unions will be 
made.
Assessment of differences
Both systems try to achieve participation and improvement of working conditions by 
different  means and the following section will  try  to  highlight  the  benefits  of  each 
system on the background of which is better able to reach these aims. At the same time, 
the systems will be analysed as to which might be better equipped to deal with the 
problems  presented  in  Chapter  X.  ‘Improved  working  conditions’  will  mainly  be 
understood as better pay and more job security.
Strike Activity
A high level of strike activity might be adverse for the economy and thus, eventually, 
adverse for the worker. However, taking the firm’s interest into account could turn out 
to  be  a  mixed  blessing  for  unions:  employers  might  use  profits  to  invest  in 
rationalisation measures.  Similarly,  with peaceful  industrial  relations  they may have 
time  and  opportunity  to  restructure  according  to  profitability  lines,  which  are  not 
necessarily  beneficial  for  employees.  Political  factors  have  to  be  taken  into 
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consideration, too. It's a question of how unions are perceived – as politically radical 
agents who are willing to fight for their goals (even outside the mere sphere of working 
conditions), or merely as service providers for their members. These perceptions might 
be important in recruiting more members or trying to exert political influence and it 
seems,  at  first  glance,  as  if  German unions  had  chosen  the  second path.  However, 
German unions have been and still are a voice in German politics speaking up on issues 
of social justice, even though they do not have a party affiliation like the TUC to the 
Labour Party.  British unions tried to achieve their goals with more militancy, but it 
should  be  remembered  that  this  militancy  helped  Thatcher  come  to  power  and  to 
eventually subdue the unions.
Less controversial industrial relations therefore might be of more benefit.
Union Structure
Multi-unionism  is  prevalent  in  the  UK,  while  German  unions  are  structured  along 
industry lines. 
Multi-unionism can be judged on three criteria: benefit  to members, advantages and 
disadvantages to the employer and impact on the general public674. 
674 A. I. R. Swabe, Patricia Rice, Multi-Unionism in the Fire Service, in: Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 56ff. (p. 62).
Competition for members might be carried out by offering lower subscription rates and more service 
than competitors. A slump in membership might be another reason for financial problems. Most 
mergers took place when pay and prices were rising rapidly and it seemed as if only unions with at 
least 200,000 members had enough funds to provide the services required. Mergers were also seen 
as a means of achieving a wider field available to recruit in for members, and also as a possibility to 
obtain new bargaining rights and enhancing bargaining power. 
(Robert Buchanan, Mergers in British Trade Unions 1949-79, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 
12, No. 3, p. 40ff. (p. 44ff.); John Black, Anne-Marie Greene, Peter Ackers, Size and Effectiveness: 
a Case Study of a Small Union, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 136ff. (p. 137).)
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Members might benefit from a large unions' ability to use funds more effectively and 
efficiently in terms of organisation and research; furthermore, time otherwise spend in 
competition with other unions is saved675. Competition for members may have negative 
effects on unions, who might decide to fight for members by offering lower rates than 
other unions, which might lead to financial troubles. Also, unions might pay too much 
attention to topics and services they think might attract members (and often do not, see 
Chapter  IV)  instead  of  focusing  on  the  core  areas  representation  and  collective 
bargaining676. Additionally, only a fraction of a large union's members will be on strike 
at any one time, thus those unions will have fewer problems in financing a dispute677. A 
larger union might also have more influence political or within the TUC or DGB678. 
On the other hand, also smaller, more specialised unions offer benefits: they might be 
better able to provide for special needs of a certain trade and to take the interest of their 
members  more  directly  into  account  than  a  larger  union  with  a  more  diverse 
composition of workers679. Negotiations in smaller bargaining units by smaller, more 
On a first glimpse, a larger union seems naturally to have more bargaining power. But this effect 
might be counteracted if a small, specialized union manages to organize almost all workers in their 
special field.
(see: John Black, Anne-Marie Greene, Peter Ackers, Size and Effectiveness: a Case Study of a 
Small Union, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 136ff. (p. 145).)
675 A. I. R. Swabe, Patricia Rice, Multi-Unionism in the Fire Service, in: Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 56ff. (p. 62).
It might be said that unions will eventually loose ground if they concentrate on inter-union rivalry 
rather than collective bargaining. However, there is machinery available in the TUC to deal with 
competition issues between different unions (Bridlington Rules). The DGB has similar provisions in 
its rules (see footnote 41).
676 Mike Rigby, Approaches to the Contemporary Role of Trade Unions, in: Mike Rigby, Roger Smith, 
Teresa Lawlor (Eds.), European Trade Unions – Change and Response, London 1999, p. 18ff. (p. 
20).
677 Robert Buchanan, Mergers in British Trade Unions 1949-79, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 
12, No. 3, p. 40ff. (p. 44ff.).
678 A. I. R. Swabe, Patricia Rice, Multi-Unionism in the Fire Service, in: Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 56ff. (p. 63).
679 David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-Unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
216
specialised unions might be more effective and thus favourable, especially when the 
overall workforce is fairly diverse680. Furthermore, smaller unions might be less prone to 
conflicts of interest between groups of members681. Closer contact between members 
and  between  members  and  leadership  could  facilitate  a  stronger  sense  of  union-
identity682 that might also provide for better representation; smaller unions might thus be 
favourable in a union-based representational system like the British683. 
Employers dealing with larger unions need to negotiate with fewer partners, making 
negotiations cheaper, easier and probably more effective.  Additionally, the enterprise is 
less likely to be used as a battlefield for inter-union rivalries and employers lose the 
chance  to  play  off  one  union  against  the  other.  Also,  management  might  prefer  to 
demonstrate  a tough approach on a small  union (thereby influencing the rest  of the 
workforce) rather than risking an industrial dispute with a large union organising nearly 
the  whole  workforce684.  On  the  other  hand,  multiple  unionism  is  likely  to  make 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vo. 24, No. 1, p. 3ff. (p. 4ff.).
680 David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.24, No. 1, p. 3ff (p. 9).
681 A. I. R. Swabe, Patricia Rice, Multi-Unionism in the Fire Service, in: Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 56ff. (p. 62).
Those conflicts could centre around competition for jobs between different occupational groups in 
one union, or role-conflicts between those with managerial authority and those subjected to it could 
ensue (Swabe and Rice, cit. opp, p. 62)
682 David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.24, No. 1, p. 3ff (p. 9).
683 A. I. R. Swabe, Patricia Rice, Multi-Unionism in the Fire Service, in: Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 56ff. (p. 65); John Black, Anne-Marie Greene, Peter Ackers, Size and 
Effectiveness: a Case Study of a Small Union, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 
136ff. (p. 141, 145).
684 David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.24, No. 1, p. 3ff (p. 9); A. I. R. Swabe, Patricia Rice, 
Multi-Unionism in the Fire Service, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 56ff. (p. 63); 
David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.24, No. 1, p. 3ff (p. 9).
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negotiations more time-consuming and costly, and “divide and rule” might not work as 
hoped when other unions take the first negotiated agreement as model for their own 
negotiations685.
Finally, the public at large is affected by the size of unions. Multi-unionism might be 
“contributing to demarcation disputes, restrictive practices, industrial action and thus 
consequent inefficiency and economic loss”686. 
While multi-unionism is likely to result in a higher strike-rate, the number of conflicts 
depends on the number of bargaining units rather than the number of unions. Strikes are 
most likely to occur in connection with collective bargaining and the more negotiations 
are  taking  place,  there  more  opportunity  there  is  for  disagreement687.  While  multi-
unionism is likely to increase the probability of multiple bargaining units, this is not 
685 David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-Unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vo. 24, No. 1, p. 3ff. (p. 9).
This effect, of course, might be used by management as well. Employers might prefer bargaining 
with a small and weak union first and use the outcome as model for negotiations with stronger 
unions.
686 A. I. R. Swabe, Patricia Rice, Multi-Unionism in the Fire Service, in: Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 56ff. (p. 63).
In fact, research has found that strikes are more common in multi-union companies that conduct 
multiple bargaining. There are more annual pay rounds thus there is a bigger risk of industrial 
action.
(David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.24, No. 1, p. 3ff. (p. 4, 7).) 
It was stated that “negotiations with the employer are likely to be more complicated if there are a 
large number of parties who must be compliant with the agreement ... multi-unionism increases the 
number of effective participants, which reduces the prospects of cooperation.”
David Blanchflower, John Cubbin, Strike Propensities at the British Workplace, in: Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics, Vo. 48. No. 1, p. 19ff. (p. 33).
687 David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-Unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1, p. 3ff. (p. 4ff.). The authors have shown that 
the likelihood for strikes rises with the presence of 4 or more bargaining units.
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inevitable;  in  the  same  way  as  single-unionism  might  involve  multiple  bargaining 
units688. But, while single table bargaining by multiple unions educes the likelihood of 
strikes in comparison to them bargaining separately689, the sheer number of negotiators 
and  the  possible  occurrence  of  “inter-group  sources  of  tension”  tend  to  make 
agreements harder to find even in a single bargaining unit690. 
It has been supposed above that low strike incidence is an advantage; therefore, multi-
unionism might  be  a  disadvantage.  The  assessment  regarding  pay  and  job  security 
depends  on  the  economic  situation.  Multi-unionism  might  lead  unions  to  exhaust 
themselves in competition with other unions; in that case they might be less able to 
engage in collective bargaining and negotiate favourable agreements. On the other hand, 
small unions might be better informed about the economic situation of the company and 
might therefore be able to bargain more effectively; however, a larger union will very 
likely have more bargaining power as it represents more workers.
With regard to workers’ participation, the size of unions is only of interest for the UK. 
As has been detailed above, small unions seem to be favourable, since they might be 
better able to concentrate on the enterprise in question. If they predominantly organise 
in one company, they might know more about the possibilities than unions organising a 
whole sector. Additionally, smaller unions are better able to keep in contact with their 
members and fewer members also mean that individuals are more likely to be heard.
688 David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-Unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vo. 24, No. 1, p. 3ff. (p. 4ff.).
689 David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-Unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vo. 24, No. 1, p. 3ff. (p. 8).
690 David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth, Peter Ingram, Multi-Unionism, Size of Bargaining Group and 
Strikes, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vo. 24, No. 1, p. 3ff. (p. 4); David Blanchflower, John 
Cubbin, Strike Propensities at the British Workplace, in: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 1, p. 19ff. (p. 26.
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On  the  other  hand,  sectoral  organisation  might  have  the  benefit  of  co-ordinating 
knowledge and information from different industries. In that way, the danger of inter-
enterprise competition might be lowered. The benefit of better contact to members is 
also annulled if smaller unions do not succeed in achieving recognition.
For union-members, the advantages and disadvantages of multi-unionism vs. industrial 
unionism seem to  balance  one  another,  while  industrial  unionism might  be  slightly 
favourable to the employer. That said, it seems that industrial unionism saves time and 
effort,  and  thus  might  foster  productivity  and  economical  performance;  therefore  it 
could be more beneficial for the employee in the long run. Some of the problems of 
large  unions,  e.g.  distance  to  members  or  not  being  able  to  cater  for  special 
circumstances, could be solved by different interest groups within unions691.
Under present circumstances, therefore, bigger unions with more bargaining power and 
a greater likelihood of recognition seem to be more favourable.
Level of Bargaining
Connected  to  the  structure  of  the  trade  union  movement  is  the  level  bargaining  is 
predominantly conducted at.  Smaller  unions with a  more local base tend to bargain 
locally, while industrial unions, organised nationally, tend to bargain at sectoral or even 
national level. Consequently, company bargaining is the most common form in Great 
Britain, while in Germany bargaining is conducted mostly at sectoral level.
691 John Black, Anne-Marie Greene, Peter Ackers, Size and Effectiveness: a Case Study of a Small 
Union, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 136ff. (p. 139).
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As with multi-unionism, there are advantages and disadvantages to sectoral bargaining. 
A disadvantages is that sectoral bargaining might lead to less wage flexibility. The same 
agreement  will  apply  to  all enterprises  in  the  sector,  regardless  of  size,  location, 
economic  performance  or  exposure  to  competition.  While  some  firms  might  find 
fulfilling the requirements hard, others will pay less than they would have to under a 
company  agreement.  However,  sectoral  bargaining  generally  takes  wider  economic 
concerns into regard692 and also a decentralised system does not automatically guarantee 
more individualistic settlements.  There is evidence from the UK that agreements by 
certain large firms may acquire “pilot-character”, encouraging comparative claims693.  
The importance of bringing bargaining close to the place where the actual agreement 
will be carried out may speak in favour of company bargaining. A local agreement will 
be  better  able  to  take  the  specific  situation  and  needs  of  the  respective  firm  into 
consideration than a national agreement694, it will typically also be more flexible and 
easier to adapt to current situations695.
On the other hand, less flexibility might also lead to predictability and stability due to 
standardised wage levels throughout an industry. Sectoral agreements serve as a form of 
692 Heinz Tüselmann, Arne Heise, The German Model of Industrial Relations at the Crossroads: Past, 
Present and Future, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 162ff. (p. 165).
693 Heinz Tüselmann, Arne Heise, The German Model of Industrial Relations at the Crossroads: Past, 
Present and Future, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 162ff. (p. 170).
694 Hugh Armstrong Clegg, The System of Industrial Relations in Britain, 3rd Edition, Oxford 1976, p. 
210f.
And, actually, trade unions in the UK often regarded national agreements as providing just-tolerable 
conditions for the weakest companies and spend much more energy to pursuing claims at company 
and workplace level, where far better terms could be achieved.
(Esmond Lindop, Workplace Bargaining – the End of an Era?, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 
10, No. 1, p. 12ff. (p. 16).)
695 William Brown, Keith Sisson, Industrial Relations in the Next Decade. Current Trends and Future 
Possibilities, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 9ff. (p. 18). 
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minimum floor of wages and conditions, providing some social guarantees throughout 
the industry, thus offering equality, even if only on central points. They therefore “avoid 
a dispersion of the results of any agreement that might be obtained, should negotiations 
take  place  at  a  lower  level”696.  In  times  of  high  coverage,  social  dumping  will  be 
prevented  and  wages  taken  out  of  competition,  forcing  employers  to  “orientate 
themselves towards non-price competitive markets and to adopt a strategy of upskilling 
to  sustain  high  and relatively even wage levels”697.  Sectoral  agreements  offer  some 
transparency of the different industrial branches or regional areas; their idea is to also 
protect individual employers from competition in terms of higher wages although in 
Germany this is constricted by the Günstigkeitsprinzip, which allows employers to offer 
more  favourable  conditions  than  laid  down in  the  agreement.  Additionally,  sectoral 
agreements might provide guidance for smaller firms when deciding to make changes in 
wages  or  working  conditions  and  might  offer  wage-stability:  Turner  observed  that 
“other  things  being  equal,  the  more  decentralised  the  bargaining  system,  the  faster 
wages are likely to move in whatever direction they are moving anyway”698. 
Another  advantage  associated  with  sectoral  bargaining  is  more  peaceful  industrial 
relations.  Collective  bargaining  contains  a  great  potential  for  conflict  and  less 
696 J.F.B. Goodman, T.G. Whittingham, Shop Stewards, London 1973, p. 158ff; Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development, Final Report, International Management Seminar 
Castelfusano, 21st - 24th September 1971, Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining, Paris 1972, p. 32.
Consequently it seems that in Germany, with predominantly national bargaining, living standards 
throughout the country (with the exception of eastern Germany, where agreements regularly provide 
for wages at only about 75% of the western standards) are comparable. The system of national 
bargaining might thus serve as a substitute for a minimum wage (there is no statutory minimum 
wage in Germany. Unions as well as employers used to be opposed to it, as it would interfere with 
free collective bargaining; however, very recently unions have started demanding the introduction of 
a minimum wage of 7,50€ per hour.
697 Heinz Tüselmann, Arne Heise, The German Model of Industrial Relations at the Crossroads: Past, 
Present and Future, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 162ff. (p. 166).
698 H. A. Turner, Collective Bargaining and the Eclipse of Incomes Policy: Retrospect, Prospect and 
Possibilities, in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 8, p. 197ff. (p. 206).
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bargaining  rounds  will  therefore  lead  to  less  strike  frequency  and  likeliness.  Since 
bargaining is carried out by professional representatives of unions and employers at a 
higher level, industrial relations at company level are more peaceful699. 
Again, an evaluation of the different systems depends on the economic situation. In 
prosperous  times  with  greater  bargaining  power  for  unions,  a  system  of  company 
bargaining might be of benefit. Unions then will be able to put pressure on companies 
and  reach  higher  settlements  than  they  would  be  to  on  sectoral  level,  where  also 
interests of firms not so well-off have to be taken into account. However, in times of 
full  employment  there  might  be  danger  that  companies  are  overtaxed  by  local 
demands700. In harder times with less bargaining power sectoral level bargaining might 
be of advantage. Unions might be weaker on company level, therefore less likely to (and 
less successful in) press(ing) demands. Additionally, sectoral bargaining takes regard of 
the  economic  situation  as  a  whole,  therefore  the  agreement  might  provide  better 
conditions than could have been achieved in struggling firms. 
Legal Enforceability of Agreements
699 Heinz Tüselmann, Arne Heise, The German Model of Industrial Relations at the Crossroads: Past, 
Present and Future, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 162ff. (p. 170f.).
700 It has been stated that the British form of collective bargaining “is distinctive in the extent to which 
it permits bargaining over conduct of work at the workplace. Analysts of very varied persuasions are 
agreed that this provided employees in Britain with an internationally unusual ability to resist 
management attempts to raise effort, change working practices, or reduce real wages. There is thus 
broad agreement that workers resistance provides a constraint on Britain's international 
competitiveness, although opinions would differ on how central this was to the country's underlying 
economic problems”.
(William Brown, Keith Sisson, Industrial Relations in the Next Decade. Current Trends and Future 
Possibilities, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 9ff. (p. 20).) 
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A strong argument in favour of legal enforceability is that a legally binding agreement 
will  provide  security  and stability  for  union members:  they  are  able  to  rely  on the 
provisions  and  to  enforce  them in  court.  Because  the  employer  is  generally  in  the 
stronger position economically, it is necessary to protect employees from his ability to 
impose terms and conditions of employment arbitrarily – hence the normative effect of 
the collective agreement and the (German) prohibition to agree on less favourable terms 
individually701. Protection against the possibility to decline or forfeit his rights is also 
necessary702,  since employees could be forced to do so otherwise. The price for this 
security  is  the  Friedenspflicht703:  as  long  as  the  collective  agreement  is  valid,  no 
industrial action is to be taken704, resulting in less flexibility than the British system. 
While new agreements might be concluded before the end of the validity705, unions have 
no Kampfmittel706 to press their demands.
701 Günter Schaub (Ed.), Arbeitsrechts-Handbuch – Systematische Darstellung und Nachschlagewerk 
für die Praxis, 11th Edition, München 2005, p. 1850, § 198, Rn. 5.
702 A Verzicht (waiver) is only possible if both partner to the agreement agree in a Vergleich 
(settlement); a Verwirkung (forfeiture) is not possible, § 4 IV TVG.
703 Peace obligation.
704 Manfred Löwisch, Arbeitsrecht, 7th Edition, Düsseldorf 2004, p. 92, Rn 307.
The collective agreement has the point to bindingly tie down minimum terms and conditions for a 
certain period of time. It would be contradictory if the Tarifvertragsparteien (concluding partners) 
would be allowed to question those terms and conditions single-handedly during the validity. 
(Löwisch, cit. opp.) German unions adhere to this principle and very rarely call industrial action 
during the Friedenspflicht, the most notable exceptions being the wildcat strikes in 1969, 1973 and 
2004.
However, the Friedenspflicht extends only to those issues covered by the agreement, so that it 
remains possible to resort to industrial action about other issues. An absolute Friedenspflicht that 
would prohibit any industrial action is not practiced in Germany. (Löwisch, cit. opp., Rn 308, 310)
705 Collective agreements are either valid for a certain period of time or might be terminated with notice 
if provided for in the agreement. However, even agreements that are valid for a certain time and thus 
cannot be terminated might be cancelled due to highly important reasons (§ 314 BGB), for example, 
if economic circumstances change and the carrying out would be unreasonable; but a offer to change 
the conditions has to be made before cancellation is possible. (BAG, 24. 1. 2001, 4 AZR 655/99, 
para 65ff; Löwisch, cit. opp. Rn. 253)
706 Kampfmittel are means of industrial action that a union can apply in order to press its demands.
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Again, an assessment of the benefits needs to take the economic situation into regard. 
While voluntarism has its advantages by giving an opportunity to gain better terms in 
favourable times, there is also the danger inherent that, in less favourable times, workers 
have to agree to conditions worse than provided for in the collective agreement. As 
Deakin and Wilkinson observed in connection with working time:
“In the UK, over 41% of male workers were employed on average for more than 46 
hours per week, compared to 23 for the EC as a whole. … this was part of the 
legacy of  laissez-faire, in particular the focus on industry-specific regulation and 
the absence of a general statutory floor to basic working conditions, … the model 
set in this way by collective bargaining was no effective constraint on working long 
hours. No upper limit on overtime was set… .”707
Voluntarism therefore seems only feasible with strong unions that will assure that the 
conditions  of  the  collective  agreement  are  observed  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  a 
unionisation rate of 29%708 is sufficient. Therefore, a legalistic system seems to be more 
beneficial in times when the employers’ side has more bargaining power; this applies to 
job security as well as pay. This is underlined by the observation that Health and Safety 
has long been subject to statutory legislation in Great Britain. If such important areas 
are subjected to statutory legislation one is left with the impression that voluntarism 
cannot be entirely trusted. 
707 Simon Deakin, Frank Wilkinson, The Evolution of Collective Laissez-Faire, in: Historical Studies 
in Industrial Relations, No 17, Spring 2004, p. 1ff. (p. 35f.).
708 Department of Trade and Industry, Trade Union Membership 2005, 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/emar/TUM2005.pdf, last accessed May 2nd, 2006, p. 3.
In 2004, the rate had been at 28.8 %, so that a slight improvement was to be observed (DTI, cit. opp. 
p. 3).
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Systems of Representation
It has been detailed that workplace representation in Great Britain is still predominantly 
undertaken via recognised unions, although in the last years steps towards a statutory, 
union-independent system have been taken due to EC-influences. In Germany, on the 
other  hand,  representation  is  done  by  works  councils,  operating  on  company  level 
independently from unions.
A steep decline in union-membership and a more adverse political climate for unions in 
the UK have led to a drop in recognition and therefore to a decline in numbers of those 
having access to workplace representation, while in Germany the (less dramatic) decline 
in unionisation has had hardly any effect on workplace representation. 
However, for an evaluation the whole system of industrial relations present in a country 
has to be taken into account. The German model is built upon the distinction between 
works council representation within the plant and union negotiations outside of it, with 
works councils being prohibited from taking industrial action. This leads, as has been 
repeatedly pointed out,  to more peaceful relations at  company level,  since the most 
controversial issues like pay and hours are exempted from company regulations709. In 
the UK these are regulated by unions on shop-floor level and the argument sometimes 
given  by  UK lawyers  that  only  union  representation  can  be  effective  because  only 
unions can guarantee independence from the employer710 has to be seen against  this 
background. 
First, also works councils are by law independent and their equipment with statutory 
rights may even enhance their independence. In fact, sec 5 of TURLA 1992 does not 
necessarily guarantee that a union cannot be influenced by the employer. 
709 Hein Tüselmann, Arne Heise, The German Moedl of Industrial Relations at the Crossroads: Past 
Present and Future, in: Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 162ff. (p. 165).
710 Paul Davies, Claire Kilpatrick, UK Worker Representation after Single Channel, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 121ff. (p. 128).
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Secondly, the different systems produce different needs. A union that bargains for pay 
and conditions at the workplace must, since those issues are highly controversial, have 
more  “industrial  muscle”  than  a  works  council  equipped  with  legal  rights  to 
participation  and  co-determination  in  certain  matters.  Legally  backed  rights  makes 
representation effective even without the possibility to resort to industrial action. For 
example,  works  councils  in  Germany  have  relatively  strong  participation  rights  in 
dismissals  whereas  hardly  any  union  in  the  UK is  still  in  a  position  to  wield  any 
influence in this matter711. However, a works council is limited to the rights given to it 
by law whereas a union is only limited by their industrial strength. Depending on the 
individual circumstances, a union might therefore be able to achieve more712.
However, the stronger legal rights of works councils allow for more peaceful relations, 
as  does  the  fact  that  the  most  controversial  issues  are  exempted  from  workplace 
regulation. Additionally, legal rights seem preferable in times when union presence and 
recognition is in decline. 
It is sometimes put forward that works councils are a danger to unions for encroaching 
into their sphere713. Again, this is not a problem in Germany since the spheres of unions 
and works  councils  are  separated.  Rather,  unions  did  manage to  exert  influence  on 
works councils by exploiting the rights given to them in the BetrVG and thus using the 
councils to strengthen their position (see Chapter II). In the UK the situation is different. 
The single channel is the traditional form of workplace representation and any attempts 
to introduce stationary representation independent from unions amounts to an attack on 
711 Richard Hyman, Is There a Case for Statutory Works Councils in Britain, in: Aileen McColgan 
(Ed.), The Future of Labour Law, London, New York 1996, p. 64ff. (p. 71f.)
712 A similar idea can be found in: Caroline Lloyd, What do Employee Councils do? The Impact of 
Non-Union Forms of Representation on Trade Union Organisation, in: Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 313ff. (p. 321).
713 See, for example, Paul Davies, Claire Kilpatrick, UK Worker Representation after Single Channel, 
in: Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 121ff. 
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the  established  system of  company  bargaining714.  Resistance  from unions  to  works 
councils is therefore understandable. However, there is a real chance for unions to exert 
influence on works councils and a works council constituted from or at least with help 
of union members is also imaginable715. Works councils might actually be used as a 
means to establish union presence in unorganised workplaces, since works councils (as 
they do in Germany) rely on union support716.  
The situation concerning union recognition in the UK is important, too.  With less and 
less recognition, no real prospect of improvement and therefore a growing number of 
workers without access to representation, statutory works councils might not only be a 
way to close the ‘representation gap’ but also a way to prevent representation structures 
that are in fact dominated by employers717. In any case, even strong advocates of union 
representation have to admit that representation by elected representatives is better than 
no representation at all718.
There are, however, advantages of union-based representation. First, the ratio of works 
councillors  to  worker  is  quite  high719,  which  may  lead  to  a  distance  between 
representatives and represented. If representation is done full-time, the effect of distance 
714 Paul Davies, Claire Kilpatrick, UK Worker Representation after Single Channel, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 121ff. (p. 132).
715 Paul Davies, Claire Kilpatrick, UK Worker Representation after Single Channel, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 121ff. (p. 145). 
716 Richard Hyman, Is There a Case for Statutory Works Councils in Britain, in: Aileen McColgan 
(Ed.), The Future of Labour Law, London, New York 1996, p. 64ff. (p. 79).
717 Richard Hyman, Is There a Case for Statutory Works Councils in Britain, in: Aileen McColgan 
(Ed.), The Future of Labour Law, London, New York 1996, p. 64ff. (p. 79, 81).
718 Paul Davies, Claire Kilpatrick, UK Worker Representation after Single Channel, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 121ff. (p. 133).
719 Depending on the size of the Betrieb, it can be as high as one councillor to about 250 employees 
(see for details § 9 BetrVG).
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to shop-floor problems might be boosted720.  Secondly, there is a danger that councils 
might  be  drawn  into  management  thinking,  due  to  the  cooperative  nature  of  the 
relationship721. Also, unions generally organise more than one plant and therefore have 
the opportunity to “generate comparative knowledge, accumulate skills and build up 
expertise”722. However, works councils are not strictly limited to their plant as well. In 
firms with more than one plant, for example, there is the possibility to elect a firm, or 
even a concern council. Representation will be limited to concern structures though, so 
that representation by unions with industry wide organisation might be of advantage.  
An assessment which representational system is of more benefit is rather difficult. Both 
have to be examined in the respective national context and can only work properly if 
embedded in it. While the British system relies on strong unions in the workplace, the 
German favours works councils with legally backed rights. Both have advantages and 
disadvantages  and  worked  well  under  more  favourable  conditions  in  the  1970s. 
However, due to declining recognition, an adverse political climate and the fact that EC 
legislation has introduced (and seems to favour) more statutory elements, the British 
system has got into trouble. A statutory system, backed and supported by unions outside 
of and within the workplace, thus seems to be more favourable. Council-like structures, 
equipped with strong legal rights, are a way to provide workers with a voice in everyday 
industrial  relations.  They  offer  representation  to  a  majority  of  employees  and  are 
independent  from trade union recognition,  therefore also providing representation in 
workplaces  with  strong  anti-union  employers.  In  present  circumstances,  British 
720 Thomas Klikauer, Trade Union Shopfloor Representation in Germany, in: Industrial Relations 
Journal, Vol. 35, No 1, p. 2ff. (p. 11).
721 Richard Hyman, Is There a Case for Statutory Works Councils in Britain, in: Aileen McColgan 
(Ed.), The Future of Labour Law, London, New York 1996, p. 64ff. (p. 79).
722 Paul Davies, Claire Kilpatrick, UK Worker Representation after Single Channel, in: Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 121ff. (p. 128).
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industrial relations would benefit from stronger legal representational rights. 
The Directive for Information and Consultation has been a chance to introduce such 
structures;  however,  as  has  been  detailed  above,  the  implementation  allows  for 
flexibility and give employers the chance to prevent effective representation. It would 
therefore be desirable to amend the ICE regulations to introduce works council like 
structures in the UK, thus creating a second channel of industrial relations. However, in 
order for works councils to function properly, bargaining would need to change as well. 
Company bargaining will get into competition with councils and employers might try to 
pit the two against each other. If a second channel was to be implemented in the UK, it 
is therefore advisable to either build it with a strong integration of unions or at least for 
unions to work closely together with the new statutory bodies. In fact, close cooperation 
with unions, in terms of education of councillors, organisatorial support and the like, is 
also needed in Germany in order for works councils to be able to work effectively. 
In summary, both systems have their pro and cons so that it is not possible to determine 
which system is the more beneficial. Widespread company bargaining might provide for 
higher  wages,  but  it  might  also  lead  to  calls  for  wage-restraints,  when  wages  are 
outstripping  productivity.  Multi-unionism  may  have  adverse  effects  in  terms  of 
efficiency but small, specialized unions might be better able to take care of a special 
sector  of  the  workforce.  Legally  binding  agreements  provide  security  and  are 
enforceable  in  courts,  however,  they  lack  flexibility.  Still,  in  times  of  high 
unemployment, legally binding agreements might be of advantage, since when the firm 
struggles the employer can only challenge them in extraordinary circumstances. It has to 
be  admitted,  however,  that  agreements  in  Germany  nowadays  often  provide  for 
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betriebliche Öffnungsklauseln723 that allow for companies to agree on less favourable 
terms locally.
Equipment to Solutions and suggested Courses of Action 
In  the  previous  chapter,  different  solutions  to  national,  international  and  global 
problems workers and unions face have been introduced. The aim of this research is to 
provide an assessment which of the two systems of industrial relations might be better 
adapted to present and future problems and might therefore give ideas for a  future trade 
union movement. Therefore, the following part will try to determine which, if any, of 
the two systems might be better suited to the problems and solutions detailed above.
On a national scale, it is necessary for both German and British unions to integrate new 
types of members due to falling rates of unionisation and a change in the workforce. 
This might be easier for Germany’s industrial unions. Organising manual as well as 
professional workers across a whole industry, they are used to deal with different needs 
and concerns of their members. The British system of multi-unionism with small and 
specialised unions might be ill adapted to these challenges. In fact, the UK experienced 
a trend towards larger and more general unions in recent years.
In order to overcome declining influence at the workplace, a “partnership approach” to 
industrial  relations  has  been  suggested.  This  is  a  far  step  from  traditional  British 
industrial relations, centred on conflict while Germany’s more peaceful system might 
have less difficulties in adopting it. There, works councils equipped with statutory rights 
do secure labour’s influence at the workplace in a more consensual way while union 
723 Literally ‘opening clauses on company level’; clauses in a collective agreement that allow 
employers to negotiate and agree with the works council on different, also less favourable, terms 
locally.
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negotiations  happen  above  the  shopfloor  level.  Peaceful,  partnership-like  industrial 
relations at shopfloor level are therefore possible without unions loosing their ‘industrial 
muscle’. Despite the fact that recent EC legislation might introduce elements of a ‘dual 
system’ to the UK, such a division has not fully developed here yet and a partnership 
approach, adopted by unions, might contain some dangers and thus appears problematic. 
However,  British  unions  need  to  find  a  way  for  meaningful  industrial  relations  on 
company level, due to European legislation and also because managers are increasingly 
promoting company-based models to regulate conditions of employment. It  has been 
suggested above that introduction of statutory representation bodies would be desirable; 
this, however, will pose a threat to unions position724. 
Finally, unions will need to integrate the unemployed. It seems that German unions are 
better equipped to deal with this, since they are, as industrial unions, more used and 
better equipped to deal with diverse interests among their members. 
It appears that the German model is better adapted to deal with possible solutions to 
problems on a national scale. The British model could benefit from the introduction of 
more and stronger legal rights in order to overcome the problems presented by loss of 
membership, an adverse political climate and a change in the structure of the workforce. 
However, also the German works council could benefit from stronger rights that would 
enable it to act instead of merely react. 
On a European scale, coordinated wage bargaining is a concept that can be filled by 
national  unions.  In  order  to  work,  a  certain  degree  of  centralisation  is  necessary. 
Coordinated wage bargaining works on the assumption that unions in a certain sector 
bargain for similar terms and conditions across Europe. While this is feasible with small 
724 Peter Leisink, Jim Van Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx, Introduction, in: Peter Leisink, Jim Van 
Leemput, Jacques Vilrokx (Eds.), The Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe, Cheltenham 1996, p. 
1ff. (p. 8).
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and specialised unions, it is much easier to organise with only a handful of industrial 
unions  involved.  Also,  coordinated  bargaining  benefits  from  legally  binding 
agreements. If agreements are not binding, they may be abrogated at any time and the 
effect  of  taking  wages  out  of  competition  will  not  be  achieved.  Coordinated  wage 
bargaining therefore seems to function better with a German style system of industrial 
relations. 
While the other ways to take influence on European and global level mostly require 
European or global actors, it seems clear that also those benefit from legal rights and a 
certain  degree  of  bindingness  for  agreements  and  contracts  they  might  conclude. 
Especially International Framework Agreements need some sort of bindingness in order 
to be able to effectively provide a framework. 
It  seems  therefore  that  a  future  trade  union  movement  should  be  modelled  on  the 
German system rather  than  the  British.  However,  it  should  be  equipped  with  even 
stronger legal rights in order to be on a par with capital and I will present suggestions 
for desirable rights below. 
Statutory rights are desirable on a European level, too. It has been mentioned before that 
a European minimum wage would help to take wages out of competition at least on a 
European scale. While Art 137(6) of the European Treaty prohibits the Commission 
from  legislating  on  pay,  Blanpain  argued  that  such  a  minimum  wage  could  be 
introduced via Art 95.  He holds that
“the  introduction of  a  single  currency will  create  a  strong incentive among the 
member states to start ‘competing’ in the area of minimum wages. It is beyond 
doubt that any such form of competition, driving wages down, will have a direct 
impact on the functioning of the Common Market. The establishment of a European 
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minimum wage by way of a directive with Art 95 TEC as its legal basis would thus 
be perfectly acceptable from a legal perspective.”725
Also coordinated bargaining could benefit from a minimum wage as it would prevent 
national agreements from falling below certain standards.
It has been detailed above that, while European action by trade unions is necessary, it is 
difficult for various reasons, one of these being that meaningful international campaigns 
need some industrial muscle. At the moment, capital enjoys quite extensive freedoms 
regarding the free movement of capital, goods and services726. These are not paralleled 
by respective rights on labour's side; especially, there is as yet no right for national 
unions to conduct international solidarity action on which campaigns like those carried 
out by the ITF rely. The frequently quoted statement that the EC should not facilitate a 
race to the bottom and that wages should be kept out of competition seems inconsistent 
against this background. Lord Wedderburn argued in 1972 that
“the international function of the trade union movement as a countervailing power 
to management in the multi-national enterprise demands recognition by  national 
systems of labour law of a right to take collective action in support of industrial 
action in other countries against companies which are, in an economic sense, part of 
the same unit of internationalised capital.”727  
However, solidarity strikes are, apart from narrow exceptions, illegal in the UK and 
Germany728.  Additionally,  also  workers  participating  in  a  primary  dispute  are  not 
protected  from  dismissal  in  the  UK,  since  strike  action  will  constitute  breach  of 
contract; while in Germany legal strikes will only suspend the employment contracts. In 
725  Roger Blanpain, European Labour Law, London 2002, note 197.
726 Bob Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade, Oxford 2005, p. 186.
727 Bob Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade, Oxford 2005, p. 186.
728  Günter Schaub (Koch), Arbeitsrechtshandbuch – Systematische Darstellung und Nachschlagewerk für 
die Praxis, München 2005, § 193, Rn. 10 (p. 1868).
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this regard it is important to note that the UK is the only EU country to be regularly 
reproved by the ILO for its industrial relations legislation729. 
On  international  level,  the  right  to  strike  is  recognised  by  the  ILO as  well  as  the 
European Social Charta. While it is not set out explicitly in any ILO convention, two 
resolutions from 1957 and 1970 stress its recognition in member states. The first one 
stipulated the adoption of “laws ...ensuring the effective and unrestricted exercise of 
trade union rights, including the right to strike, by the workers”, while the latter 
“invited the Governing Body to instruct the Director-General to take action in a 
number  of  ways  'with  a  view to  considering  further  action  to  endure  full  and 
universal  respect  for  trade  union  rights  in  their  broadest  sense',  with  particular 
attention to be paid, inter alia, to the 'right to strike'”730. 
Another recommendation from 1951 states explicitly that none of is regulations shall 
interfere  with  the  right  to  strike731.  Additionally,  the  “Declaration  on  Fundamental 
Principles  and  Rights  at  Work”  requires  member  states  to  guarantee  “freedom  of 
association and the effective use of collective bargaining” and it can be argued that 
“effective use of collective bargaining” is only possible if accompanied by a right to 
take industrial action. 
For a European trade union movement on equal footing with European capital the right 
to  solidarity  action  is  essential,  as  has  been  held  by  the  Declaration  of  the  ILO 
Committee of Experts, enacted with regard to the 1988 Employment Act in the UK. It 
729 Roger Welch, Judges and the law in British Industrial Relations: Towards a European Right to Strike, in: 
Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 4 (1995), p. 175ff. (p. 192f.).
730 Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero, Horacio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike, Geneva 
1998, p. 7.
731 ILO R92 Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation 1951, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=93&chapter=2&query=right+to+strike&highli
ght=on&querytype=bool&context=0, last accessed January 9th, 2007. 
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stated that 
“it appears to the Committee that where a boycott relates directly to the social and 
economic interests of the workers involved in either or both of the original dispute 
and the secondary action, and where the original dispute and the secondary action 
are not unlawful in themselves, then that boycott should be regarded as a legitimate 
exercise of the right to strike”732.
In 1996, the Commission considered “that workers should be able to call  sympathy 
strikes provided that the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful”.733 The right to 
strike and especially the right to sympathy strikes and secondary action thus effectively 
are recognised at international level by the ILO. 
While on European level the EU Social Chapter recognises the right to strike, Art 137 
(6) of the European Treaty detains the EU from legislating on pay, rights of association 
and the right to strike so that these areas are entirely left to the national states734.
Different ways for European labour to secure an influence and their weaknesses have 
been detailed in Chapter IV. Not only would most of these ideas benefit from a right to 
strike including a right to solidarity action, such a right could also help the ETUC. 
Having the possibility to organise campaigns across the EC could endow it with means 
732 ILO CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 United Kingdom (ratification: 1949) Published 1989, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=233&chapter=6&query=secondary+action&hi
ghlight=on&querytype=bool&context=0#4, last accessed January 9th, 2007
733 ILO CEACR: Individual Direct Request concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 Congo (ratification 1960) Submitted: 1996, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=6961&chapter=9&query=+sympathy+strike&
highlight=on&querytype=bool&context=0, last accessed January 9th, 2006.
734 Roger Blanpain, European Labour Law, London 2002, note 190f.; Roger Welch, Judges and the law in 
British Industrial Relations: Towards a European Right to Strike, in: Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 4 
(1995), p. 175ff. (p. 193).
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to be better noted on a national level; this could also foster a specific ETUC-identity 
that  in  turn  could  heighten  awareness  of  European  labour  issues.  Additionally, 
meaningful European bargaining could develop.
Exploiting the Social Dialogue to secure an amendment to the European Treaty that 
would delete Art 137(6) so as to allow the Commission to legislate for a Directive 
concerning the right to strike and, especially, the right to solidarity action is therefore 
strongly desirable.  However,  while  it  is  desirable that  such a right  is  laid down on 
European level, the different industrial relations traditions in the member states have to 
be kept in mind. Therefore, a European right needs to be flexible. Since all EU member 
states are members of the ILO and should therefore adhere to its principles, the adoption 
of  similar  rights  modelled  on  the  ILO  recommendations  and  declarations  by  EU 
Directive seems feasible.
The example of the campaign against Flags of Convenience by the ITF has shown that 
sympathy action cannot be restricted to the EU, rather, the right needs to be global. Also 
the  International  Framework  Agreements  detailed  in  Chapter  IV might  be  easier  to 
implement with the possibility to take solidarity action. It is therefore important that, if a 
right to solidarity action is introduced by the EU, it is not restricted to conflicts within 
the European Community. 
237
